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ABSTRACT
Loebs, Patrick Samuel. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May/2013. An
Appeal to the World: The Controversial Rhetoric of Samuel Adams. Major Professor: Dr.
Sandra Sarkela
Samuel Adams is a well-known member of the American revolutionary era. A
politician by trade, his writings are credited by some as sparking a flame which led to
independence. Communicating primarily through his writings in official Massachusetts
documents and articles in the Boston area newspapers, Adams was a significant figure of
the time. Yet history has routinely characterized his persuasive techniques with varying
degrees of honor or disgust. Shortly after the revolution, he was thought of in glowing
terms, yet by the late 1800s, the name of Samuel Adams was associated with malicious
demagoguery and propaganda. Interestingly, however, these characterizations have been
put forth without a thoroughly rhetoric-based analysis.
In this dissertation, I explore the writings of Samuel Adams' looking for the
“themes” of his rhetoric in order to determine the motives which drove his writings, as
well as the common rhetorical traits by which one can understand his work. Doing so
provides a glimpse at a relatively unexplored facet of an important figure.
My research focuses on three events which occurred in pre-revolutionary Boston:
The 1768 Circular Letter; moving the Massachusetts Court in 1770; and furor
surrounding the Whately letters. Through an examination of the conversations between
Adams and British leaders Lord Hillsborough and Thomas Hutchinson, I examine the
way Adams framed debate and controlled the argument. I argue that Adams' writings
must be understood through the lens of his deeply-held convictions and that his
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unwillingness to bend on certain issues ultimately resulted in helping to define the
American people in such a way that independence came to be thought of as not only
acceptable, but necessary. Consequently, I argue, his effectiveness can be understood
through an analysis of rhetorical controversy. That is, his stalwart understanding of the
American people and of the British Constitution was ultimately inconsistent with British
understandings of the same and resulted in confusion as to the relationship between
Britain and her colonies. After years of restraint, Samuel Adams and others ultimately
determined that Independence was ultimately the only viable solution to the conflict of
interests, terms, and definitions that plagued British/colonial arguments.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Immediately following Britain's 1763 victory over France in the Seven Years War,
Britain and her colonies were experiencing a feeling of general good will. They were
members and heirs of the most powerful nation on earth, encumbered by none. News of
victory was brought to Boston on September 23, 1763, and prompted Governor Bernard
to deliver a speech to the Massachusetts assembly. In response, the House acknowledged
that “to their relation to Great Britain, they owe their present freedom”(qtd. in T.
Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts 83). Quipped Mr. James Otis, “We, in America
have certainly abundant reasons to rejoice. The heathen are not only driven out, but the
Canadians, much more formidable enemies, are conquered, and become fellow subjects”
(qtd. in T. Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts 9). Truly, colonists were ecstatic. The
settlement with France left England with almost complete control of not only North
America, but as Max Savelle noted, “Africa, and India” as well. “England was now the
greatest colonial power in the world, rivaled only by a decadent Spain” (436).
Only thirteen years into the future, a very different set of events was taking place.
The same colonies which were previously indebted in gratitude to the motherland were
casting off all forms of allegiance and declaring themselves independent. Clearly, there
had been a drastic shift in the thinking of those living in the North American colonies and
how they viewed themselves in relation to Great Britain. It is the time period between
these events which most interests me. In an effort to understand the process by which
such a dramatic turn of allegiance occurred, I turn to a rhetorically-based study of an
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individual who figures prominently into this era of splintering ties with England: Samuel
Adams.
Research Questions
This dissertation seeks to answer two basic questions. First, what constitutes
Samuel Adams' rhetoric? As will be discussed below, though a prolific writer, the
consensus of those who study Adams is that he had no identifiable rhetorical
consistencies. Yet at the same, his writings are thought to have been an important
motivator in goading the colonists toward independence, thus earning him such title as
“Father of the American Revolution” (Puls). Thus this dissertation seeks to identify the
previously overlooked rhetorical aspects of Adams' writings and understand this apparent
contradiction.
The second question of this dissertation asks how Adams' particular rhetorical
style contributed to his effectiveness in the early days of the American Revolution. This
question is addressed by examining the conversation between Adams and some of his
opposition to understand how his rhetorical style affected larger conversations about
colonial identity and the British/colonial relationship.
Why Samuel Adams?
The figure of Samuel Adams occupies a curious place in the folklore and
mythology of American history. Though I have not come across any official studies
which document this claim, I do not think it a stretch to say that the majority of those
who have participated in an American history class of any kind are familiar with him, at
least in name. Yet at the same time, when I am asked by friends or family about my
dissertation research or what I study at the university and I respond, “Samuel Adams,” by
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far the most common follow-up question is if he has any relation to the popular beer
brewed by the Boston Brewing Company.
To be sure, Samuel Adams is an important figure. Any student of American
history will recognize his contributions to the eventual rebellion and most, if not all,
history texts acknowledge his efforts in shaping and driving the rebellion in the Northern
colonies, especially Massachusetts. The remarkable aspect of Samuel Adams, however,
is that his perceived importance, or the manner by which he is thought to have affected
the revolution, has wavered dramatically over the course of American history. He was
considered by many of the early American leaders as among the foremost of the founders.
Yet in the current popular vein of history, Adams occupies the space of a second-tier
revolutionary, in a category below John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, George Washington
and James Madison who are more commonly associated with the revolution and the
national founding documents.
Certainly, Samuel Adams is not the only one to have fallen from a prominent
place in history. Indeed, history is filled with these largely forgotten figures, known to
some only by name, but all of them instrumental in some small (or large) way to the
cause. People like Mercy Otis Warren, Gouvernour Morris, James Otis, John Dickinson
and others all played important roles in the making of the American experiment, but are
simply not as well known as the more popular founders. Yet as said above, Samuel
Adams' fall is noteworthy because it is so precipitous. In addition, definitions of his
character are filled with conflicting interpretations of his actions and writings. To some,
Adams is regarded as the “Father of the Revolution,” the driving force behind what
eventually became the United States of America (Puls). In this line of thinking, there is a
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famous anecdote that upon John Adams' arrival in France, he was greeted with
disappointment for not being “le fameux Adams” (Maier 3). To other historians,
however, Samuel Adams represents the absolute worst of divisive politics. To these, he is
thought of as something akin to a conniving demagogue, eager to manipulate truth by any
manner in order to facilitate increased hostility toward British colonial leadership (J. C.
Miller).
The truth, I believe, lies in between these interpretations, a construction of two
particular sides of a man devoted to his cause, but it is not the explicit goal of this
dissertation to reform any thinking about Samuel Adams' character. For those who wish
to undertake such a task, the various conceptions of the man are available for anyone who
wishes to embark on the process of discovery. What I do hope to accomplish is
something that I feel is lacking in the defining characteristics of his personality,
something that has not been attempted by any historian or rhetorically-trained scholar.
What I hope to do is determine, classify and critique the manner and style of Samuel
Adams' rhetoric and identify the source of its effectiveness. This aspect has been largely
overlooked, or, as will be demonstrated below, dismissed as irrelevant to his seemingly
greater abilities at organizing and inciting mobs. It is my greater hope that a study of this
kind will also assist in further historiographical research of the man.
The lack of research on the rhetorical aspect of Adams' character is especially
egregious since he was among the most prolific writers of the pre-revolutionary period,
writing hundreds of letters, articles, and official colonial documents over the course of
several decades. In addition, due to his relative importance, many (though not all) of his
works have been saved for posterity. There are volumes of collected papers and writings
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freely available on the internet. Archives of the newspapers in which he published his
works are also available.
To fully gain insight into this man, we must begin with what can be known. At
the least, we know this: Samuel Adams was a significant character in the American prerevolution, particularly in Boston. We know that he was eventually a staunch advocate
for independence from Britain (though the date of that decision remains in question and is
discussed further below). We know that through letters in the newspapers and as a formal
representative of Boston, Adams wrote and published extensively on British abuses of
power and on colonial rights. We know that through the press and through his
involvement in local Boston politics, Adams had great influence among the working
class. And finally, we know that after the Declaration of Independence was signed,
Adams' influence steadily lessened until the revolution passed him by and he was left just
another signature on the bottom of the page. Though his waning influence is not the
primary purpose of this dissertation, it exists as a sort of secondary goal. Frankly, I
believe that Adams' importance should be re-acknowledged. I hope this research
demonstrates his significance.
Preliminary Considerations: Adams on Independence
The question of Adams' motivation presents a potential problem for a rhetorical
analysis, for approaching a text with a predetermined motive does not allow the text to
speak for itself. Therefore, in a case like that of Adams, it is imperative to try to
understand what, if anything, Adams sought. Through a close reading of his works I have
come to believe that Adams' primary motivation was the establishment of what he called
the “pillars of the Constitution.” I came to this recognition only after a thorough study of
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a large collection of his works. In essence, Adams' words speak for themselves and
provide his intention. Yet before venturing out and basing a dissertation on this particular
claim, it behooves me to address and perhaps dispel one persistently lingering belief
about Adams.
Simply stated, it has been said that Samuel Adams was among the first to actively
pursue separation from Great Britain. This idea stems primarily from anecdotal evidence
which seems to suggest that Adams believed that independence was the only way to
arrive at what he thought was the natural state of liberty.
There are a couple explanations for this lingering belief. The first is that Adams
does in fact advocate for a kind of independence, but not independence of the colonies.
In fact, Adams believed in the independence of the legislatures in the colonies and held
that only through a certain degree of self-sovereignty would the rights of the people be
truly protected. Consequently, it seems entirely possible that some of his passion for this
topic was extended through various means to apply to colonial independence as well. If
this is the case, there is opportunity for much research as to how this occurred and why
some may have desired to link colonial independence with Adams. But it is irrelevant to
this dissertation and I will therefore not address it any further than to say that it seems an
indeterminate theory.
The second explanation is that Adams was in fact a closeted advocate of colonial
independence and shrewdly advanced his beliefs only in private so as not to harm the
cause with what at the time would have been a scandalous proposal. This notion has been
widely accepted. Indeed, Samuel Adams' grandson William Vincent Wells, remarked in
what could be called the first biography of Samuel Adams published in 1865 that, “It has
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been observed by contemporary writers, and the assertion is generally admitted, that
Samuel Adams was the first man in American who openly advocated the independence of
the Colonies” (144). Wells cited Thomas Hutchinson as evidence, who wrote in his
History of Massachusetts Bay that as early as 1765 “independency” was Adams'
“professed principles, which he owned, without reserve, in private discourse” and that
“from time to time he made advances towards [independence] in public, as far as would
serve to the great purpose of attaining to it” (History of Massachusetts 134). Historian
John K. Alexander generally agreed when he noted that Adams' contemporaries, “Whigs
and Tories alike – emphasized that he was the first popular leader to conclude that
American must be independent” (65). Furthermore, Mark Puls argued that by the time
the first shots were fired at Lexington, “Samuel Adams had already spent a decade
working to convince colonists... that independence could only be secured with a break
from England,” (13) and Ira Stoll explained Adams' impatience over the delay in
independence when Adams wrote “If it had been done nine months ago we might have
been justified in the sight of God...” (qtd. in Stoll 182). Therefore there exists a belief
that Adams was pursuant of independence as a primary goal early in the dispute and that
he advocated for this end for many years prior to its fruition.
Yet, there is more to the story than this simple explanation. We must recognize
that openly advocating for independence in the 1760s was a path down which few would
venture. Wells explained the colonial attitude best when he wrote that in this era Samuel
Adams is traditionally thought to have first advocated for independence,
[t]he general feeling throughout America... was one of deep loyalty to the King
and Parliament. England was known, even among those who had never left the
Provinces by the affectionate name of “home.” Massachusetts had freely
exhausted her treasury and spilt her blood in fighting the battles of Great Britain
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in America for the conquest of territory, which, while it resulted in no benefit to
the Province, enlarged the British dominion. The idea of separation, if it was ever
entertained, was regarded as one of the greatest evils which could befall the
country. Its trade would be ruined, its credit destroyed, and the people left a prey
to the power of France. Vague terrors attached to the thought, and the wealth and
intelligence of the country were opposed to it. (145)
Therefore, advocating for independence would have been disastrous for Adams. And, if
the dangers associated with that belief, including potential for financial and reputational
ruin, are not enough to demonstrate the unlikelihood that Adams openly desired
independence, it is important to recognize that if Adams was in fact pursuant of an
independent America, he hid his beliefs masterfully, for none of his writings support that
claim. In fact, in the early years (1760s), Adams wrote quite explicitly against
independence as in his letter to Massachusetts agent Dennys De Berdt when he bemoaned
the very suggestion that “the Colonists are struggling for Independence....” “Nothing,”
he said, “can be more injurious” as colonists “have always prided themselves in being
British Subjects...and will ever remain firmly attached to the Mother Country” (Adams
70–71).
This is one example, but in most of his writings he is explicitly clear that
reconciliation was preferable to independence, but with a caveat. Reconciliation was
desirable on the condition that such reconciliation resulted in a turn back to the principles
of liberty that were supposedly guaranteed by their status as British subjects. This
qualification is important for it reveals a great deal about Adams' underlying belief
system. Simply, whenever independence is even mentioned, it comes in the form of a
reaction to some British policy. Much more will be said about this in chapter two, but for
now recognize that Adams considered independence not a threat, but a warning to Britain
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about the consequences of their actions. William Wells admitted as much in his
biography when he noted that Adams did not think of independence in terms of a desired
outcome, but rather as an unavoidable outcome based on the “hopelessness of peaceful
efforts of redress” (144). Consequently, Wells said that Adams simply believed “forceful
resistance would inevitably ensue” (144) but independence was never desired without
cause. In short, any existent belief in independence that Adams might have had in the
1760s was not for independence's sake. Concurrently, there is no explicit advocacy of
independence in any of Adams' writing prior to about 1774, and, though his eventual
outspokenness still puts him as among the first to actively advocate independence, it
distances him from the claims made long ago by Hutchinson and more recently by Puls
and other historians. In short, any thoughts of independence that Adams may have
harbored were only thought of as a way to return the colonists to a right status of liberty
that had been taken from them by corrupt and divisive leaders. Furthermore, only after
repeated attempts at appealing to the favor of the king, ministers and governors failed
was independence eventually granted status as a valid option in Adams' mind. But to
claim that Adams was wholly and previously devoted to this one end negates all of his
writings that suggest otherwise. Such a claim is based on speculation and guesses
stemming from third-party information drawn from the works of writers of 250 years ago,
all whom undoubtedly had their own motivations.
So, I argue that it is not accurate to assert that Adams was single-mindedly set on
independence at all costs. Furthermore, such an assertion is counter-productive and
problematic to a study of this kind. For if one approaches Adams' works with this
premise as a foundation, one finds (as I originally did) the pronounced tendency to read
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much more into his writings than may actually be intended. Insisting that pursuit of
independence was an underlying cause from the very beginning makes everything Adams
wrote suspect of being intended to promote colonial outrage. For some historians
(discussed below), this has been the predominant assumption. From this corner of
thought comes the criticism of Adams as a manipulative demagogue, capable only of
stirring the masses. John C. Miller's Sam Adams: Pioneer in Propaganda is a prime
example of this manner of thinking. For example, Miller suggested that “Sam Adams
deliberately set out to provoke crises that would lead to the separation of mother country
and colonies” (276). Consequently, Miller considers all of Adams' actions as emanating
from this agenda.
There is another branch of historians (also discussed below), however, who seem
to have made it their goal to reexamine Samuel Adams to determine if his agenda was
really as focused and his method as malicious as has been thought. I consider myself to
fall into the latter of these two camps, though again, rebuilding Adams' reputation is not a
foremost intent.
Motivations
I am often asked why I chose a topic of study that seemingly has little relevance to
the contemporary world. My reasons are four-fold and range from the specific to the
philosophical. I explain them here.
What made Adams effective?
The primary motivation for this research project is based on what I suspect to be
conclusive with the forthcoming research, namely that Adams' historical notoriety can be
further understood through an analysis of his rhetorical ability. I also believe that his fall
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from popularity is a result of the very same issue. We find in the scholarship that though
Adams' leadership among the first wave of the revolutionists is well-established, there is
a great degree of disagreement as to what made him so influential. Given his importance,
what was it about Adams that made him such a nuisance to the British leadership? To
wit, how were Adams' writings interpreted by British leaders and American colonists that
led to ultimate separation? Furthermore, his years of influence encompassed a variety of
changing colonial circumstances. Seeing how Adams negotiated these changes makes the
historical factors of his rhetoric nuanced and interesting. As will be discussed in
subsequent chapters, I have decided to look at three particular events, each containing its
own unique rhetorical needs: the first being the controversy caused by the 1768 Circular
Letter; the second being the arguments over moving the location of the Massachusetts
Assembly in the early 1770s and the third being the debate over the Whately letters.
These events allowed Adams to explain the concepts of colonial abuse with clear
evidence. And, as I argue later in this dissertation, Adams wove these events into his
writings and in doing so articulated a concise, firm worldview that was able to manage a
variety of changing situations which found British policy misguided and the colonists as
(mostly) innocent victims. Finally, it is my assertion that a search for the common
elements of Adams' rhetorical style will be instrumental to answering these questions.
The question of reputation
The second of my primary motivations might be described as simple curiosity, for
the nature of Adams' reputation itself is of great interest to me. In short, why are there
varying interpretations at all? What is it about Adams that tends to create such different
views on his actions? Why has history forgotten this man and his accomplishments and
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contributions in the formation of the American revolution? In this way, Samuel Adams
offers a kind of case study for the formation and evolution of popular history. The
varying interpretations themselves make a research study on Samuel Adams an
undertaking of merit. These interpretations also lend themselves to a series of other
motivations which drive my research.
Argumentation
As a more general motivation, the nature of augmentation has become an
increasingly important subject of both my personal research and teaching philosophies. I
believe argument is essential to societal improvement, especially as it exists in a
democratic society. As I strive to understand the intricacies of argument, I have come to
believe that the lack of engagement is one of the greatest hindrances to productive
deliberation. Hence, the motivation for this study arises from what I see as a common
problem in today's political dialogue. Often, when arguing civic policy, opposing sides
shy away from civility in favor of hyperbolic claims which do nothing to promote an
honest discussion. They find it easier to demonize, write off, or discredit their opponents
rather than participate in engaging dialogue. Consequently, engagement becomes scarce
and deflection or baseless accusations become the standard methods of dealing with
opposition. The consequences are not only tiring to the political observer, but hinder the
honest resolution of political problems. Though it remains to be seen if this was the
tendency in Adams' works, or if causing such frustration was intentional, what does seem
clear is that there is a definite divide between the two factions of the movement which
ultimately led to the irreconcilable differences necessary to justify war.
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Throughout this dissertation, readers might notice my use of “irreconcilable
differences” as a sort of “event horizon” of argument. Based on little more than my
observation of political affairs, it is my belief that reaching this point whether internally
(in one's own mind), or actually, is the where problems truly begin. For when a party is
convinced that the other side is “too far gone,” “insane,” “illogical,” “uncivilized,” or any
of the other synonyms for “impossible to reason with,” this is the moment when actions
otherwise considered unthinkable (including violence, torture, etc.) are not only justified
but they become necessary. In other words, (channeling Aristotle) when artistic proofs
fail, inartistic proofs are legitimized. It behooves scholars in general to understand the
nature of the arguments and the causes which lead humanity to the point where in the
name of “irreconcilable differences,” atrocities are thought of as the only available
manner of recourse.
Yet, perhaps the burden falls to scholars of rhetoric to lead the charge of this
study, for it falls within our realm of expertise. For us, the movement away from
engaging conversation should create consternation; for rhetoric exists and holds greatest
promise within the realm of engaging dialogue. When true dialogue vanishes and
individuals lose the ability to understand opposing ideas and reconcile them with their
own, public debate suffers. This, Bryan Garsten noted, results in people content to reside
in “groups of like-minded individuals, talking to one another,” (4) considering all others
as outsiders. These closed-off spaces stifle the deliberation which would otherwise
contribute to a vigorous body politic and result in an ineffectual version of democracy.
Rhetorical teaching uses lessons such as dissoi logoi (arguing both sides of an issue) to
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explore possible solutions to problems and arrive at the best course of action. Without
these teachings, true deliberation, and in turn true democracy, grinds to a halt.
If closed-off debate is the effect, controversy can be thought one of the many
causes. Controversy is the topic of this dissertation. Samuel Adams' writings provide an
interesting case study into the way these early-American arguments functioned.
Application to contemporary discourse
Lastly, it is my broader hope that an examination of these arguments might shed
light on how the United States arrived at the political state currently occupying most, if
not all, of the punditry and news media. In turn, I suggest how this nation might rescue
itself from the trap of vain self-assuredness and begin to enter an era of measured
discourse. Disagreements will abound, as they should in a free society, but a move away
from the national mentality where the victory goes to whoever yells loudest and
demonizes best to a place where reason triumphs would be a monumental achievement.
Such a movement would be a difficult task, but I believe there is hope. I believe that a
study of Adams' techniques can illuminate such manner of disagreement by
demonstrating how the arguments of opposing factions interact to either promote
integration, or in the case of the American revolution, lead to further separation resulting
in irreconcilable differences. Thus, a final motivation for this study is to understand the
nature of argument and how it can locate, or else disregard engagement with opposition.
I believe such a study can only benefit the current overtly dichotomous state of political
affairs. To that end, I submit my study: An Appeal to the World: The Controversial
Rhetoric of Samuel Adams.

14

Explanation of Topic/Purpose
As explained above, the main purposes of this dissertation are to understand
Adams' rhetorical style and then use this understanding to explain his effect on the
movement. Chapters two, four, five and six constitute the bulk of the research and work
together to accomplish these ends.
Adams sought to direct the conversation both in the local newspapers and in his
capacity as clerk of the Massachusetts House of Representatives. The result was one of
great frustration for Adams and the Massachusetts House of Representatives who found
themselves in an unwilling and unproductive conversation with a stubbornly determined
authority.
Each of the events discussed in this dissertation presents a different opportunity to
explore how opposing forces interacted with each other. My intent is to focus on the
rhetorical challenges present in each of them, explain their contextual implications and
how they differed from each other, and demonstrate how Samuel Adams negotiated the
conversation and how controversy effected productive dialogue. Throughout, Adams
negotiated the rhetorical obstacles and sought to explain opposition to British policies and
British arguments while helping the colonists define, understand, and justify their
outrage. Doing so not only helps to understand the character of Adams, but also reveals
the nuanced nature of the conflict between opposing sides. In the process, I will provide
evidence of Samuel Adams' interaction with British argument and speculate on the
purposes and effectiveness of this technique.
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Contribution to Scholarship
As will be demonstrated below, this undertaking is also important because it
explores a rhetorical aspect of Adams that is largely neglected in the existing scholarship.
Adams is widely known, but failure to examine his rhetorical tendencies means we fail to
see the whole picture of who Adams really was: how he thought, reasoned and acted.
One purpose of this project is to understand the perceived effectiveness of Adams'
writing. For though his motives have been the subject of scrutiny, curiously, in a point
that will be made clear in the literature review, Adams' method of argument and his
persuasive strategies have been largely ignored. The effects of his messages and his
involvement in colonial affairs are fairly well substantiated, yet a detailed analysis of the
structure of his arguments or his rhetoric is largely missing. This speaks to the first of my
research questions: what is Samuel Adams' rhetorical style?
In his capacity as a prominent writer of the times Adams was a rhetorical figure
forced to measure his words carefully. And certainly there is much rhetoric to be
considered in his construction of the narrative between colonial and British thought.
Obviously Adams had to keep a close watch on his depictions of British atrocities. Too
much hyperbole and Adams could have lost the respect and attention of his readers. Yet
too little and Adams would have been just another author submitting his thoughts to the
people. As we shall see, Adams' motivations were much greater than just sharing his
opinion. He was therefore bound by a degree of propriety and limited by the evidence
available to him as sources of argument.
As also mentioned above, the second of my research questions speaks to the
effectiveness of Adams' rhetoric: why was his writing as effective as it was? Was it a
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consequence of rhetorical manipulation or was there another factor to consider? There is
every evidence that what Adams said resonated with his audience and struck at the heart
of what they needed, or perhaps wanted, to hear. In essence, there seems to have been
something powerful embedded in his rhetorical choices that gave validity to his points.
Where this validity comes from and whether this was an intentional action is in question
and will be addressed below. What is not clear, however, is how Adams' words and the
ideology expressed through his language rhetorically created and contributed to
decreasing affection for Britain.
In chapter two of this dissertation, I suggest that there are indeed commonplace
themes to Adams' rhetoric and that they remain unchanged throughout the years of his
relevance.
As a result of these themes, I demonstrate that the effectiveness of Adams' rhetoric
was not the result of an intentional desire to cause division but was instead the result of a
fundamental difference of opinion which, when seen through the lens of “controversy,”
caused irreconcilable differences between British and colonial thought and agendas. I
suggest that Adams' stalwart adherence to his principles created a substantial rift in the
genteel expectations of the era. Using three events as backdrops, chapters four through
six of this dissertation explain how the themes of Adams' rhetoric affected colonial
thought about the relationship between Great Britain and the colonies and identify the
source of controversy which resulted from the themes of Adams' rhetoric.
As mentioned above, though his contributions to the American cause are generally
accepted, there have been few, if any, attempts at making a documented correlation
between these contributions and the effectiveness of Adams' written rhetoric. This
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absence has opportunity to greatly shape the way we understand Samuel Adams as an
important figure in the American revolution as well as our understanding of effective
rhetoric in that era. In short, this absence demands attention not adequately granted since
Adams' death in 1803. This dissertation fills a gap in scholarship by demonstrating the
composite picture of Adams as a rhetor and then offering a criticism of his rhetoric.
Problems
One dilemma in embarking on this particular project is that Samuel Adams was
among the most voluminous writers of the revolution, penning hundreds of articles and
letters in his years of significance. Consequently, selecting just a handful of
representative texts for analysis is problematic. Fortunately, history has made the
selection easier by providing a some neatly packaged events which demonstrate the backand-forth nature of revolutionary-era argument. In this way we can easily follow the
conversation as it began, and took different paths, eventually leading to widely varying
stances.
Solutions
In Michael Leff's essay, Things Made by Words, he recognizes that texts tend to
arise from “scenes of controversy,” (226) and later suggests this method as a solution to
the problem of positioning a single text within a larger contextual framework. Leff
suggests that this controversy can allow “representative anecdote[s]” (229) to function as
parts of the whole and can mitigate the problem of situating a handful of texts within the
much larger body of early-American discourse and understanding their effect. Thus, by
examining these events and the conversation surrounding them, we can draw broader
conclusions about the revolutionary era as a whole. This technique is advocated by
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Railsback as a “viable method of rhetorical analyses of social change” (419).
Consequently, my choice to focus on particular events allows me to significantly limit
necessary texts while still making broad claims about the nature of the situation and the
conversation between both sides.
The events I have chosen as these representative anecdotes and their particular
writings are detailed below. Adams wrote at length of the implied tyranny at work during
these times. The actual events only served to justify and “prove” that Adams' fears were
correct. Throughout this era, Adams crafted arguments which had the effect of keeping
the fire of rebellion alive. How his words resulted in that end is detailed in chapters four
through six. There I suggest that Adams' very consistent manner of thinking, with great
emphasis placed on the constitutionality of issues within the colony, was wholly
incompatible with the kind of defenses offered by the other side. In addition, the
governors, ministers and parliament were unable or unwilling to answer some of the most
important questions which led to a dismissal of colonial concerns and a furthering of
disagreement. Consequently, rhetorical controversy played a significant role in
diminishing the possibility of productive argument by regularly shifting the point of
contention and forcing the opposition to take stances which were difficult to defend. In
the process we will discover that Adams played a significant role in helping to craft the
arguments that ultimately led to establishing the colonial mindset and furthering the unity
necessary for revolution to occur. Below, I offer a technical definition of controversy as a
foundation for this analysis. But first, the texts that will be used in this analysis:
Chapter Four: The 1768 Circular Letter
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Samuel Adams

Opposition

The House of Representatives of
Massachusetts to the Speaker of Other
Houses of Representatives [The 1768
Circular Letter], February 11, 1768

-Circular Letter to the Governors of
America, April 21, 1768
-Letter from the Right Hon the Earl of
Hillsborough, dated Whitehall, April
22, 1768

The House of Representatives of
Massachusetts to Lord Hillsborough, June
30, 1768. (Printed in the Boston Gazette, July
18, 1768)
Resolutions of the Boston Town Meeting:
September 13, 1768

Resolves of Parliament, February 9,
1769

Chapter Five: Movement of the Massachusetts Court from Boston to Cambridge

Samuel Adams

Opposition

Instructions from the Town of Boston to their
Representatives. May 15, 1770.

His Honour's Answer, June 7, 1770.

In Council, 12th June, 1770. The address of
his Majesty's Council of the said province.

-Lieutenant-Governor's Answer, June
15, 1770.
-Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson's
Speech. July 25, 1770

The House of Representatives of
Massachusetts to the Lieutenant Governor,
August 3, 1770

The Lieutenant-Governor’s Answer to
the foregoing Reply to his Speech to
both Houses at the opening of the
Session, 1770

Articles signed:
-“A Chatterer”. Boston Gazette, August 13,
1770
-“A Chatterer”. Boston Gazette, August 20,
1770
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Chapter Six: The Whately Letters

Samuel Adams

Opposition
From the Governor to the House of
Representatives, June 3, 1773

From the House of Representatives to the
Governor, June 6, 1773

From the Governor to the House of
Representatives, June 9, 1773

Resolves of the Massachusetts House of
Representatives, June 16, 1773

Message from the Governor to the
Board, June 17, 1773
From the Governor to the House of
Representatives, June 21, 1773
His Excellency's Message to the House,
June 22, 1773

Message from the Board to the Governor,
June 2, 1773

His excellency's message to the Board,
June 23, 1773

From the House of Representatives to the
Governor, June 24, 1773

Methodology- A Study of Controversy
Controversy can be thought of in a variety of contexts. In the traditional sense it
represents a basic presence of disagreement between two factions. The dictionary
definition refers to the act of having a public dispute or debate. These are not, however,
the kind of controversy important to this study.
There are specific rhetorical definitions of controversy. Though admittedly vague
in the definitions, it is rhetorical controversy that constitutes the central focus of this
dissertation. From a rhetorical perspective, controversy represents not necessarily the
action of disagreement but an abstract location where rhetoric and disagreement can
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function. Similar to argument, controversy consists of a meeting place of competing
ideas where engagement, refutation, repudiation, or rebuttal can occur. Such a location is
considered by scholars such as Bryan Garsten as foundational and necessary for potential
persuasion. In essence, without controversy, there is no room for persuasion. In other
words, in order for persuasion to occur, there must be a disagreement that is willingly
entered. Garsten noted that “the politics of persuasion is a politics of disagreement and
controversy” (210) and further explained that the continued availability of persuasion,
though not appreciated by a defeated arguer, can once again become useful when “the
next disagreement arises” (210). It is this availability of persuasion that Garsten holds as
a necessary, though contentious and often undesirable, consequence of a productive
democracy. It is this realm of engagement that I wish to consider in my analysis of
Samuel Adams. His writings represent a meeting place of controversy, for they are rife
with references to the totalitarian nature of British laws and the treatment of the colonists.
In other words, they exist in a realm of disagreement and provide opportunity for meeting
with opposition ideas. Yet importantly, it is not the presence of certain references that
makes Adams' works prone to controversy, but rather the opportunity for controversy
created by his manner of argument.
Though vaguely defined, controversy, of the kind discussed in this dissertation,
can be perhaps best understood by examining the effects of its presence. Controversy
exists as a sort of ever-present force, native within argument itself. It is not a negative
force on its face, for as mentioned above, it, along with argument and disagreement in
general, is essential in any functional democratic system. But it lies latent within the
system, as a potential power of immense strength, waiting for the moment where it can
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effect the construction of argument. And when it acts, it is swift. Its effects are vast.
Again, though always present by nature of disagreement, certain events can occur
which tend to “trigger” controversy's increased influence and allow it to take over the
conversation. Controversy can become especially problematic, and can take over a
conversation, when one party is faced with difficult argumentative decisions and chooses
not to confront, but instead to deflect, impugn, or ridicule either the opposition argument
itself, or the character of the one making the opposition argument. Furthermore, when
substantial arguments are not addressed, but are left to simmer, the results can be an everdeepening disagreement which often varies wildly from original intent and enters new
realms of opposition. These changing argumentative realms erect barriers to resolution
through argumentative confusion and misdirection. Consequently, argumentative stasis is
destroyed and resolution become increasingly difficult. In this way, controversy is like a
virus which lies latent until triggered by some means, at which point it spreads and
replicates within the host argument, infecting other aspects until a “cure” is no longer
possible.
Due to the lack of a formalized theory relating to rhetorical controversy, the best
that a rhetorical scholar can offer is an examination into 1) the nature of controversy and
2) how these divisions are created and perpetuated. For this study, I employ the idea of
controversy to examine its hidden effect on the conversations and examine how its
existence plays a role in hindering debate and segmenting conversations into
incompatible stances. I argue that controversy can be thought responsible for much of the
strife that existed between the British leaders and the colonists, and that the words studied
here were only symptoms of the deeply held frustrations.

23

Lest it be read as such, a study of the kind promoted here is not meant to promote
demagoguery. On the contrary, conclusions born from this study are meant to be a
warning on the inevitable dangers of considering one's opposition in terms of irrationality
and refusing to engage in points of disagreement. Yet, as shall be seen, the dilemmas
created by controversy can provide tools for those in positions of power. These instances
will show up primarily in the works of Thomas Hutchinson and Lord Hillsborough.
To understand the technique under which Adams operated, we must recognize
argumentation as a mutually agreed upon process. By extension, unless both sides of an
issue are willing to approach the table with hopes of reconciliation, reconciliation cannot
occur. As we shall see, the works of Samuel Adams examined in this dissertation are a
neatly packaged case study in the manner by which conflict is typically resolved
(argument, debate, civic deliberation) not only did not occur, but as a result of
controversy, was made nearly impossible. In what follows, we shall see how Adams
method of argument helped create opportunity for controversy which was then exploited
by his opposition as an easy way out of precarious argumentative positions.
The events which embroiled the colony of Massachusetts Bay provided a unique
and opportune moment for controversy to rise. This, I argue, resulted in divided colonial
loyalties to the extent that reconciliation with the motherland was eventually virtually
impossible. Though I do not believe it was intentional, I argue that Adams assisted in the
process by navigating the fine line between open hostility against Britain and standing for
the rights of the people all while asserting the principles of British constitutional rights.
Again, I do not believe that Adams was using controversy to further some end. Instead, I
argue that in the conversation between Adams and the opposition, controversy was the
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result of Adams' writings, not the cause. For his principled stances positioned his
arguments in such a way as to make engagement uncomfortable and politically difficult.
Consequently, when seeking to respond to Adams' claims, his opposition chose to deflect,
dismiss, or otherwise ignore Adams' points. Controversy, then, crept in and rapidly
destroyed any opportunity for productive engagement by erecting more and more barriers
to engagement. Therefore controversy played a tremendous role in the eventual
breakdown of productive dialogue.
To begin to understand the workings of controversy, consider the basic situation
encountered by Samuel Adams in 18th-century colonial Boston. A much fuller
explanation of this context is found in chapter three, but for now suffice it to say that after
years of relative autonomy, Britain began clamping down trade in order to extract a
revenue from the colonies. Britain determined it was their right to do so, as they were
due allegiance by their colonial offspring. Samuel Adams, however, had a very different
notion of the relationship between England and the colonies. He thought of the colonists
as fully citizens of England and thus equally due the blessings of such belonging,
including the right to be taxed only with representation. Thus there existed a tremendous
degree of separation between the two factions of the American revolution. Adams'
contribution to the American revolution was exacerbating that already divisive issue and
loading it with ever more evidence such as troop presence, unelected politicians and
various other atrocities foisted on the colonists by the British government. As a result of
controversy, the stances taken by Britain and Adams were irreconcilable, resulting in a
great deal of frustration between patriot colonists and British leaders. Such a setting
represents a prime opportunity for controversy since each side was essentially looking to
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persuade the populace of its own rightness. As might be expected, diverging opinions
inevitably led to frustration on both sides. Events occurring during this time created a
disconnect which were found in the writings of political figures like Samuel Adams. This
disconnect, as will be explained, is the heart of rhetorical controversy. Thus, in sum, this
dissertation is an attempt to identify the rhetoric of Samuel Adams and observe its
application in specific events of the colonial era. As we shall see, once unwillingness or
inability to engage set in, controversy took over and it took little effort to perpetuate the
disagreement. Peaceful resolution was made increasingly difficult as controversy's
influence grew. Ultimately, as far as argument goes, there was no victor. Resolution in
the presence of rhetorical controversy came from one of two sources: suppression or
revolution. I argue that as the struggle wore on, colonists began to understand this
ultimatum.
As we shall see in the following dissertation, rhetorical controversy had a
significant effect on British/colonial relations. I will demonstrate how, according to
Adams, whatever the specific event happened to be, constitutional rights were shown to
be at stake. These principled stances proved particularly difficult to argue against and
provided the entry point for rhetorical controversy. I will argue that after observing and
reading opinions of differing sides in the newspapers, the public would have observed
that attempts at productive dialogue were proving fruitless. For the effects of rhetorical
controversy not only destroyed the hopes of reconciliation on one particular issue, but
would have undoubtedly had larger ramifications on the practicality of the system in its
entirety. Slowly, colonists began to realize that there was no hope of recompense as long
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as Parliament and the Governors of the colony were unwilling to admit any wrongdoing.
This project examines this unique historical situation.
Thesis
The thesis of this dissertation is that there is a consistent rhetorical style to Adams'
work and it played a major role in the non-productive dialogues. Yet, again, Adams'
words should not be thought of as representing or contributing to the controversy, but
rather only creating opportunity for controversy's existence. I posit that Adams' writings
allowed for controversy by providing a consistent source of colonial discontent based in
the value of constitutional rights that his opposition was unable to respond to in an
effective manner. The British responses to his assertions severely dichotomized the
political stances until engagement with the “other side” was virtually impossible. It is
these responses that provide evidence for controversy’s working. In the process, Adams
and his opposition sought to construct their arguments in a way that helped them attain
their goal, but doing so led to a severe breakdown of productive conversation. I argue
that it is primarily Adams' strict adherence to the immovable rights of the British
Constitution and his oppositions' failure to engage on these points which contributed to
controversy's role in the conversation and which resulted in rapidly shifting arguments.
How Adams was able to construct all his arguments in terms of what he calls the “pillars”
of constitutionalism and how he was able to draw principal lessons from single events
that modify the colonial relationship are what made his rhetoric so significant.
I posit that Adams' reputation as an opportunistic demagogue, willing to appeal to
the lowest common denominator is incorrect. Instead, I argue that he is remarkably
consistent and that his writings, whether they be in the newspapers or in an official
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capacity, are loaded with a deep respect for and pursuit of liberty for the people of the
colonies.
Furthermore, I argue that Adams' writings against British policy emboldened the
colonists, convincing them and teaching them that they were right in their opposition and
that their rightness was based on ageless truths of natural law and natural rights. Yet his
primary tool was only his written word. As shall be demonstrated, I believe that the
rhetorical force of Adams' words came from the opportunity for controversy caused by
his consistent stance.
Importantly, this study is unique. There is very little analysis that situates
conversational argument within controversial settings and closely examines the back and
forth as published in the newspapers. It is a new approach to scholarship of this era.
Sandra Sarkela has written briefly on this situational setting in her article on Mercy Otis
Warren's dramatic sketches, Freedom's Call, but a study of this kind about this era has not
taken dissertation form. Adding to this fact is that Samuel Adams is such an important
and understudied individual, that makes this dissertation a worthwhile undertaking.
Controversy in Rhetorical Scholarship
As noted in the work of scholars (Goodnight 2; Jasinski 116), “controversy” is not
a widely-used concept, especially when applied to a study of American history. Most of
the contemporary scholarship on rhetorical controversy is found in the works of scholars
like Thomas Goodnight and Kenneth Philips. These scholars provided the basis for an
understanding of rhetorical controversy.
Olson and Goodnight posited that within the realm of controversy, persuasion is
often not the goal. Rather, controversy's objective is to “block, unsettle, and reshape the
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commonplace in the interest of sustaining opposition” (249). In other words, controversy
can exist to sustain itself in order to create a lingering opposition which serves to
confront the dominant views. This, I suggest is one outcome of Adams' work and
technique. He has been recognized for his ability to effectively stir opposition to British
policy, but as will be demonstrated below, there has been little research as to what
rhetorical aspects contribute to this ability. Thus, the question of my research relates to
the rhetorical techniques Adams used to create and sustain a lingering opposition.
According to Olson and Goodnight, controversy tends to arise in the public sphere
or public space. This nondeterminate space, rife with political opportunity, “provides an
arena for spokespersons, parties, and institutions to advocate and contest matters of
shared concern using the available means of persuasion” (250). In other words, Olson
and Goodnight saw the public sphere as a theoretical place wherein reside a finite range
of acceptable uses of language, ideas, arguments and truths by which cordial debate can
take place. This definition mirrored work by scholars like Gerard Hauser who envisioned
the public sphere as a rhetorically defined “discursive realm in which individuals and
groups may transcend their private concerns to interact freely in ways conducive to
forming a common sense of reality” (438). These discursive spaces, Hauser explained,
must be “open-ended, for their open-endedness makes conflict and, equally rhetoric a
possibility” (439).
In an ideal setting, engagement of opposition and deliberation occurs with relative
ease among participants. Thomas Farrell called these places of deliberation “rhetorical
forums,” and argued that their fundamental importance is a development of the
“conscious awareness” of the other; or, the realization that an opposition exists, matters
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and “must therefore be taken into account in... deliberations” (284). Controversy arises
in these spaces, however, as a consequence of what Kenneth Phillips called a “general
decline in public deliberation and debate” (490). When this occurs, opposition tends to
be neglected, or is deemed invalid. I will argue that this “decline of public deliberation”
is precisely what happened in Adams' rhetorical argument construction.
From Farrell's explanation we see that the decline of public debate leads to
controversy being the primary means of argument. Controversy, in turn, perpetuates the
decline of the public debate. Thus begins a vicious cycle. In one sense then, controversy
could be said to be the result of a collapsed public sphere. In the same way, controversy
perpetuates further collapse of these places of deliberation by making engagement with
opposition ever more difficult. Yet at the same time, rhetoric's function is to facilitate the
very controversy which ultimately leads to a collapse of deliberation (Garsten 28).
Controversy then both creates and is a product of a collapsed public sphere. Following
this collapse, controversy is left as the primary means of resistance.
As Goodnight noted, “[c]ontroversies [are] generative of argumentation without
inviting an open, reflective discussion of the controversial” (3). Thus, controversy by its
very nature tends to create arguments that cannot be argued, muddles the issues, confuses
the opponent and lengthens the scope of the argument with its constant quest for
opposition. This continues to the extent that it questions the validity of even the most
fundamental premises. As Philips noted, “controversies involve objection to not only
argumentative positions, but communicative practices as well” (Phillips 491–492)
thereby questioning every aspect of the argument from the content of the message itself
to the means of dissemination. Mark Moore has noted that the rhetorical significance of
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controversy comes from its tendency to avoid resolution and “actually exacerbate the
problem through indecisiveness, postponement and contradiction” (268). Consequently,
he suggested, controversy “will prevent resolution and remain a problem in its own right”
(271). Jonathan Lange suggested this kind of controversy can arise from “competing
information campaigns” (239) where each side tries to construct reality in a manner
which best suits its cause. In what follows, I demonstrate that by looking closely at the
conversation between Adams and British leaders, we can begin to see just how a rhetoric
of controversy functions and what purpose it served in colonial American political
debates. I believe that doing so has potential to yield interesting understandings about
pre-revolutionary argument and may have some broader implications for more
contemporary political discourse as well.
Review of Literature
In the following literature review, I demonstrate that Adams is regarded as an
important figure and often noted for his writing ability, yet scholarly examination and
criticism of his writing from a rhetorical perspective is virtually non-existent. Also, there
is a distinct lack of focus on his discourse within the fields crossed by this study. In
short, rhetorical critics do not study Samuel Adams and historians do not (or perhaps
cannot) adequately study historical rhetoric.
This absence is significant because as James Boulton summarized in The
Language of Politics “it is a truism that people respond to a given situation because of
what they believe to be the truth about it rather than what necessarily is the truth” (5).
Consequently, there is great opportunity to bridge the gap and conduct research which
benefits both historical and rhetorical fields of study. Boulton argued that it is a

31

rhetorician's job to supplement historical understanding by contributing what historians
either do not, or cannot do; that is, in the case of 18 th-century political rhetoric, to “try to
define the character of the persuasion exercised by the political writers and to estimate
their effect on the prevailing climate of opinion” (5). In short, a rhetorical approach to
this topic grants us access into the character and personality of Adams and his thought
process and an important and otherwise absent dimension to historical research.
Adams' changing reputation
Importantly, Adams' reputation has been in flux since his influence began to wane
in the days following the Declaration of Independence. No researcher does a better job of
explaining the varying interpretations of Samuel Adams than Pauline Maier. Her short
article on Samuel Adams, Coming to Terms with Samuel Adams, explored his stature as
both an enviable as well as a despised figure in American history and explained how the
changing times contributed to his falling stature. As other scholars have noted, until the
late 19th century Samuel Adams was considered second only to George Washington when
it came to important founders (Puls 15). Yet by the 1920s, his reputation was severely
diminished as several works, including John C. Miller's Sam Adams: Pioneer in
Propaganda, dismissed Adams as little more than a demagogue and manipulative
opportunist (Maier, Old Revolutionaries 11). Yet modern historians like Pauline Maier,
Mark Puls, and Ira Stoll have sought to revisit Adams' reputation. In fact, it seems that
the present body of scholarships is trending back to considering Adams in a more positive
light. Yet importantly these charges of either demagoguery or virtue have been applied to
him throughout the ages without any in-depth analysis of the nature of his words. For
though Adams is recognized as an influential figure, scholarship on his life has been
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limited to a handful of biographies, the first not written until sixty years after his death.
Since that time, interest in Adams has been sparse, only to experience a mild resurgence
in the last decade. Yet in this time, no rhetorical research has considered Adams in a true
rhetorically-based study. This task is my burden and my delight.
Existing Scholarship
The existent biographies of Samuel Adams provide a good account of his life,
education, his influences, his involvement in Boston politics, and contribution to national
politics. In addition, there are a number of other books which devote only a chapter or a
significant portion of the book specifically to Samuel Adams and his contribution to the
cause. These books tend to focus on a major aspect of the revolution (e.g. the literature,
propaganda, etc.), and Samuel Adams is recognized as one of the major contributors to
that aspect. These books are issue-centric.
Two things are apparent here. First, the relatively small number of books relating
to Adams indicates that there is much room for scholarship. Secondly, after reading these
books, it is clear that there is significant content overlap. Many repeat the same stories
and anecdotes of Samuel Adams' life with only subtle re-wording.
Adams' reputation seems to be in a state of permanent flux. Among his
contemporaries, Adams enjoyed a high degree of respect. Thomas Jefferson and John
Dickinson held Adams to be highly effectual. Even those who opposed him were willing
to note his abilities. Loyalist Peter Oliver regarded Adams as “a person of
understanding....he understood human nature, in low life, so well that he could turn the
minds of the great vulgar as well as the small into any course that he might choose...and
he never failed of employing his abilities to the vilest purposes” (qtd. in Jensen 404).
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Recognition of his writing ability is present in almost all historical research from
the very first biography to the most recent histories. In the first published biography of
Samuel Adams in 1865, William Wells recognized the written contributions of Adams by
asserting that “Samuel Adams stood at the head of the political essayists of New England
as regards to clearness and force of reasoning, vigor of style, and entire devotion to
public liberties” (Wells 441). In this example however, no rhetorical analysis exists.
Instead, as seen above, the focus is on Adams' position as “political essayist.”
This trend of neglecting rhetorical significance continued in James Kendall
Hosmer's 1886 biography. Hosmer summarized Adams' abilities by noting that “as an
orator, Samuel Adams was surpassed by several of his contemporaries” (Hosmer 358)
but, as a writer, he was one of the most voluminous writers whom America has yet
produced” (360). He then explained that of the portion of Adams' writings which have
been recovered from history, “these pages has given specimens enough to justify a high
estimate of the genius and accomplishment of their author” (361). In the age of great
political writers such as Burke, Rousseau, Voltaire, Dickinson, Franklin and Paine,
“Samuel Adams will bear a good comparison with them” (361) . Thus Hosmer also
recognized Adams’ abilities but neglected a deep analysis of Adams' words and
diminished any rhetorical merit they may have possessed.
As another example of the neglected state of Adams' rhetoric, consider Moses
Coit Tyler's work on the literature of the American revolution. In Tyler's work, we find
the beginnings of a diminished view of Adams' method of influence. Like Hosmer, Tyler
noted that Adams was “perhaps the most voluminous political writer of his time in
America, and the most influential political writer of his time in New England” (M. C.
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Tyler 2). Unlike earlier historians however, Tyler held that Adams wrote purely for
political expediency and therefore was disqualified from examination on the basis of his
writing as an art. Tyler did note that in Adams' day, his works were noted for their
eloquence and artistry by such notable contemporaries as James Otis and John Adams.
Thus, there seems to be a paradox in Tyler's analysis. While the effectiveness and
vigilance of Samuel Adams' writing is readily recognized, there is no analysis as to why
these writings were effective or what made them influential. Tyler's summarized
thoughts on Adams diminished the rhetorical aspects of Adams' work saying, “[Adams]
wrote pure English, and in a style severe, felicitous, pointed, epigrammatic. Careful as to
facts, disdainful of rhetorical excesses... and adept at implication and at the insinuating
light stroke, he never had anything to take back or apologize for” (M. C. Tyler 12). He
implicitly recognized the brilliance of Adams' knowledge of audience and 18 th-century
style, yet he largely ignored this important aspect of Adams' work, opting for the simple
explanation that Adams wrote in purely practical terms with no rhetorical artistry
whatsoever.
Perhaps the work most likely to mention Adams' significance as a writer is John
C. Miller's 1936 book on Adams as a propaganda figure. Miller had little respect for
Adams' methods as a manipulative propagandist and mob leader. Yet he too noted that as
early as 1758, Adams had discovered his penchant for skillful writing. Miller told of the
successful written propaganda campaign orchestrated by Adams which pinned the blame
for the Stamp Act squarely on Thomas Hutchinson, who in reality had little to do with the
law. Miller also addressed Adams' role in spinning the Boston Massacre and use of the
newspapers for promoting his agenda. In these instances, Adams' writing was recognized
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as the chief tool for spreading propaganda, but there was no analysis of the content of his
writings.
Miller even devoted a chapter to one of Adams' most famous works, The 1768
Massachusetts Circular Letter. Miller noted that this particular piece of propaganda
produced “immediate results in Boston” (118). The brilliance of the letter was that
Adams had “formulated a new theory of colonial rights” (123) while implicitly making
an argument for “unit[ing] the colonies against British oppression” (125) and exposing
the widening and irreconcilable rift that “now divided British and American political
thought” (132). This analysis of the 1768 Massachusetts Circular Letter is demonstrative
of Adams' argumentative and rhetorical abilities, yet Miller offered little to no detailed
analysis of its structure, content, or other aspects, focusing instead on its effect. For this
reason, Miller's analysis is also lacking.
Philip Davidson's 1941 book on the propaganda of the American Revolution
begins with the acknowledgment that “Sam Adams owned no superior as a propagandist.
No one in the colonies realized more fully than he the primary necessity of arousing
public opinion, no one set about it more assiduously” (3). In the process, Davidson wrote
about Adams with a sense of admiration, noting that he “was no true mob leader,” and
“no social incendiary” (5), thereby refuting some of Miller's claims.
Davidson noted Adams' use of the newspapers to spread his messages. Adams
was invested in this medium to the point that his paper of choice (the Boston Gazette)
was “the only one on the continent which kept up the fight against England” (Davidson
228) during a long interlude of relative quiet. Though Davidson acknowledged the
effectiveness of Adams' relentless written campaign, there was no analysis of the way this
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agitation took place, or how the use of controversy might have played a role in Adams'
agenda.
Adams' talents were also recognized in works during the First Continental
Congress. Edmund Burnett (in 1941) noted that even while the Continental Congress
was in session, Adams was busy “stirring up sedition and aiming at complete severance
of the colonists from the mother country” (47) in the form of writings going back and
forth nearly every day from Philadelphia to Boston and successfully “managing at one
and the same time the factions in Congress and the factions in New England” (47).
Even among the general histories of the American Revolution written during the
mid-20th century, Samuel Adams occupied an important place, yet again, he is often cast
in a negative light. Samuel Morison and Henry Commager (1958) described Adams as
“the western world's first orchestra leader of revolution,” (167) and a “master of
propaganda,” (167) content to let others speak “while he wrote provocative articles for
the newspapers” (168).
Other historical works regard him in a similar fashion. Merrill Jensen in 1968, for
instance, explained that while “the war for independence had many 'fathers',” of these
fathers, Samuel Adams is entitled to a “very high place” (403). He noted that “Adams's
interest was in politics and his talent for it in time approached genius” (Jensen 405). He
called Adams a “propagandist extraordinaire,” a “truly gifted and most determined
politician,” (128) and a “sincere and excessively prejudiced champion in the cause of
American freedom” (129).
Hiller Zobel's 1970 book The Boston Massacre comes close to an actual textual
analysis, albeit very briefly. Zobel, like others, acknowledged Adams' ability to construct
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the narrative to fit his needs. “Put your adversary in the wrong and keep him there” (qtd.
in Zobel 19) is the technique Adams preferred when dealing with most of his foes. Zobel
took his analysis one step further by recognizing some of the implied results of the text,
notably the insinuations that Adams used, the subtle reminders that were embedded in
Adams' words, and the suggestions that Adams hinted at regarding Hutchinson's motives.
This extra analysis speaks to the text itself and outlines the general process behind the
function of Adams' words. Unfortunately, this is as much detail as Zobel provided,
leaving much still lacking.
In her 1972 book From Resistance to Revolution, historian Pauline Maier
characterized Adams as an agitator rather than a manipulative figure, thus signifying a
shift in perception that has continued to this day. She devoted an entire chapter to the
organization of the Sons of Liberty, including their use of newspapers to further their
agenda. Though Samuel Adams was the leader of the Boston branch of the organization
and responsible for their writings, his contributions to the organization and their agenda
receive only a cursory mention in Maier's work, leaving largely untouched the question of
what made his newspaper articles so significant. So, though Maier elevated Adams'
reputation to some degree, there was still no analysis of how Adams' words contributed to
colonial agitation.
In 1976 Steven Lucas noted the importance of rhetoric in historical context when
he recognized a revealing Adams' truism. Adams wrote, “We cannot make events. Our
business is to wisely improve on them” (qtd. in Lucas 248). In this instance, we see that
Adams was acutely aware of the rhetorical challenges he faced. Lucas explained that
“discerning the symbiotic relationship between rhetoric and events, we can arrive at an
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evaluation of the debate over independence that is at once critically satisfying and
historically scrupulous” (252), again demonstrating the contribution that rhetorical study
can make to historical research. Unfortunately, Lucas did not delve deeply into an
analysis of Adams’ writings, opting instead for an analysis of the rhetoric of
Independence in Philadelphia.
John Galvin provided insight into the relationship between Adams, Otis and
Hutchinson in his 1976 book Three Men of Boston. In it, Adams' work as a propagandist
and writer is mentioned. For example, Galvin noted Adams' essay An Appeal to the
World in which he constructed thirty-seven pages of “ruthless analysis and with his now
perfected tone of suppressed outrage and righteous anger, [and] carefully and deliberately
demolished [Governor] Bernard once and for all in the eyes of Bostonians” (Galvin 188).
Clearly in this example Galvin recognized Adams' rhetorical ability, but again, all the
emphasis is placed on effect with no in-depth analysis of the words. Galvin wrote of
Adams with a sense of admiration, referring to him more as a leader of public opinion
than a manipulative demagogue, which resulted in further elevating Adam's reputation.
In her 1980 publication, The Old Revolutionaries, Pauline Maier continued to
elevate Adams' reputation by providing a historic view of how Samuel Adams had been
perceived throughout history. She referenced several of the works above and suggests
that Adams' nefarious reputation is largely illogical, but was grounded first in anxiety
caused by separation from Britain and later in a curious result of history. To wit, she
suggested that Adams mirrored too closely the “urban boss” (Old Revolutionaries 15)
who controlled cities of the 20th century. The negativity and fear of manipulation were
transferred onto Adams' reputation.
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Furthermore, Maier believed that fondness for revolution as a solution to societal
ills has diminished, making Adams' methods less endearing to the modern generation.
These are the reasons, Maier explained, that “Samuel Adams was rejected with increasing
vehemence” by many contemporary historians (Old Revolutionaries 15).
However, Maier also noted that Adams' power of influence was often overrated,
but concluded that despite the lingering questions surrounding his persuasive abilities,
contemporaries such as John Adams held him in high esteem, especially on the issue of
independence for which his fervor cannot be mistaken. “Samuel Adams,” noted Maier,
“was above all a master politician, and organizer and coordinator who believed in a
constitutional government” and “his medium was...the press” (Old Revolutionaries 28).
“Even his loyalist detractors testified to Adams's skill as a writer, whether of legislative
documents or for the press” (Old Revolutionaries 29). Maier noted a certain degree of
selflessness to his writings, noting that Adams “seemed to hide behind a rhetorical
facade” in which the literature was meant to be selfless and promote the cause over the
author. In this regard, Adams lived up to the traditional Whig standard of republican
virtues. Though Maier's work improved Adams' reputation and recognized his political
skill, there was no attempted analysis of his words, or recognition that the appeal to virtue
is itself a rhetorical device harkening from the teachings of British belles lettres.
Therefore, Maier's work also remains rhetorically incomplete.
Another Adams biographer, William Fowler, Jr. wrote in 1997 of Adams as a
powerful writer. Fowler wrote, “With his facile pen, Adams skewered enemies and
extolled friends” (72). Fowler harkened back to Miller's perspective and referred to
Adams as “the political manipulator, cunning and sly” (73). Again, Adams' abilities with
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the written word were noted, but there was no discussion about the aspects of Adams'
writing that made him so powerful.
Mark Puls' 2006 work held Adams in high regard for his abilities, noting Adams'
realization that “the press was vital in winning political causes” (94). Consequently,
Adams churned out essays against British policies “at a torrid pace, while balancing his
writing duties in the House and keeping up his correspondence with writers in America
and London” (116). Even early into his career, his achievements were quite impressive.
During two short years in the late 1760s, Adams had “roused the continent, engineered
the first boycotts, helped unite the colonies for the first time, implanted a reverence and
stoked the love of liberty based on individual rights. He supplied the colonists not only
reasons to fight for their rights, but with the political weapons to do battle” (63).
Governor Hutchinson, greatly frustrated by Adams' seeming unending talent at causing a
stir, referred to Adams' writing skills as a 'black art'” (qtd. in Puls 116).
In these examples, Puls clearly recognized Adams’ skill as a writer and noted the
chain of events brought to fruition by his writing talents, yet the only analysis of Adams'
words he offered was to say that “Adams place[s] faith in a logical persuasion, devoid of
feckless emotional appeals” (16). It is my assertion that for such influence to have
occurred, there must be more to Adams' writing than pure logical presentation, a fact that
several other historians have alluded to, but again, without the analysis that explains what
that extra persuasive appeal might be. I believe a study of controversy will help explain
Adams' potency.
In another recently published (2008) biography, Ira Stoll noted the proclivity of
Adams' writing in a series of anecdotes about his life, noting that while other
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revolutionaries served “as spies or soldiers or diplomats...one of Adams' key roles was as
a writer” (56) whose “goal as a journalist was not to deliver a bias-free, strictly factual,
balanced, neutral, 'objective' account, but to advance his cause” (63). With this
motivation in mind, Stoll provided numerous examples of Adams' use of pseudonyms to
advance his religious, economic and political interests in the colonies. Stoll even
referenced one of Adams' common metaphors, that of the children of Israel paralleling the
colonists, as being instrumental in Adams' writings. Stoll continued the trend of holding
Adams in esteem, yet there is no in-depth analysis of the rhetorical aspects of his words.
I could continue to demonstrate this absence, but at this point the message
should be clear. For all the recognition that Adams is given as the foremost
revolutionary, there is little analysis that demonstrates the means by which his words
influence.
There is a degree of irony in the way the communicative aspects of Samuel
Adams were perceived by scholars. Almost to a fault, historical scholars qualify his
writing style as plain, lacking flair, and devoid of almost any rhetorical qualities. Yet
they all acknowledged that his writings were largely responsible for the propagation of
the rebellious events in Boston, which to some extent led to the eventual need for the
Declaration of Independence and the outbreak of war against Britain. Thus there seems
to be a paradox when examining Samuel Adams which lends itself to one of the questions
of my study, namely how a man who wrote in such a plain style was able to start and
maintain a rebellion simply with his words. Surely there were some implicit
argumentative and stylistic aspects embedded in his text which resonated with his
readers. The hidden qualities of his words is one example of when a rhetorical
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perspective can shed light on another important aspect of Samuel Adams and the nature
of language and persuasion. Exploring those hidden qualities is the purpose of this
dissertation.
Preview of the Chapters
Chapter Two: The Rhetoric of Samuel Adams
This chapter argues that there are identifiable aspects to Adams' writings and
demonstrates the consistencies of Samuel Adams' rhetoric. It examines his words and
demonstrates that from his earliest writings he stood as a consistent purveyor of what he
called the “pillars” of British constitutionalism: the right of property; the right of
representation; and the right of trial by jury. This chapter explains the historical
background for each of these and why they were so valued in the era. Because of their
importance, any opposition to British policies was presented by Adams as conflicting
with one of these three fundamental rights. It is this unwavering dedication by which we
can classify Adams' rhetoric.
Chapter Three: The Rhetorical Rise of Samuel Adams
Chapter three describes the emergence of Samuel Adams as a formidable figure in
Boston politics, first with his involvement in the campaign against the Stamp Acts and
later replacing an ailing James Otis as leader of the Boston populist movement. This
chapter also describes Samuel Adams' use of the Sons of Liberty to influence popular
opinion against importers and tax agents.
Chapter Four: The Circular Letter
Chapter four applies the Adams pillars of constitutionality to the situation faced
during the debate over the 1768 Circular Letter. By examining the letters of Adams and
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the responses of Lord Hillsborough and Francis Barnard, I demonstrate the way the
arguments shift as a result of controversy and a general unwillingness to engage with the
important topics. I argue that Adams' strict adherence to the pillars of constitutionality
had the effect of narrowing possible responses in a way that made it extremely difficult
for his opposition to argue against him. Consequently, the opposition tends to dismiss or
ignore Adams' claims, settling for tangential topics and irrelevant topics. This in turn has
a detrimental effect on the productivity of the conversation, leading instead to diverging
stances. I also demonstrate how this controversy served as further evidence for Adams'
claims about the inherent problems with the British /colonial relationship and helped
facilitate a new colonial identity.
Chapter Five: Moving the Court
In an effort to stave off rebellion, Hutchinson moved the House of
Representatives' meeting place out of Boston to Cambridge. Though a minor move in
terms of distance, this movement provided another opportunity for Adams to point out the
growing tyrannical tendencies of unelected officials dictating colonial occurrences.
Chapter five examines the conversation between the House and Thomas Hutchinson and
again recognizes the key role that Adams' pillars of Constitutionalism played in his
arguments against Hutchinson's decisions. It also notes the role controversy played in
positioning the argument in such a way that productive disagreement was difficult to
attain.
Chapter Six: The Whately Letters
Chapter six examines the debate which occurred between the House of
Representatives and Thomas Hutchinson over the appearance of the Whately Letters. We
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find in this conversation the same similar themes typically contained in Adams' rhetoric.
In addition, the presence of controversy again severely curtailed the ability of Hutchinson
to respond in a way that would satisfy the House's concerns.
Chapter Seven: Conclusions/Application
Chapter seven draws conclusions about the reputation of Samuel Adams based on
the previous chapters and argues that the title of demagogue is unfitting. It also revisits
the nature of controversy and speaks to the problems and successes of this important
place of persuasion. This chapter also recognizes the problems and applicability
associated with its use in analyzing early-American politics. Finally, this chapter looks
critically at the value of controversy, both as a tool of analysis and as its role in
contemporary politics and draws conclusions about the current and future state of
political dialogue.
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Chapter Two
The Rhetoric of Samuel Adams
The purpose of this chapter is to locate the common characteristics of Adams'
rhetoric and try to understand the internal ideology that governed how he approached the
topics of his day. To do this, I examine a broad cross section of his works from as early
as 1749 to demonstrate Adams' commitment to civic virtue and show how this
commitment influenced his writing and thinking. Secondly, I demonstrate that Adams'
rhetoric was consistent throughout his writings regardless of the year or the changing
circumstances he faced. I argue that this consistency and his unwavering appeal to what
he calls the “pillars” of British constitutionalism, are what make Adams' rhetoric uniquely
his own. In other words, the identifying rhetorical characteristics of Adams' writing are
found primarily in the philosophical stances which govern his writing choices.
Civic Virtue
The first and most notable aspect of Adams' values, and one that I argue had the
greatest influence on his rhetoric, was his commitment to civic virtue. Civic virtue
functioned as an umbrella philosophy which gave credence and purpose to everything he
did, including his involvement in the cause. Furthermore, in this belief, Adams was not
alone.
Adams' understanding of virtue was the brand taught in his classically-based
education at Boston. It was also the predominant understanding of virtue in early
America. As Gordon Wood explained, in pre-revolutionary America, public service was
paramount. “No phrase except 'liberty' was invoked more often by the Revolutionaries
than 'the public good'” (55). It was a particularly “whiggish” ideal that found a home for
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itself in the persistently independent-minded colonies. In this manner of thinking, the
people, when contrasted against a government, were to be thought of as a “homogenous
body whose 'interests when candidly considered are one'”(58). Writing as “Candidus” on
February 3, 1776, Adams asserted that the state could be considered a “moral person,
having an interest and will of its own,” (Volume 3 199) and thus it was the duty of a good
citizen to work not on behalf of one's own interests, but for the betterment of that the
community.
Individual liberty must be understood in the context of the larger, and vastly more
important, devotion to public good. In this sense, individual liberty was a heterotelic
ideal with its ultimate end being the betterment of society as a whole. The conflation of
public good and individual liberty was a natural outcome of Whig political theory and
was possible only because the specific liberties that were of concern in the colonial era
were not the private liberties of the people against the common interests of the public, but
rather the rights of the collective “people” against the will of an elevated ruler. Thus, it
was considered absurd that the choices of an individual would somehow intentionally
oppose the good of the collective. For a good citizen republican like Adams, it was a
right, and perhaps even more strongly stated, a duty to thrust one's self into the public
square in order to work to maintain the liberty of the people as well as keep democratized
society from sliding into the kind of moral precariousness brought on by frivolity and
worldly excess.
Yet Republicanism, for all its benefits, had a weakness. Though it was the system
of government which guaranteed the greatest degree of liberty to its adherents,
republicanism rose or fell on the virtue of the people who took part in the system.
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Therefore, the desire for a great degree of liberty required maintaing a functioning
republic and this in turn meant keeping the system free from greed, excess, and
licentiousness which, it was thought, led to corruption. 1
Conversely, any obstacle (including those brought on by excessive wealth) that
caused one to place his own interests ahead of the public good was considered to be a
societal negative. It was William Moore Smith who noted this “sad dilemma in politics:”
(Wood 64, 65) the freedoms given by this kind of system had a tendency to result in
wealth through free enterprise. Yet wealth had ruinous effects on the virtue of those in
the republic. Therefore, the philosophical question that baffled the thinkers of the day
was how to allow for the greatest degree of freedom for citizens (individual liberty) while
keeping the wealth brought on by that freedom from corrupting the souls of those who
had it (public good).
For Adams, the answer was clear: individual virtue was essential to a successful
republic. As he wrote in a letter to James Warren on Feb 12, 1779, “[i]f virtue &
Knowledge are diffused among the People, they will never be enslaved. This will be
their great security. Virtue & Knowledge will forever be an even Balance for Power &
Riches” (Writings Vol. 4 124–125).
For Adams, the pursuit of virtue was a kind of antidote to the evils of excess. On
a personal level he reasoned that since money and power inevitably corrupt, his meager
service to the state would be without aspirations to pursue either vice. He would be a
disinterested party whose service to the state would be above reproach. As Wood
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This was not a novel idea, but one rooted in the ancient works such as Plato's Republic where
he noted the four cardinal virtues to be embraced by the Greeks: wisdom, temperance, courage,
and justice. (J. L. Golden and A. L. Golden 29) These traits, it was thought, were instrumental in
the perpetuation of a good society.
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explained, this “disinterestedness” was the 18 th-century's “synonym for civic virtue.”
Adams was not alone in this endeavor, as 18th-century philosophy decreed that “[p]ublic
virtue was the sacrifice of private desires and interests for the public interest” and it was
generally agreed that in accordance with rules of propriety, “[a]ll men of genius and
leisure, all gentlemen, had an obligation to serve the state” (Wood, Radicalism 104).
Adam Potkay wrote that in the era of Adams' education, virtue meant “the classical
political virtues: courage, magnanimity, love of justice, civic participation, and, above all
a preference for the public above any merely private good” (3). This ideal was lasting, as
James L. Golden and Alan L. Golden noted that Thomas Jefferson believed that “for a
democratic society to flourish, there must be a meaningful and productive interaction
between private and public good” (28). Thus, in his commitment to civic virtue, Adams
was not unique, but a characteristic representative of the age.
Adams was, however, perhaps among the most stringent adherents to the
principles of virtue being manifest in unburdened service to the state. His lack of concern
about money, fashion, or such unnecessary “novelties” as horseback riding serve as just a
few examples of this attitude. However, Adams was not the kind to live in loud
observance of his piety. On the contrary, it seems that his tendency was to quietly live a
life of destitution with an air of happiness. This attitude prompted early American
biographer John Eliot to describe Adams as a “poor man, who despised riches, and
possessed as proud a spirit as those who roll in affluence or command armies” (16). As
Pauline Meier explained, for Adams, “poverty was a source of pride, an outward sign of
inner commitment” (Maier, Old Revolutionaries 34).
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Furthermore, Adams considered virtue a trait not only to be lived personally, but
to be actively promoted in the general society. For Adams, this was a lifelong endeavor.
On the front page of the April 10, 1749 edition of the Independent Advertiser, nearly
fifteen years before he made a name for himself in Boston politics, Adams previewed
what would become his prevalent views on the symbiotic relationship between liberty
and virtue when he wrote that “...neither the wisest Constitution, nor the wisest Laws,
will secure the Liberty and Happiness of a people, whose Manners are universally
corrupt. - He therefore is the truest Friend to the Liberty of his Country, who tries to
promote its Virtue” (Adams, “Advertiser 67” 1). And promote virtue he did. There is
evidence to suggest that Adams understood virtue to be a confounding character trait
among the unvirtuous as when he wrote a letter of recommendation for a Mr. Hugh
Hughes to James Warren on July 12, 1775, “Virtue has rendered [Hughes} obnoxious to
all the Tories of [New York]” (Warren-Adams Letters, 1743-1777 82). Obnoxious though
it may have been to his opposition, among his peers in Boston, virtue manifest in service
to the state was highly respected and represents a foundational aspect of his character.
When in pursuit of liberty, Adams did not mean liberty of the self-serving kind.
He explained in the April 10, 1749, edition of the Independent Advertiser that “when
some Men talk of Liberty, they mean Their Own Liberty... [but] it is not without shining
Examples of the contrary Kind: Examples – of Men of a disinterested Attachment, to this
same glorious Liberty...[w]hom no Hopes could draw – No Terrors could drive, from
steadily pursuing, in their Sphere, the true Interests of the Country.” Here was the
defining aspect of Adams' career: self-submission to this manner of liberty and doing his
part to perpetuate its existence throughout his beloved Boston. His rationale was simple:
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“If we would truly enjoy this Gift of Heaven [Liberty] – Let us become a VIRTUOUS
PEOPLE: - Then shall we both deserve and enjoy it” (Adams, “Advertiser 67” 1). Thus,
Adams' most notable trait is that his writing is first and foremost for the promotion of
benefit to the “state.” And “state” itself had a specific definition which meshed nicely
with the larger conceptions of civic virtue.
For Adams, the “state” was more of a conceptual notion of the principles and
ideals exemplified by the Constitution of the British empire than it was devotion to a
country, king, or Parliament. Therefore to serve the state was to live according to the
morals and principles that would encourage virtue. Note that in this definition, it was
entirely possible to serve the “state” while advocating for overthrow of the present
government; for the “state” was a larger, more important entity than any particular nation
or leader.
When we understand that the root of Adams' rhetoric was service to an ideal, and
not a motive for self-aggrandizement, or notoriety, or monetary gain, it casts him in a
different light than he is commonly perceived. Indeed, throughout his political career, he
was remarkably transparent about what he desired to have occur in the American
colonies. His motive was to establish and maintain virtue within the land.
At the advent of colonial strife with the mother land, Adams did not desire
independence, but was motivated instead by a deep-seated longing to see that goodness of
the British Constitution manifest in the American psyche. It was only later in his career,
when he lost hope that Britain would renounce their perversions of the Constitution and
turn from their malicious actions, that he advocated independence. But, even then, it was
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a last resort. And in each case, his ultimate agenda, the pursuit of virtue, remained the
same.
Adams' commitment to civic virtue influenced every part of his belief system and
had a great effect on the manner in which he argued his points. It was civic virtue that
caused Adams to devote his talents to argue for a return to the principles of British
Constitutionalism.
Four Warrants for British Constitutionalism
The second notable characteristic of Adams philosophy was his devotion to
British Constitutionalism. Constitutionalism, according to Adams, was composed of
three elements: representation, trial by juries, and the right of property. Together, Adams
referred to these as the “pillars of British Constitution.” There are four important
understandings without which the rest of his arguments are either ineffective or
nonsensical and, therefore, these themes are consistently present in his writings. Or,
where they are not explicitly spoken, they are present in implication by providing the
necessary key to functional argument. They are, in a sense, the argumentative warrants
that allowed readers to leap from the evidence to the conclusion. These themes are: the
fixed nature of the Constitution, a respect for parliamentary authority, status of the
colonists as citizens of Britain, and the incorruptibility of the Constitution. Adams'
rationale for the pillars of Constitutionalism rests upon these four fundamental beliefs.
The Constitution was fixed
The idea for the fixed nature of the Constitution was featured predominantly in
the 1768 Massachusetts Circular Letter. This letter will be discussed in greater detail
later in this dissertation. My purpose for mentioning it here is that it provides an
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excellent starting point for an explanation of Adams' definition of the Constitution and
the inherent guarantees of liberties contained within.
In this letter, Adams argued that “The Constitution is fixed,” (Volume 1 185) and
could not be changed by the whims of any legislative body. Furthermore, he argued that
since Parliament derived its authority from the fixed Constitution, going beyond their
constitutionally limited role effectively negated the power of the Constitution and
therefore effectively deprived Parliament of the source of its authority. Adams proceeded
to explain what constitutional limits Parliament was guilty of breaking. In this case
Adams found the issue of taxation to be in violation of Constitutional law.
Though it may not seem a serious accusation, Adams' claim was quite bold. For
when Adams refers to the British Constitution and claims that it is fixed, he was not
referring to a codified constitution such as the kind possessed by the United States today:
such a document does not exist in British law. 2 For Adams, this represented a key part of
his ideology. That the Constitution could not be manipulated at the hands of any leader
and was not subject to any circumstances was a notion that appeared time and again
throughout his writings.
2

In Britain, the lack of a written constitution had traditionally meant that “[n]o Act of
Parliament can be unconstitutional, for the law of the land knows not the word or the idea”
(Chrimes 42). Instead, in British politics, the Constitution was comprised of whatever Parliament
determined the law to be. Furthermore, a functioning British government was a consequence of a
precariously balanced separation of powers, for as Chrimes further explained, “the Crown could
dissolve Parliament at any time, and Parliament could bring the executive [king or queen] to a
stop by refusing financial support and by disbanding the army”(123). It behooved both powers
then to work together toward common goals by means which Chrimes called “convention of the
Constitution”; that is “a system necessitated by, and also rendered possible by, the state of
parliamentary representation and electoral franchise” (123). Furthermore, since a king's
dissolution of Parliament would have essentially resulted in animosity toward the sovereign and
left tyranny or anarchy as the rule; under British constitutional law, the only real check on the
sovereignty of Parliament was the ability of the people to elect new parliamentary members every
five years. When seen in this way, one can understand the dire consequences that Adams
describes as resulting from being subject to laws he and his fellow colonists had no say in
making.
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Respect for Parliament
Another aspect of Adams' writings is the degree of respect granted to Parliament.
Despite Adams' belief that the Parliament was a corrupt body, he was careful to show
deference to Parliament as an institution. Despising Parliament as a body was tantamount
to treason and would have lost Adams the respect of many of his contemporaries.
Therefore, throughout his writings, Adams was careful to avoid questioning Parliament's
authority. For instance, in a letter from the House of Representatives on January 29,
1768, he wrote that “[t]he superintending authority of his Majesty's high court of
parliament over the whole empire, in all cases which can consist with the fundamental
rights of the constitution was never questioned in this province, nor...in any other”
(Adams, Volume 1 174). And in the 1768 Massachusetts Circular Letter Adams again
conceded the sovereignty of parliament calling it the “supreme Legislative” (185). At
the same time, Adams clearly believed that Parliament was not immune to criticism. In a
letter to Dennys De Berdt dated January 12, 1768, he reasoned that while Parliament as a
system was sovereign and was only inclined to “justice equality and truth,” (140) the
current Parliament was committing acts that were found to be grievous to the colonists.
This posed a paradox for Adams and he found the explanation when he acknowledged
that “Parliament [is], the supreme legislative and constitutional check on the supreme
executive”. “But,” Adams continued, “the law does not presume that the King may not
be deceived, nor that the Parliament may not be misinformed” (140).
The implied conclusion is that misinformation must be blamed for Parliament’s
passage of what could only be construed as unconstitutional decisions which affected the
colony. For in his conception of Parliament as a noble institution, it was inconceivable
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that they would knowingly perpetuate such atrocities. Notice here a clearly implied
belief: that Parliament as an institution was good, noble, and above reproach. Therefore,
illegal measures must have had their root in some other rationale. If Adams did not
believe this it would have been easy to blame Parliament for the problems and decree that
the only way to fix the problem was to rid the government of that institution. But this
was never suggested. Instead, his concern was only with those operating in the system
and the false information which they were receiving. Here we find evidence of Adams'
deeply held belief in the inherent goodness of the British system, provided it was
functioning correctly.
Colonists were citizens
Adams' respect for the institution of Parliament leads to the third underlying
warrant of his belief system. Simply, Adams held that the colonists were full subjects of
the king and fully citizens of England. By extension, they were privy to the rights which
were found in the British Constitution consistent with that status. This was made
especially clear in examining the rationale behind Adams' frustration toward the
Massachusetts governors. For only as citizens did the Constitution have any relevance.
Adams wrote as much in a letter written to Massachusetts' British agent, Dennys De
Berdt, in early 1768 where he noted that “[t]he fundamental rules of the constitution are
the grand security of all British subjects” (Volume 1 134).
Adams placed this disputed status in a position of foremost importance. He
considered all actions of Parliament as stemming from Parliament's belief that the
colonists were “other” and were not to be granted the same privileges of a native of
England. Such thinking was baffling to Adams and he expressed as much in his letter to
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Dennys De Berdt in January 12, 1768, when he wrote, “No jurist...will deny that
[colonists] are entitled to all the essential rights, liberties, privileges, and immunities, of
his Majesty's natural subjects...” (Volume 1 141). For Adams, the status could not be
rationally disputed. But listing colonists among the king's subjects was not for the sake
of convenience. Rather, Adam's views on colonial status were grounded in truths from
the early days of the colony. Elsewhere, Adams explained that colonists were privy to the
constitutional rights on the basis of the initial charters issued to those who originally
founded the colonies. Here Adams reasoned that since the founding charters were
granted by the king for the purpose of enlarging the king's territory, then those who
braved the seas and tamed the new land were by extension privy to the rights and
privileges granted to those living in the king's original territory (Volume 1 139–140). For
Adams, the fact that the charters were granted prior to the revolution of 1688 made no
difference. For the Bill of Rights that was established by the Parliament after the arrival
of William of Orange in 1689 corrected the wrongs that had been perpetrated by King
James and set the constitutional footings back where they should have been. For it was a
consequence of King James' illegal actions that led to his fall. Thus King James'
replacement did not negate the actions of his predecessor but in fact only rectified the
wrongs and thus reaffirmed the power of the existing, enduring Constitution. And this
example leads us to the fourth and final underlying principle which governed Adams'
thinking.
Constitution as “incorruptible”
For Adams, the Constitution possessed an eternal nature. It stood as the only true
source of liberty, its beauty and importance stemming from the fact that it was the
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manifestation of the natural rights that existed without but were only perceptible within.
These thoughts were clear when Adams noted in a letter to Dennys De Berdt on January
12, 1768, that “[I]t is the glory of the British , that it hath its foundation in the laws of
God and nature” (Volume 1 135). Elsewhere Adams embraced a similar idea, that “[t]he
Rights of Nature are happily interwoven in the British Constitution – It is its Glory that it
is copyd [sic] from nature...” (Volume 1 47).
Because of its superior origination, one can easily understand Adams' firm belief
that the principles of constitutionalism were transcendent of any and all shifts in
legislative or executive power and existed completely independently of the ruler. The
implication, of course, is that rulers come and go, but the Constitution remained.
Consequently, opposing a legislator, or even a governor, was perfectly consistent with the
principles of constitutionalism if the said leaders were infringing on colonial rights.
In chapters four through six, I further examine the writings of Adams' opposition,
but for now, suffice it to say that to Adams, the presence and appointment of Francis
Barnard, and later of Thomas Hutchinson as governors of the colony, and the influence of
Lord Hillsborough in England represented everything that was wrong with the system.
Their actions, decisions, and misinformation drove the policies that Adams believed
represented a severe curtailing of subjects' rights. Therefore, in Adams' mind, promoting
civic virtue and asserting colonial liberty meant simply exposing the malcontents by
necessarily diminishing the reputation and influence of corrupt leaders like Hillsborough
and, in the case of the Bernard and Hutchinson, ridding the colony of the nuisance of
unelected, unaccountable governors and replacing them with a legislature that was
beholden to its own constituents. For we must realize that though Adams focused on
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Bernard and Hutchinson as targets, his real concern was to the system that placed such
unaccountable leaders in positions of authority and how this violated the status of the
colonists as citizens by depriving them of representational rights.
Adams also recognized that the governors were the most trusted source of
information coming from the colonies and therefore, if Parliament was making wrong
decisions based on this information, then the governors were largely responsible.
Therefore, Adams' tactic was to delegitimize them, for if their judgment was open to
doubt, Parliament's best course of action would presumably be to treat the colonists as
wholly natural-born citizens of the British realm, with all the rights and privileges
thereof. Simply, he desired to see a return to a time when the colonies were left alone as
they had been for most of the 18th century, remaining as happy subjects of the king.
Adams therefore sought to demonstrate the inherent problems which arose when imbuing
fallible leaders with powerful, privileged positions. Recognize that this cause was only
possible because Adams valued dedication to the Constitution as vastly more important
than allegiance to any king, governor, or any other ruler. Deposing the governors was
merely a means to an end.
In the above sections, I have previewed the four fundamental beliefs on which
Adams' arguments about the Constitution necessarily rest: the Constitution was fixed;
respect for Parliament; colonists were citizens; and the Constitution was incorruptible.
The overarching point is that without these ideas existing as the accepted truths, the rest
of Adams' claims about the Constitution and the relationship colonists had with the
motherland would have been unsubstantiated. As a result of these argumentative
foundations, when Adams appealed to the British Constitution, he was referring to it in
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very specific terms, with a very specific set of beliefs. If any of these were proven false,
much of Adams' basis for argument faltered. But, they stood on their own, and upon
these Adams built the centerpieces of his argument: the pillars of the British Constitution.
As we shall see, every British action was measured by these pillars, compared, and found
wanting.
Pillars of the British Constitution
The Pillars of British constitutionalism on which Adams based his arguments
were not laws. That is to say that due to the lack of a codified constitution, there was no
written document that said the people had a right to property, for instance. Even Magna
Carta, which has been called “the greatest constitutional document of all times” (qtd. in
Danzinger and Gillingham 268), contains no explicit reference to these pillars. Rather,
the pillars that I discuss below exist as generally-abided principles which are found in all
the laws made in British history. The British Constitution, in Adams' mind, was a
manifestation of the natural laws and natural rights that existed before, and would long
outlast, the Constitution. Therefore, it must be noted that the constitutional rights
provided to British citizens were not explicitly found in Parliamentary British law. They
were seen not so much as “laws,” but rather “principles,” and these principles are found
the in laws that precede 18th-century Parliament by several hundred years.
Adams explained in a letter to Dennys De Berdt on December 20, 1765 that “[t]he
primary, absolute, natural Rights of Englishmen as frequently declared in the Acts of
Parliament from Magna Carta to this Day are Personal Security, Personal Liberty, and
Private Property” (Volume 1 65 emphasis in original). As a consequence of these three
natural and inherent rights, Adams believed that Parliament had ever made laws
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consistent with three distinct principles, or pillars. First, “[i]t is a fundamental Principle
of the British Constitution that the supreme Power cannot take from any Man any Part of
his Property without his Consent...” (Volume 1 65). This is the pillar of property. The
second and third pillars which Adams identifies are representation and trial by jury. The
basis for these claims is found in his Instructions of the Town of Boston, written in
September, 1765. Here Adams wrote, “The most essential Rights of British Subjects are
those of being represented in the same Body which exercises the Power of levying Taxes
upon them, & of having their Property tried by Jurys [sic]: These are the very Pillars of
the British Constitution founded in the common Rights of Mankind” (Volume 1 8–9).
Having explained the mindset and the premises which governed Adams' thinking,
I now proceed to explain how this thinking led to the establishment of Adams' three
pillars of Constitutionalism. These in turn are the basis on which (as will be seen in
chapters four through six) all the arguments against British policies were based. Finally,
these provide the background to his rhetorical system of thought, as every British action
was weighed against these standards. As a result, these three pillars were extolled as the
most important vestiges of the colonial relationship with Britain, and their consistent use,
by means of controversy, resulted in an argument which severely limited productive
deliberation.
On the Right of Property
For Adams, the right of private property was important for both the existence of
liberty and as a standard institution not only of Britain, but of all civilization. Herein lies
the idea that the Constitution was merely a manifestation of the preexisting rights. He
noted in a letter to Dennys Be Berdt on January 12, 1768, that “though many have
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disregarded life, and condemned liberty...there are few men who do not agree that
property is a valuable acquisition, which ought to be held sacred. In addition, the right of
property is not only valuable to the 18 th-century British citizen, but “is admitted to have
an existence even in the savage state of nature.” Consequently, Adams explains by means
of an a fortiori argument, “if property is necessary for the support of savage life, it is by
no means less so in civil society” (Volume 1 137). The right of property is therefore
commonly recognized in all societies.
Adams also explained what constitutes property. Simply stated and broadly
defined, his letter as “T.Z.” published in the Boston Gazette on January 9, 1769, described
property as “the fruit of [a man's] industry” (Volume 1 282). Thus, anything that a person
owns and had legally acquired is termed property. Consequently, the constitution of
“property” will invariably change for each people group. For the American “savage”
property might be things needed to survive such as a bow and arrow, tomahawk, hunting
and fishing ground; for the “Mogul” or “Nabob,” objects of ornamentation such as pearls,
rubies, and diamonds are property; and for Europeans, “tenements, hereditaments
[inheritance], messuages [land and buildings], gold and silver” (Volume 1 137) are all
property.
In the case of the colonists, the above descriptions set the stage for an argument
about why money could not be taken from them without representation. For Adams,
money was as much “property” as bows and arrows were to the “savages.” It was a
source of livelihood and something that had been legally acquired. Notice therefore that
what is really at stake is not the specific item itself, but rather a principle of property.
That money was subject to taxes in a way that a physically “owned” item (e.g. a
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tomahawk, or a musket, or a china bowl) might not be was irrelevant. In all these cases,
the owners had a right to keep their property unless it was freely relinquished by means
of a gift, or through a tax policy that was self-imposed. For Adams, the issue was clear:
if a governmental power had the right to seize property (of any kind) without due cause,
then the property was really not private after all but was de facto public property. This
understanding was obviously inconsistent with the notion that private property was a
foundational right of nature.
Adams was clear, as he wrote in 1768, that “it is an essential unalterable Right in
nature, ingrafted into the British Constitution, as a fundamental Law & ever held sacred
& irrevocable by the Subjects within the realm, that what a man has honorably acquired
is absolutely his own, which he may freely give, but cannot be taken from him without
his consent” (185).3 Adams further claimed that laws like the Townshend Duties, which
took money from the colonists, represented an illegal form of taxation. For as he also
explained in 1768, acts “imposing Duties on the People of this province with the sole &
express purpose of raising a Revenue, are Infringements of their natural & constitutional
Rights because they are not represented in the British Parliament” (Volume 1 185–186).
There are several things to note in this passage. First, recognize the basis of
argument to be on the rights granted by constitutional law. As mentioned above, this
remained a fundamental source of Adams' belief system. In this instance, however,
Adams appeals to an even higher power than British law. He appeals to the law of
nature, which he claims is “ingrafted into the British Constitution.” In this way, natural

This ideal is repeated nearly verbatim in several other writings by Samuel Adams including:
Resolutions of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, October 29, 1765; Letter to John
Smith, December 19, 1765; Letter to John Smith, December 20, 1765; and Letter to Dennys De
Berdt, December 20, 1765.
3
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rights are seen as a sort of external element to British law. However, it is thought that the
two have some kind of relation to one another, for the term “ingrafted” implies a kind of
permanent unity whereby two previously separate and distinct elements are combined,
thereby assuming characteristics of and becoming indistinguishable from one another.
The term itself is notable, for in the physical process of grafting branches onto a tree for
instance, the grafted branch literally becomes part of the tree and the lifeblood of the tree
itself (the sap) sustains and nourishes the grafted branch. Though the metaphor does not
work perfectly, the point is that the two are united as a single entity with the laws of
nature embedded deeply into the British Constitution. Consequently, to violate the latter
is to violate the former as well. The point was that the laws of nature were an essential
element to the British Constitution and could not be overlooked as an inconvenience.
The two elements were united. It could be said that though natural law could exist and be
understood apart from British Constitutionalism, the reverse is not true, since British law
was crafted as a manifestation of natural law.
Understand the rhetorical definitions that were being constructed at this point.
For to define the right of property as an irrevocable manifestation of British
constitutionalism meant that the violation thereof is tantamount to breaking an implied
agreement between the lawmakers and the governed. Consequently if the governors had
any role in either the support or implementation of laws designed to subvert this rule,
then they were guilty of a serious violation of both natural and Constitutional law.
If Adams' fundamental goal was to push for a return to a more traditional sense of
British Constitutionalism in the American colonies (with all the manifestations of civic
virtue, and morality), then portrayal of the law makers and law enforcers (being in this
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case both the Parliamentary body, and the executors of the law, namely governors of the
colonies) would have had a significant effect in rendering the services of these bodies
odious in the minds of the people. While I do not think it Adams' goal to rid the colony
of governors as a matter of principle, I do believe that he saw them as representative of
the problems and as an obstacle to the establishment of a more moral society. They were,
in effect, collateral damage to the cause.
In effect then, Adams posited a sort of breaking of fellowship, thereby freeing the
people of their allegiance to a totalitarian body. As will be discussed later, this
assumption contributed to establishing a new way of thinking in the minds of the
colonists where they saw themselves as existing in a more basic relationship, allegiant to
not the law makers themselves, but to the philosophical grounds by which the lawmakers
were supposed to themselves be subject. It seems likely that when Adams wrote these
words, he had internally come to the conclusion that rectification to British
Constitutionalism could never occur with the current crop of corrupt and self-proclaimed
sovereign authorities making laws that were inflicting such pain on the colonial populace.
It was therefore the colonists' right to return to a system of governance where these rights
were reaffirmed. Therefore, while Adams did not necessarily or specifically advocate the
removal of these government figures, they came to embody the wrong-thinking of British
policy and were thus necessarily the focus of condemnation.
Also worth noting is that due to the strength of the argument from the stance of
property, it is not surprising that references to the right of property were peppered
throughout a large portion of Adams' writings. In addition, many of the complaints that
Adams had against British Parliament and the governor are framed in reference to their
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violation of the rights of property. Again, I believe that the conflation of the accepted
truth of property rights and the ill feelings toward governors are more a marriage of
convenience than a verifiable relationship. Nevertheless, this result speaks to the
tremendous power of the accepted truth of property rights as Adams' first major pillar of
argument.
On the Right of Representation
As noted above, representation in Parliament was the only real check on
Parliament's supreme power and thus it is easy to see why this idea was at the forefront of
Adams' concern and argument. For without the key structural piece of representation, the
very basic premise of British Constitutionalism falters. It is worth noting that the
difference between the colonial and British definition of representation played a major
role in the frustration felt between each party. As for what Adams meant when he
demanded proper representation, he explained his stance in a 1765 letter to Dennys De
Berdt. “When we plead the Right of Representation, we only mean to have our not being
represented upon our own free Election considered as a Reason why we should not be
taxed by the Parliament” (Adams, Volume 1 67). In this understanding, representation
was thought to be a means to an end. Colonists were not opposed to taxation on
principle; in fact, they already taxed themselves on a local level for a variety of public
services, a point Samuel Adams would have been very familiar with as former tax
collector of Boston. Instead, what Samuel Adams argued in a letter to Dennys Be Berdt
on January 12, 1768, was that it was against the foundations of British law “that
Parliament should impose duties, subsidies, talliages, and taxes...internal or external, for
the sole purpose of raising a revenue” (Adams, Volume 1 136).
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Adams was concerned that Britain viewed the colonies as an irresistible source of
tax money and was essentially looking for excuses to extract funds from the colonies by
any means necessary. Some colonists feared that without representation, they would be
seen as scapegoats for the financial strains brought on by the Seven Years' War. And to
some extent, this was indeed the case; for in an effort to raise revenue, Britain had tried a
number of laws to regulate colonial commerce. The Revenue Act of 1764 (Sugar Act)
was a failure. The Currency Act of 1764, which drastically reduced the availability of
paper money in the colonies, had the effect of “add[ing] to the growing irritation of many
Americans toward the mother country” (Jensen 54). The Stamp Act was met with firm
resistance. Adams noted in a letter to Henry Seymour Conway on February 13, 1768,
that while the colonies would have been happy to have “the honour and privilege of
contributing to the aid of their sovereign by a free and voluntary gift”, “...it seemed to be
conclusive, that... those acts were made with the sole and express purpose of raising a
revenue out of America” (Volume 1 191). The objection consistent in all these bills was
that they essentially benefited Britain while undermining colonial interests. Due to the
inherent harm these legislative acts caused the colonies, Adams reasoned that these kinds
of laws would not have been passed through Parliament if the colonies had proper
representation in the law-making process.
For British leaders, “representation” had a different definition. To British
officials, “virtual representation” was the solution to the dilemma posed by the lack of
representation. Yet Adams repeatedly asked for clarification of what this term meant. 4
He wrote to Reverend G.W. on November 11, 1765, that “It has been alleged by some
In his bafflement over the concept of “virtual representation” Adams was not alone. John
Dickinson's Farmers Letter's numbers four and seven both rail against the notion.
4
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Writers in England, that [the colonies] are, as they are pleased to call it, Virtually
represented; a Term which almost always when it is used, needs Explanation” (Volume 1
30). For Adams, the term was ambiguous because it equated the Parliamentary
representation of towns in England with representation of the colonies. Using
Manchester and Birmingham as an example, Adams noted that these English towns had
the ability to send representatives to Parliament, even if they chose not to do so. But for
the possibility of the colonies being represented in Britain however, as he notes later, “it
will forever be impracticable that they should be equally represented there &
consequently not at all; being separated by an Ocean of a thousand leagues” and again,
“Americans are...separated from Great Britain by the wide Atlantic” (Volume 1 186, 30).
Furthermore, for Adams the notion of virtual representation was flawed in light of
the basic purpose of representation. As he explained to Dennys De Berdt on December
20, 1765, “A Representative should be, and continue to be well acquainted with the
internal Circumstances of the People whom he represents” (Volume 1 67). However, the
distance from England,and specific needs of the colonies made such representation
impossible. Adams made clear that due to the distance, the needs and circumstances of
the American colonies “can no more be judged of by any Member of Parliament than if
they lived in the Moon” (Volume 1 30–31).
Adams also refuted arguments against colonists regarding the issue of taxation. In
a personal letter to “G.W.” Adams anticipates the British argument and provides the
alternative mode of thought to refute it. “Then the Question is asked, [“]Will any one
deny that ye Parliament hath a right to tax the Colonys [sic][”], it only needs to ask again,
[“] Are the Colonys [sic] represented in Parliament[”] (Volume 1 38)? The implied
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answer is “No. The colonies are not represented.” In Adams' mind, it was clear that were
one to cut through all the various claims of the sovereignty of Parliament and the rights of
the British citizens, the issue ultimately came down to the simple fact that since colonies
were not represented, they could not be taxed. Representation was thus an essential
aspect to the proper exercise of the Constitution and one that was by definition missing in
the British treatment of the colonies. It was a stance which again demonstrated the vast
disconnect between the ideal manifestation of British Constitutionalism and that which
was actually being foisted upon the colonies.
Having demonstrated the importance of representation to nearly all aspects of
colonial life, we move on to the third of Adams' “pillars” of constitutionality.
On the Right of Trial by Juries
Adams designates trial by jury as one of the pillars of the British Constitution. Its
purpose, however, is a bit different than the other pillars discussed in this chapter.
Whereas representation and the right of property are first-order principles which were a
first-line argument against tyrannical policies, in the way Adams explains it, trial by jury
was a secondary principle necessary in case the other principles were violated. In other
words, the right to trial by jury existed as a sort of safeguard for the other rights. After
all, were there to be a trial over property, Adams reasoned that it should be required that a
localized jury of peers be the ones to make a determination of guilt or innocence instead
of a distant, single judge who could not grasp the nuances of any particular trial. In a
sense then, only by having a trial by peers could the right of property be protected. This
claim was in direct response to recent occurrences of smuggling in Boston.
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In the 1760s, the city of Boston found itself in the midst of a fairly rigorous
crackdown on what British officials considered to be smuggling. Deprived of the profits
due to them by the illegal trade, custom officials had stepped up efforts to confiscate
illegally imported goods. The law at the time had declared that upon conviction, the
smuggler was to be fined three times the value of any seized goods and these proceeds
were to be divided equally between the governor of the colony, the king, and the
informant. There was, then, great monetary incentive for “tattlers” to inform the customs
board and for the crown to prosecute. The location of the trial, however, was not
guaranteed to be a local affair. A section of the Revenue Act of 1764 had established a
vice-admiralty court in Halifax, Nova Scotia, which presided over the entirety of the
colonies. When a customs official accused a ship owner of smuggling, it was the
official's choice to try them in either the local courts, or, if the official thought that the
vice-admiralty court would be more favorable to the case, send it to Halifax for trial. The
judge for this court was appointed and sent directly from England.
Those charged with smuggling faced a variety of obstacles while they tried to
clear their name. First, they were forced to pay for their own travel to Halifax in order to
appear before a judge. In addition, failure to make the journey resulted in an automatic
“guilty” verdict. Finally, even if the owner was able to demonstrate his innocence, he
was not able to recover any damages if the judge certified that there was probable cause
for the seizure. Jensen explained that these laws “free[d] customs officers from virtually
all responsibility for their actions” and as a result, “many of them took advantage of the
opportunity offered to line their pockets by making seizures without evidence...” (51).
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The system was corrupt as a result of the power placed in the hands of a single,
unaccountable judge, an option which Adams decried as “contrary to the very expression
in the Magna Charta” (Volume 1 20). He scoffed at the legality of a system where
“Property may be tryd [sic] at the Option of Informers the most detestable sort of Men, in
a Court Admiralty, where there is no Jury” (Volume 1 46).
It must be understood that Adams' overarching disagreement with these kinds of
laws was that they effectively removed liability from the local courts and provided further
opportunity for property to be seized illegally with no threat of consequence for those
who did so. Such laws were really nothing less than abuse of colonial good will. He
argued that “[I]f his Majesty's American subjects are not to be governed, according to the
known stated rules of the constitution...” there is fear that the colonists may grow to feel
“disaffected” toward the crown. This, Adams claimed, would be “the greatest
abhorrence” (Volume 1 20).
Note again that the right to a jury of peers was understood to be a safeguard of the
previously discussed “pillar” of British Constitutionalism: property. Thus again we see
evidence of the relatively limited focus of Adams' concern. He was not advocating for
ambiguous rights for the colonists, but rather a very limited few, all which centered
around the main issue of the right of property. Were representation and local jury trials to
be the norm, Adams reasoned that property rights would be largely protected. It is this
issue of “property” which shall be seen to be the most foundational disagreement and the
cause of all kinds of frustrations for those on both sides of the Atlantic.
Thus in examination of his writings, we find three pillars that Adams holds to be
fundamental principles of British Constitutionalism. Understand that these three work in
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tandem to supply the primary source of Adams' argument. This principle-based
argumentative framework is a large part of what defines Adams' rhetoric.
Conclusions
In the above sections, I have explained the principles that ground Adams'
arguments. These are important, because in order to judge the quality and effectiveness
of his rhetorical choices, one must first determine what Adams was hoping to accomplish
by writing.
Whereas the above serve as a starting point to understanding the rationale behind
his opposition to British laws, they are also, I believe, indicative of the rhetorical function
found in his work. As will be seen, many of the principle-based choices found in Adams'
words and described above have significant rhetorical merit as well.
First, by founding his arguments in these principles (civic virtue and
constitutionalism [including the rights of property, representation, and trial by jury]),
Adams argued from a position of great authority: not authority which lay with him alone,
but with the notion of British Constitutionalism which is portrayed as a stalwart,
immovable issuer of rights, standing in higher stature than any other law. The same could
be said about the appeal from civic virtue. Civic virtue was thought to be an elevated
way of thinking about the responsibilities of being a good citizen and it implied
selflessness on the part of those citizens. In the same way, Adams had nothing to gain by
taking the stances he did. Adams was well-known for his distaste for anything of a
monetary nature. Besides, appeals to civic virtue and to the right of property (for
instance) were not the kind of issues that one would typically take up were they seeking
to benefit themselves. They are appeals to a higher order, which appealed to all and were
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detrimental to none. And, this belief placed Adams firmly in the mainstream of 18 thcentury Anglo-American thought. In truth, it was his complete disinterestedness that set
him apart, for though others might have espoused a life of pure-hearted civic service,
Adams lived it. Thus Adams' disinterestedness toward the issues lent him great
credibility. For by placing himself in the position of a disinterested individual with
nothing to gain but that which would serve the colony as a whole, his words took on a
persuasiveness that would not be possible were they to come from someone like John
Hancock, who had a vested interest (and much money to be made) in opposing British
policy.
Thus, we find in Adams' writings that despite the vast differences in topic or
circumstances, there were similar themes. The consistencies suggest that Adams' method
of argument was intentional and based in something deeper than the situation itself. It
was rooted in impartial dialogue and the seeking of truth, or at least the portrayal of truthseeking. He placed great emphasis on the issue of natural rights, rights which were
grounded in nothing but the accepted truths of being British and the privileges thereof.
I believe that the techniques described above served two distinct purposes. First,
and perhaps most importantly, they are yet another manifestation of the devout
commitment to a virtuous lifestyle that characterized Adams' life. Though some may
read the descriptions of Adams' “manipulations” and question the legitimacy of calling
him virtuous, by “virtue” I only mean devotion to service of the state through any and all
means. This definition of “virtue” is one of the main reasons I believe Adams' work has
been so grossly mischaracterized over the years. But we must acknowledge that were
Adams to intentionally participate in the kind of opportunistic and inflammatory,
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grievance-inducing rhetoric as is commonly attributed to him, it would have gone against
every noted characteristic of his life. Adams' devotion to the cause of virtue was
complete and rigidly adhered to and all aspects of his life were singularly committed to
this goal. Once this point is understood and accepted, the remainder of his method
becomes clearer.
Secondly, by positioning himself and his writings as based in incontrovertible
rights, Adams assumed the mantle of truth-teller. Using both inductive and deductive
reasoning, Adams very clearly asserted that the path that the colonies and Britain were
headed down would not end well.
Of course, no one would claim that Adams was without an agenda when he wrote
these pieces. In fact his agenda, as discussed above, was clear. But I believe that it is a
mistake to assume that his goal was to overthrow British governance. Instead, I believe,
and his rhetoric suggests, that he sought to encourage the emergence of a society built on
virtue and would go to nearly any length to see this virtuous society through to the end.
Seeing Adams in this light makes him seem paradoxical. In one sense, he was an
opportunist to the greatest degree, willing to bend on nearly anything in order to establish
his very specific goal. Opportunism is typically associated with terms like “shrewd,”
“sly,” and “unscrupulous,” each implying a sort of nefariousness and lack of principles to
the subject. Yet, in the case of Adams, I believe his goal was virtue, morality and ethics,
and not the kind that are open to definition, but objectively speaking – the transparent
pursuit of good. Though it is admittedly a phrase of contradiction, I believe it is fitting to
refer to Adams as a principled opportunist.
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In the preceding text, I have described what I find to be the rhetorical constants of
Samuel Adams' writings as he responds to a variety of circumstances facing the people of
Boston. His reliance on the pillars of constitutionality as his ultimate source of argument
is a characteristic present throughout his works. The question remains as to how this
style of Adams' rhetoric and his argumentative construction interact with the arguments
of the other side and to what end. In the following chapters, I explain Adams' rise to
prominence. I examine the writings of Samuel Adams and compare them to the works of
some of his greatest nemeses, Thomas Hutchinson and Lord Hillsborough, and
demonstrate how Adams' devotion to the principles discussed above allowed for
tremendous rhetorical controversy. Furthermore, I examine how such controversy
effectively pushed the colonies toward the inevitable acceptance of independence.

74

Chapter Three
The Rhetorical Rise of Samuel Adams
This chapter discusses Adams' upbringing, early influences and the beginning of
his role as a “propagandist”1 for the American Revolution during the Stamp Act Crisis.
Adams' early years were important in developing his attitudes about the dangers of
governmental abuses. This led to a deep reliance on the principles of liberty that were so
important to his later writing. In what follows, I explain the important contextual aspects
of Adams' upbringing, including the political occurrences in his native Boston. In
addition, I explain how certain factors, including the financial strains of Britain, and the
waning influence of popular leader James Otis, resulted in an opportunity for Adams to
emerge as Boston's foremost political figure. We shall see how Adams grew from a
young man with ministerial aspirations into a formidable proponent of political liberty.
We recognize Adams as not only a writer, but as an organizer of people and a popularizer
of ideas. Challenging British policy through questionable extra-legal associations earned
him a place among the important figures of the revolutionary era.
The Adams Family
The Adams family of Massachusetts had a long history of political involvement.
Young Samuel was a seventh-generation American and a distant relative of the famous
Cotton and Increase Mather family who preached religion and politics in the seventeenthcentury. In keeping with the family tradition, Adams was raised a strict Puritan and
maintained a puritan lifestyle, with all the trappings of virtue and piety, throughout his
“Propagandist” often carries with it negative connotations of manipulation and demagoguery.
I bracket the term because though Adams participated in the kind of idea promotion which might
be associated with propaganda, the connotations do not really fit. Inasmuch as Adams was a
purveyor of ideas and an agenda, he was a propagandist, albeit sans the overt demonization
associated with certain kinds of propaganda (Nazi propaganda, for instance).
1
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life. Yet, though he may have been a Puritan at heart and in principle, it seems that his
religious beliefs effected him internally only. He was not an evangelist or a theologian.
His works are largely absent of any mention of or imposition of his religious views on
others, save the warning against the threat of “popery” which appeared in some of his
letters. Rather, in as much as he was a Puritan, his religious beliefs remained only
influential of his political beliefs, including his devotion to civic virtue.
Samuel's father, the elder Samuel Adams, made his living making beer malt. He
was also a well-known political practitioner in early eighteenth-century Boston, including
being elected a member of the Massachusetts legislature and later serving as “director of
a land bank company that issued paper money for use by farmers until the company was
outlawed by Parliament in 1741” (Stoll 16).
Due to a peculiarity in the law, Parliament declared that directors of the land bank
were personally responsible for any losses it might incur. John Alexander noted that
“[d]espite Parliament's assertion, the 1720 law clearly did not apply to the [American]
colonies,” (6) yet as a consequence of this misapplication and the failure of the land bank,
the Adams family was forced into “repeated legal battles to prevent seizure of their home
and personal holdings” (Puls 25). Given the trajectory the young Samuel Adams took, it
seems likely that witnessing his father's experiences with Parliament deeply affected him
and perhaps established the fear of an impersonal, disconnected, and overreaching British
government.
In the time surrounding the land bank events, Samuel Adams was still a young
man in the midst of his college education. His studies at the Boston Latin school and
Harvard were heavily rooted in Greek and Roman histories and the philosophies of
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Plutarch, Cicero, Locke, Harrington and Pufendorf (J. C. Miller 16). He returned to
Harvard in 1743 to pursue his master's degree. It was here that Adams famously debated
the affirmative for the question of “Whether it be lawful to resist the supreme magistrate,
if the commonwealth cannot be otherwise saved” (Stoll 22; J. C. Miller 16). It was also
at Harvard that Adams began to develop abilities as a rhetorical practitioner, holding
debates and demonstrating “an uncanny ability to understand his opponents' views and
remain one step ahead...[using] their own arguments against them” (Puls 27).
After graduating, Samuel tried his hand at business. Ultimately, the business was
a flop as Adams' attention and energy were focused more on political and less on
financial success. Yet it was during this time that Adams took the first step in what would
become his modus operandi in the foreseeable future: he began writing newspaper
articles. His first appeared in a publication called the Independent Advertiser (Stoll 24), a
short-lived (1748-50) weekly publication. The paper was a perfect fit for Adams as its
publishers promised that
whatsoever may be adapted to state and defend the rights and liberties of
mankind, to advance useful knowledge and the cause of virtue...whatever may
tend to inspire this people with a just and proper sense of their own condition, to
point out to them their true interest, and to rouse them to pursue it...shall at all
times find (free of charge) a most welcome reception”. (qtd. in Buckingham 157)
One of his first public essays in this newspaper was a philosophical treatise on the
nature of loyalty and sedition. As was the case for many of Adams' early works, this
article called into question the notion of unconditional loyalty to “one individual man,
however dignified by the applause or enriched by the successes of popular actions”
(Wells 17). Adams asserted in the August 8, 1748, issue of the Independent Advertiser
that such naïve devotion only led to “such a degree of dependence and submission” that
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many are led to “homage the instruments of their ruin at the very time they were at work
to effect it” (Adams, “Advertiser 2”). Instead, Adams claimed, the true object of loyalty
should ever be “a good legal constitution, which, as it condemns every instance of
oppression and lawless power, derives a certain remedy to the sufferer by allowing him to
remonstrate his grievances, and pointing out methods of relief when the gentle arts of
persuasion have lost their efficacy”(Adams, “Advertiser 2”). Consequently, according to
Adams, those disloyal to the Constitution and thus guilty of rebellion were:
“whoever...insinuates notions of government contrary to the constitution”; “whoever
acquaints us that we have no right to examine the conduct of those who...impoverish and
ruin us”; “he that despises his neighbor's happiness...and pretends to adjust the rights of
men by the distinctions of fortune”; “he that aggravates beyond measure the well-meant
failings of a warm zeal for liberty”; and “he that [strives] to defend and propagate the
schemes of illegal power” (Adams, “Advertiser 2”).
The inference was clear: devotion to the Constitution was of greater import than
devotion to any title, whether judge, governor, or even king. Furthermore, those who
sought to subdue liberty or oppress in the name of devotion to any entity were not loyal,
but were guilty of treason against the Constitution.
These ideas persisted throughout his years of public influence, suggesting that
they were not the rantings of a confused youth, but the stalwart beliefs of a man who
exhibited great conviction early in his life. This consistency is a fact which, perhaps
more than any other, helps us understand the nature of Adams' mentality. As William
Wells noted, “A careful scrutiny of [Adams'] career for more than forty years, including
the more eventful period of American history, reveals no instance of inconsistency. The
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principles which became fixed in his mind, as soon as he was capable of understanding
political subjects were never changed” (Wells 18). It should be no surprise, then, that
when Adams made his debut into the public spotlight, the ideas he espoused were quite
similar to his earlier writings.
Political Beginnings
It was in publications like the Independent Advertiser that Adams perfected his
talent for writing. He gradually learned the value of political expediency, including the
tricks of the trade. One commonly used tactic was to write two or more consistent
articles and then sign them with different pseudonyms, often selecting a name that would
make the piece resonate with a particular section of the populace. For instance, when
fighting against the “illegal” sale of the Adams family property following the land bank
debacle, Adams wrote in the August 14, 1758, issue of the Boston Gazette from the
perspective of an independent, unassociated party and declared the event to be a
dangerous violation and contraction of the rights of Englishmen. Signing the letter “A
Freeholder,” Adams rhetorically removed himself as the affected party and sought to
invite all other landowners to consider the kind of precedent this occurrence might create
and how it would affect their own property (Alexander 10–11; J. C. Miller 23–24).
This was the manner by which Adams made a name for himself in Boston.
Perhaps it is not surprising, given his family's name recognition and his penchant for
speaking his mind in the press, that he was soon elected by the people of Boston to a
government position, albeit a humble one. On March 12, 1753, Adams was selected as
one of 115 individuals charged with various tasks for the city of Boston. Adams'
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assignment was as one of twelve “town scavengers, empowered to help keep the streets
clean” (Stoll 26). He was, in effect, a colonial garbageman.
Three years later Adams was elected to the position of tax collector, which was a
less dirty but just as undignified position. However, the job afforded him the great
opportunity to acquaint himself with nearly all Boston residents, from the affluent to the
impoverished. But his heart was not in the job of tax-collecting and he regularly declined
to collect the taxes of those who owed. Such policy made him a popular, but ineffective
collector of town money. Consequently, by March of 1763 it was revealed that Boston's
tax revenue was short by £4,000, of which Adams was responsible for £2,200. Because
Adams himself was paid as a portion of his tax revenue, the city of Boston was not the
only entity that was financially strained. Adams was broke and it was widely thought that
his livelihood was being sustained by generous friends (Puls 34). Fortunately, it was
around this time Adams began to realize that his talents were not in the field of tax
collection. A series of events were brought on by British actions that radically
transformed the reputation and career direction of Samuel Adams.
Background
In order to grasp the opportunity which gave rise to Adams' influence, there are
two factors that need to be understood. First, we must acknowledge that Great Britain
had instigated a revolt by imposing what many colonists considered to be illegal tax
policy on the colonies. Yet Britain's policy decision was not made out of spite, but was
rather a reaction to a very real problem. I explain Britain’s financial situation below.
The second factor that gave rise to Adams' influence was a transition occurring
within the Massachusetts popular party itself. Here we must mention James Otis, who by
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all accounts had effectively paved the way for Adams take over after Otis' eventual
mental deterioration. Thus, though this dissertation is not about James Otis, his
contributions to elevating Adams' stature and influence cannot go unmentioned. I
discuss James Otis below.
Britain's Revenue Problem
Adams' rise in prominence corresponded to a changing relationship between
Britain and the colonies. This changing relationship was the result of Britain's major
financial problems stemming from the cost of the Seven Years' War. In short, Britain
needed money to maintain their influence in the colonies and the colonies represented a
large, untapped reserve of funds. As we shall see, it was this situation and Britain's
resulting policies that demonstrated the inherent dangers of an overzealous Parliament.
Such factors also provided the opportunity for Adams to utilize his talents for a noble
end.
To be sure, the problem of taxation in the colonies was not new. In fact, the
problem of how to tax the colonies and to what degree to do so had been one of the
longest running issues in Britain. British finances had been stretched thin as a result of
the Seven Years' War with France2 and as the colonies continued to grow, so too did the
temptation of the colonies as a potential tax base draw Britain's eye. The failed Molasses
Act of 1733 had been the first attempt to extract revenue from the colonists. In the thirty
years that followed, colonists had grown accustomed to little intrusive tax policy from
Britain. Passage of the American Revenue Act of 1764, more commonly known as the
Sugar Act, changed that status. This law was essentially a tax on various goods being
imported into the colonies, the most important of which was molasses coming from the
The Seven Years' War was referred to as the “French and Indian War” within the colonies.
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West Indies. It also included a number of rather arcane rules intended to stem the tide of
illegal smuggling into the colonies. In Smugglers and Patriots, John Tyler explained that
the offending portion of this law was not so much the taxation itself as the fact that it
greatly interfered with the established manner of importing and exporting that had ruled
the Northern colonies for decades (J. W. Tyler 65–69). Years of relative autonomy had led
to a sense of expectation about the way business in the colonies was conducted and this
new law greatly hindered the established order. The law also came at a terrible time for
the citizens of Boston. The city was more or less impoverished, having lost up to ten
percent of its male population in the war and the remaining orphans and widows were
cared for at public expense (Fowler, Jr. 49). The city was also trying to recover from a
disastrous fire in 1760 that destroyed many houses and businesses.
No one was more acquainted with the financial plight of the city than was Adams.
His position as tax collector afforded him great insight into the burdens of the people, an
insight that he would call upon many times in later years. In the minds of many citizens,
the law had the effect of positioning the British government as one with questionable
wisdom and integrity. As the Sugar Act and the subsequent events are not really within
the range of this paper, suffice it to say that it was not well received. Merrill Jensen has
noted that “[a]s a revenue maker, the law was a failure” (48): its income did little to
nothing to offset the budget problems of Britain. It did, however, lead to a number of
important changes in the colonies, including increasing the prevalence and ingenuity of
smuggling, Furthermore, contrary to the intent of the law which was “intended to
strengthen what the [British] administration perceived as rapidly dissolving ties between
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Britain and America,” (J. W. Tyler 78) the law had the opposite effect of “further
irritat[ing] the northern colonies” (Jensen 48–49).
Tyler noted that “the various restrictions of the revenue Act of 1764 when taken
together must have constituted a serious menace to one of America's most vital and
rapidly growing trades” (J. W. Tyler 82). Moreover, the law led to the elevation and
recognition of a political class built on the ideas that 1) the American colonies were privy
to basic English rights, and 2) the Revenue Act constituted a serious violation of these
rights. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Act and in the ensuing months of protests and town
meetings, Massachusetts Governor Francis Bernard foresaw the laying of a framework
consisting of intercolonial cooperation that would have vast repercussions. He worried
that “demagogues of several Governments of America [would] join together in opposition
to all orders from Great Britain which don't square with their notions of the rights of the
people”(qtd. in J. W. Tyler 84). Nowhere were Bernard's fears more justified than in
Adams' home of Boston. Yet Adams was not the original vocal opponent to the Revenue
Act or any Act that threatened to trample the natural rights of the colonists. In the early
1760s, that title belonged to Mr. James Otis.
James Otis
James Otis' contributions to the cause are instrumental in understanding Adams'
rise. Otis mentored Adams, instructing him in the ways of politics. Consequently, we
find many of Adams' arguments similar to those promoted by Otis. Adams' contribution
was to take many of Otis' ideas of colonial rights and British wrongs and expand them,
temper them, and disseminate them. Thus, Adams' rhetoric supported Otis' pre-existing
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ideology. In the same way, Adams' influence in the popular party was the result of the
organization created by Otis. Thus, to understand Adams, we must touch on Otis.
The Sugar Act had been positioned as a means of revenue and regulation, as made
clear in the preamble of the law: “it is just and necessary that a revenue be raised...in
America for defraying the expenses of defending, protecting, and securing the same...”
(qtd. in Jensen 48). In the eyes of men like James Otis, the revenue aspect of the law
made it blatantly unconstitutional. So impertinent were men like Otis that by 1766, they
were arguing not only for the repeal of acts like the Revenue and later Stamp Acts, but
they were to the point of “demanding completely unrestricted trade”(J. W. Tyler 66) in
the colonies.
James Otis had served as unofficial guardian of colonial rights for a number of
years beginning with a legal showdown with Thomas Hutchinson over the Writs of
Assistance. Writs of Assistance were essentially warrants for search and seizure of
property suspected to have escaped customs taxes. Supposedly, before the court would
grant the writ, customs men had to demonstrate a high degree of likelihood that
smuggling had taken place. Over time, however, the law had expanded to include
searching any property for any reason, often with the help of the sheriff. In addition, the
writs being granted were “general,” meaning that they had no expiration date or specific
target. They were issued to an official permanently and allowed him to search anyone,
for any reason, with no justification necessary, and seize any suspect property. Not
surprisingly, this “right” was abused by customs men and used for political purposes, to
exact revenge on adversaries in the town by leveling fines on the merchants. Thus, when
the writs of assistance came up for renewal, James Otis was chosen by the merchants of

84

Boston to argue against them. As Bernard Bailyn explained in The Ordeal of Thomas
Hutchinson, Otis' brilliant rhetorical maneuvering was to shift the question from one of
legality of the law to a question of its position in relation to the higher law of natural
rights. “It was the moral basis for the law, not the literal provisions, that primarily
concerned him” (Bailyn 55). Ultimately, Otis ended up losing the case, but not before
creating a stir over the implications of governmental overreach and establishing his name
as a protector of natural rights.
So it was that James Otis was among the foremost critics of Britain’s plan to tax
the colonies and was instrumental in formulating organized opposition to the policy. And
to be certain, opposition was ever-present. In the form of town meetings, letters to
newspapers, publication of pamphlets and official instruction to representatives of the
town, colonists (especially merchants and their dependents) demonstrated outrage at the
actions perpetuated by the new law. It was here that Otis' name was further enmeshed
with the cause of English liberties with publications such as his 1764 pamphlet The
Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved. One historian has noted that “[o]f
all the pronouncements issued by the colonists in the agitated year between the passage of
the Sugar Act and that of the Stamp Act none was more widely known or commented
upon than James Otis’ The Rights of the British Colonists Asserted and Proved” (Bailyn,
Pamphlets 409). In it, “Otis discusses the nature of government, then the rights of
colonies in general, the natural rights of colonists, and finally the rights, both political
and civil, of the British colonies in particular” (Ginsberg 34) and “attempts to discover
the origin of government, the nature of the colonies and their rights” (Pleasants 22).
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This was the situation that gave rise to the person of James Otis. Imagine the
surprise when in the face of such mounting opposition, Parliament essentially doubled
down on their determined stance to tax the colonies with passage of the even more hated
Stamp Act in 1765.
Otis' contribution is important to understand, because it was he who paved the
way for Adams to assume the position of leadership. The two shared much in terms of
ideology and passion, though as shall be seen, it was Adams who ultimately demonstrated
the knack for popularizing the principles of Otis among the colonists.
The Adams Strategy
Adams was soon to prove himself as more than a meager tax collector. Until this
time, “Adams was seen publicly as a background figure in a quiet port town on the outer
reaches of the civilized world” (Puls 38). For despite Adams' family associations, Jensen
noted that even as late as 1764, Adams “had little prominence” (83). Yet he was about to
jump head first into the world of politics and radically alter the course of American
history. Growing dismayed at the lack of outspoken opposition to the constitutional
questions of the Sugar Act, Adams began to “plot a strategy [to] transform...English
merchants into lobbyists on behalf of the colonial cause by orchestrating a boycott of
English goods” (Puls 39). He realized, however, that such a boycott would prove futile if
not for the support of the other twelve colonies. Thus Adams decided to make the case
against abuses of colonial rights to a degree never suggested in colonial America to this
point.
In 1764, Adams attended a Boston town meeting where he spoke out firmly
against Prime Minister Grenville's taxes, arguing that they must be resisted in order to
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retain any degree of colonial sovereignty. At the same meeting, he was appointed to
write instructions to Boston's representatives at the House of Representatives. The
resulting instructions, dated May 24, 1764, represent Adams' very first official
publication and demonstrated the clarity of his thought process and agenda. In this
writing, Adams outlined the argument that would preside over the rest of his writings in
the coming years. Adams' written manifesto was quite radical in its construction.
According to Mark Puls, this was “the first public document to question Parliament's
right to tax the colonies or its authority in America, the first call for the colonies to unite
in protest in a congress, the first denunciation of non-American juries to try Americans,
and the first threat of a boycott” (41). Ira Stoll disagreed with Puls to a point, arguing
that the first call to unify the colonies actually came from Benjamin Franklin in 1754, and
that an earlier protest against taxation without representation was present in “Cotton
Mather's declaration on the day of the rebellion against Governor Andros in 1689” (38).
Nevertheless, the importance of the document stands as even Stoll agreed that it
“provided an important roadmap for the struggles to come, and, unlike [the
aforementioned precursors to Adams' calls for unity and protest], these ideas, with
Adams' leadership, would blossom into full-scale revolution and independence” (38).
The ideas contained in this writing represented the beginning of Adams' political career.
Furthermore, as we shall see below, the ideas present in this document represent a sort of
“standard” by which one can see the unchanging nature of Adams' beliefs. It previewed
his belief in the importance of unity against British policy and helped to popularize and
codify some of the vague, or perhaps implied, characteristics of colonist's status with
Great Britain.
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After it was approved by the town leaders and forwarded to Boston's
representatives, it was published a special supplement to the May 28, 1764, Boston
Gazette and reprinted in other newspaper across the colonies. It had the effect of clearly
laying out a case for colonial rights and consequently “lit a smoldering fire in the hearts
of many readers across the continent,” not the least of whom was Patrick Henry, who was
said to have been prompted to run for office in Virginia in order to fight British taxation
as a result of Adams' words (Puls 42). The document also had the effect of greatly
increasing Adams' name recognition. He was already known in Boston and as John K.
Alexander reported, “within a year, Otis and Adams worked together so closely that
members of the court party referred to them as a unit” (22).
The document itself contained several strains of argument which would prove
important in later construction of the rebellion, including economic, legal and moral
reasons to oppose the illegal taxes. Though they are not explicitly outlined in the text
itself, a close reading reveals a number of “truths” or “premises” present in Adams' words
against which the actions of the governor or parliament would be compared. Thus they
form the foundational set of beliefs which undergirded every claim made by Adams about
the problems that British policy was causing within the colony. Therefore it behooves a
rhetorical study to understand the principles which internally governed Adams and are
exemplified in this example.
In the following section, using both quotations from the text and my own
paraphrase, I outline the premises which undergird Adams' arguments. These premises
are important for later evaluation since they represent a focal point for his argumentative
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standards. Hence, we can see that despite the greatly changing colonial circumstances,
Adams' methodology changes very little.
Adams' Beliefs
Based upon a close reading of the May, 1764 Instructions of the Town of Boston
to its Representatives in the General Court, we can conclude that Adams held and
promoted the following beliefs:
On British citizenship: Colonists were British in every sense, were loyal subjects
of the king and acknowledged their “Dependance upon & Subordination to Great Britain”
(Adams, Volume 1 5) and thus deserved “those Rights & Privileges which justly belong to
us either by charter or birth” (Volume 1 5).
On rights of British citizenship: Charter rights were granted on the basis of being
“freeborn subjects of great Britain” (Volume 1 2) and included the opportunity to govern
and tax themselves. Anything less, Adams wrote, “strikes at our Brittish [sic] privileges
which...we hold in common with our fellow subjects who are native Brittains [sic]”
(Volume 1 5).
On the abuses of British citizenship: Charter liberties and rights were under
assault by external taxation. Taxes were onerous because they detracted from British
subjectivity and demoted the colonists to the level of slaves. Such activity should not
have been tolerated, for acceptance of illegal taxes then might have encouraged more
illegal taxes in the future thus further subjugating colonists. Finally, independence in
government (including the right to self-taxation) was a character of free people and a
necessity in the creation of a happy populace. By extension, a subjugated people could
not be happy.
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On virtue: The morals of the people were the basis for public happiness.
Consequently, if the virtue of the people was ever encumbered, there must be a way to
appeal for the redress of grievances. In addition, as “cultivating the Lands & improving
the Husbandry of the province” are virtuous endeavors, laws that hindered commerce
(which included illegal taxation) were, in effect, an attack on the charter rights.
Furthermore, the blessings and gifts of the British Constitution were rooted in the
“principles of Virtue & publick Spirit” (Volume 1 2).
On the responsibilities of citizens: The citizens' responsibility was to support
virtuous government and oppose corruption. Consequently, laws and judges which
promoted the preservation of morals should have been supported. It was also strongly
implied that if laws and judges did not work to preserve morals, then any support for
them should have been withdrawn.
As previously noted, this document was important because it was Adams' first
entry into the political sphere. Yet this document exemplified Adams' rhetoric as well. In
essence, it provided a basis by which resistance was justified. For if the premises noted
above were accurate and true, then disgruntled, rebellious colonists were rhetorically
transformed into devoted British citizens recognized by their resistance to illegal British
policies. Furthermore, by writing as an official from the town of Boston, Adams granted
great legitimacy to his arguments. After this writing, his arguments were there, in the
public documents as the wishes, thoughts, and beliefs not of Samuel Adams, but of the
Town of Boston.
Adams' statements were not radical on their face. That is to say that taken
individually, claims about the status of the colonists as subjects, for instance, would not
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have been much in dispute. What was new was the conclusion necessitated by this letter
and the forthrightness of its explanation. In essence, Adams very publicly drew a line in
the sand. He noted that if the colonists could be taxed without representation, then they
were not free, but slaves. Conversely, if they were free by their position as subjects of
Britain, then taxation was illegal. Stated in this way, colonial resistance to British tax
policy was legitimized. These arguments were, in effect, the concentrated version of his
political philosophy that had developed throughout his life and would be maintained in
the rest of his writings. After his election to the House of Representatives in 1766, he
would have great opportunity to spread this philosophy throughout the city of Boston,
further popularizing notions of Britain's illegal policies.
As noted above, the news of the Stamp Act arrived in the colonies in early 1765
and caused great dismay among the leaders of Boston. Perhaps with Adams' and Otis'
and others' words of warning and predictions of illegal taxation still ringing in the minds
of the people, Parliament had passed another law which had an even more deleterious
effect to colonial autonomy than did the hated Sugar Act.
The Stamp Act was intended to gain revenue by requiring a stamp on each page of
printed material including newspapers, magazines, and legal documents. These stamps
were to be distributed by a placement of stamp officers in various cities (Jensen 65). The
act was looked upon with great disgust by many colonists, though through threats of mob
violence and absolute refusal to abide by the law, the act was never fully implemented
and was eventually repealed.
Though it was law for less than five months, and mostly ignored in twelve of the
most populous colonies during those months, it had the impact of galvanizing opposition
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around a strong belief in the inherent rights of Englishmen. James Otis was again at the
center of the Massachusetts opposition forces, leading primarily through the use of
newspaper articles and pamphlets. In these endeavors, however, he had gained a young
sidekick in the form of Samuel Adams.
Though gifted in the expression of political philosophy, this was not Adams' only
talent. As mentioned above, in his capacity as tax collector, Samuel Adams had spent a
good deal of time conversing directly with the city's working class. The people liked him
and he understood them and their concerns. Consequently, when Samuel Adams took a
side on an issue, or called for the gathering of a crowd to help ward off another incursion
of the people's liberties, he could expect a large population of cooperative participants.
He has proved especially effective at organizing the rabble of the city. Bands of “lesser”
citizens were called together to participate in events which were of great importance to
the colony, as when they were used to “persuade” stamp officers against taking up their
stamp office post. Those assigned to the stamp officer position regularly found
themselves met with threats of bodily harm or even death as on August 14, 1765, when
stamp master Andrew Oliver was hanged in effigy on a Boston tree. Oliver resigned the
next day. These tactics were replicated with great success in many of the other American
port cities, to the point that by November 1, 1765, when the law was supposed to take
effect, there were few stamps available to be purchased in the colonies.
In late 1765, Adams accomplished another feat of organization. He successfully
convinced the two factions of Boston mobs, the North End and the South End, to put
aside differences and understand the cause of patriotism as greater than their petty
quarrels. The result of this meeting, which Miller reported consisted of the two mobs
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sitting together with “Whig merchants and politicians and joined 'with Heart and Hand in
flowing Bowls and bumping Glasses' until they had completely drowned all memories of
their former differences” (69), was the formation of a unified rabble capable of exerting
great pressure on various political entities within the city. Miller reported that from this
point forward, Boston was under the control of a “trained mob” (69) led by the direction
of Samuel Adams. While I disagree with Miller's choice of description, the notion of
Adams as the assumed leader of the townspeople seems accurate.
Adams also assumed the mantle of leader of the Boston Sons of Liberty, a group
which consisted of “some of the most fiery, unruly whigs on the continent” (J. C. Miller
52). A smaller contingency within the Sons of Liberty was known as “the Loyall [sic]
Nine” and was made up of a variety of business leaders from the city. Though Samuel
Adams was not officially one of the Nine, his association was very close and the younger
Nine “looked to Samuel Adams, an older and more experienced plotter against the royal
government for leadership” (J. C. Miller 53). Of particular interest is that Benjamin
Edes, one of the publishers of the Boston Gazette, is suspected of being a member of “the
Loyall [sic] Nine” and, whether he was officially in this position or not remains in
question, but as Pasley noted, Edes was at the very least “a junior partner of Samuel
Adams in the ground-level management of the movement. Certainly, Edes was present at
meetings of the group’s brain trust and involved in many of its activities” (38).
As a result of these actions and Adams' organization, Boston cemented its
reputation as the most radical of the colonial cities. It was home to many events over the
following decade, many of which are still well-known in the modern public mind: Stamp
Act riots, which resulted in the ransack of Thomas Hutchinson's and Andrew Oliver's
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homes; the Boston Massacre, which was exploited for great political gain; and the Boston
Tea Party. There is evidence to suggest that if Samuel Adams was not planning these
events, he at least knew of them and perhaps assisted with their success. The exception
to this rule might be the Stamp Act riots, for which Adams and the town of Boston were
quick to express “utter detestation of the extraordinary and violent proceedings” (qtd. in
Jensen 111). Consequently, though Adams expressed regret at some of these acts of
violence, he also recognized that “the Stamp Act had given the greatest uneasiness even
to the most judicious men in the Colony” and thus was not surprised that “among the
common people such steps should be taken as could not be justified” (qtd. in Wells 63).
After all, the people had a right to be outraged based on the fact that their liberties were
being trampled.
We find here a war of ideals. On one hand, Adams' brand of virtue was manifest
in an orderly, peaceable governing process. In Adams' mind, however, there were
instances when outrage, and even violent opposition, was justified. We find in the above
instance the clear indication that dedication to the Constitution as an ideal was even more
important than dedication to a law that forbade (for instance) the ransacking of private
property. Indeed, we should not be shocked at this conclusion, for it was the very same
application that he had penned in his first public writing which was discussed above. In
short, it was not that Adams condoned the violence, but rather he understood it in terms
of the desperation felt by the people. Throughout his career, Adams would become a
master at expressing to the people that their livelihood was in fact in jeopardy, and action,
even occasionally violent action, was morally justifiable. This was a philosophy with
which (presumably) leaders like James Otis would also express satisfaction.
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So, though Adams believed in the principles which spawned the riots, he realized
that success could not come by the hand of a mob. Future protests would be managed
more closely. The fact that he was able to temper the anger indicated his level of
influence in the city.
Thus, through a variety of circumstances, by 1765 Samuel Adams had made a
name for himself in Boston. Soon, the elections of 1766 arrived and James Otis was
elevated to the position of Speaker of the House only to have Governor Bernard negate
the posting. This action, it is said “merely bolstered Otis' popularity” (Alexander 39).
Given his name recognition and his influence with the common populace, it should be no
surprise that Adams was also elected to the House of Representatives, having decided to
run to fill Oxenbridge Thatcher's seat. As Miller reports, “within a fortnight of taking his
seat...[Adams] was elected to all the important committees and recognized as Otis' chief
lieutenant” (60). Already a loquacious writer, Adams continued to push his political
agenda in the form of numerous papers. Adams, it was said, was always ready with “a set
of resolves ready, cut & dried” (J. C. Miller 61) in order to educate the rest of the
committee members on any matter that the House might be facing. Once in the House,
he was also elected to the position of clerk of the House of Representatives, a position
that Alexander noted “reinforced Adams' role as an author of House documents” (40) and
allowed him to determine which official documents should be released to the public and
when to do so. In this capacity Adams excelled. In his first term, “Adams produced so
many resolves and wrote so many State papers that [Thomas] Hutchinson rightly blamed
him for the House of Representatives aggressive attacks upon the royal government” (J.
C. Miller 61). It is no stretch to say that Adams used his newfound position to great
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effect. Many of the official state papers were forwarded to the office of the Boston
Gazette and other local newspapers for publication. His already good relationship with
Edes and Gill of the Boston Gazette would prove to be most advantageous. This
publication became Adams' primary means of distributing arguments throughout the city.
A brief word on newspapers: as exemplified by the Boston Gazette, colonial
newspapers on the whole had matured from their humble origins to the point that they
had begun to take sides on political issues. Consequently, they played an important role
in opposing the Stamp Act. Partly out of self-preservation (since the act would have
substantially increased the cost of printing newspapers) most newspapers continued to
print without the required stamps, some even going to greater lengths to demonstrate their
derision of the law. The New London Gazette and Connecticut Gazette for instance,
issued a silent statement of contempt to England and published without the stamps on
November first. As Walett noted, “The Boston Gazette followed suit three days later; and
on November 7 Holt’s New York Gazette daringly appeared with the ringing cry “The
United Voice of all His Majesty’s free and loyal subjects in America—LIBERTY,
PROPERTY and no STAMPS” (164).
As brazenness grew, some newspapers took extra steps to jeer at the new law. In
place of the stamp, some newspapers included an emblem of the Jolly Roger both as a
statement of rebellion and also implying that with the passage of the Stamp Act, liberty
itself was on the verge of collapse. In either case, no newspapers appeared on the
required stamped paper and most continued publication.
At the time of the Stamp Act, the Boston Gazette's publishers realized there was
money to be made in the crisis, and, most likely at Adams' behest, they took advantage of
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the situation. In addition to printing copies of the Stamp Act for public consumption,
they had slowly but firmly come out on the side of the colonies and against the Stamp Act
writing in 1765, “[W]e hope the [stamped] Papers will never be seen in America” (qtd. in
Sloan and Williams 130). Ties between the Boston Gazette and the rebellion movement
were quickly forged and strengthened and the offices of the Gazette became a second
home to Samuel Adams. Adams, however, was not the only one who utilized the
Gazette’s resources. He was “only the most persistent of the group of writers who kept
the columns of the Gazette filled with assaults on authority” (Harrison 213). James Otis,
John Adams, Joseph Warren and Josiah Quincy Jr. also belonged to this exclusive clique
of provocateurs.
Nevertheless, it was Samuel Adams who played a fundamental role in the
propagation of newspaper articles and, just as importantly, in leading Boston's rabble.
Looking back on these events, Adams recognized the value the existence of the Stamp
Act as a galvanizing force in the colonial unity. “What a blessing to us has the Stamp Act
eventually...proved,” he wrote Christopher Gadsden in 1766. “I dare say such Friendships
& Connections are established between [the colonies], as shall for the future deter the
most virulent Enemy from making another open Attempt upon their Rights as Men &
Subjects” (Adams, Volume 1 109).
Thus, in the mid-1760s the political leadership of the town of Boston looked like
this: James Otis provided the legal expertise to challenge Parliamentary law; Otis and
Adams ran the legislature; Adams controlled the crowds and, with the help of the “Loyall
[sic] Nine” and the newspapers, provided a steady flow of material for public
consumption. By 1766, Adams had achieved remarkable success. Puls noted that
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[d]uring the previous two years, he had roused the continent, engineered the first
boycotts, helped unite the colonies for the first time, implanted a reverence and
stoked the love of liberty based on individual rights. He supplied the colonists not
only with the reasons to fight for their rights, but with the political weapons to do
battle”. (63)
All these techniques were proven effective in the battle against the Stamp Act. They
were also put to the test later, in the form of the Townshend Acts, an analysis of which is
contained later in this dissertation. One important change occurred in the events of this
time. Namely, there was a shift of political power that saw the fall of Otis and the rise of
Adams.
By the time the protests against the Stamp Act ramped up, Adams was already a
popular figure. Yet he was not elected to public office until September 27, 1765, only a
few months before the Stamp Act was eventually repealed. Thus, most of his
contribution to the Stamp Act protests was in extra-governmental organizations such as
the Sons of Liberty. So, though the groundwork was laid, Adams was mostly an
organizer at this point. It was not until he assumed the position of House Clerk in May of
1766 that he really began exercising his rhetorical abilities.
In October 1765, just weeks after the election which landed Samuel Adams a seat
in the House of Representatives, the first intercolonial meeting was held in New York to
protest the Stamp Act. Adams did not attend, but James Otis did. Though Otis
performed brilliantly at this meeting, by this time he was already thought of as somewhat
of a discombobulated character, inconsistent and often changing his mind on important
political issues, making long-winded, yet pointless speeches on the House floor. It was
noticed by those in close association with Otis that “he had become excitable, and that his
natural eccentricity was accented at times to the extent of rendering his conduct as
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irrational” (Ridpath 74). Consequently, many of his former followers were beginning to
shift their loyalty and hopes to Samuel Adams. Adams effectively took over the writings
responsibilities of the House, either penning his own works, or revising and tempering
the works of others. Here, Adams excelled and seemed to demonstrate a great capacity
for understanding how far to push an issue and when to refrain.
In 1769, Otis lost all sense of rationality. In response to the Townshend Act, he
had been locked in battle with what he saw as corrupt customs officials. Finally, Otis
published an advertisement in the Boston Gazette “declaring that [the four
commissioners] had formed a confederacy of villainy, and warn[ed] the officers of the
crown to pay no attention to them” (Ridpath 75). The following day, James Otis walked
into a coffee house where John Robinson, one of the commissioners, happened to be.
Outraged at Otis for his slanderous piece, Robinson struck Otis on the head with his cane,
seriously injuring him. After the melee, any hint of lucidity was gone. The once brilliant
legal mind and orator lost much of his mental ability. Ridpath noted that “[f]rom this
time forth the usefulness of James Otis was virtually at an end” (77). Although he
retained membership in the Boston Assembly, others began to notice his decreased
mental state. Finally, at a Boston town meeting on May 10, 1770, the assembly, by
unanimous vote approved a statement about Otis which “express[ed] our warmest wishes
for the recovery of your health and that the Community as well as all North America may
long enjoy the benefit of your public Services” (City Records 60)
The patriot cause was not lost, however. At this point, Samuel Adams had served
alongside Otis for a number of years and understood the mission and importance of the
fight for liberty. Otis' fall from power resulted in a vacuum which Adams was ready and
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able to fill. Consequently, though Adams' influence had been building for several years,
Otis' decline left Adams “in undisputed control of the popular party and the Boston
political machine” (Galvin 191). It was in this capacity that Adams shifted the course of
the patriot cause in a decidedly radical but purposeful direction. He was not alone in this
endeavor, however. Adams had a great number of tools at his side, including
relationships he had established with the people of the town, which would prove most
advantageous.
Following the ineffective implementation and eventual repeal of the Stamp Act,
the patriots celebrated, albeit briefly. Almost on cue, Parliament sent word of the
Townsend Act, which was as egregious to the colonists as the hated Stamp Act had been.
This time, however, things were different. Adams was in virtual control of the
Massachusetts House and all the pieces were in place defeat this new threat to liberty. Of
course, this would not be an easy task. It would be a battle fought in the House of
Representatives, on the streets, and, most importantly to this dissertation, in print. For
Samuel Adams had learned something about the power of the press in the process of
Stamp Act victory. It was the same lesson that newspaper publishers had learned about
themselves.
“[T]hey had become acutely aware of the political and economic pressure that
they could exert… No longer mere purveyors of information, the newspapers had
become involved in the business of shaping public opinion, a function that they
continued to exercise in subsequent episodes of the revolutionary dispute”.
(Walett 166–167)
Successful opposition and consequent repeal of the Sugar and Stamp Acts played a large
role in emboldening the patriots in their opposition to British abuses of power. As a
result, when the Townsend Act arrived on the colonial shores, Samuel Adams was ready.
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The remainder of this dissertation applies Adams' recognized rhetorical standards
and his argumentative tendencies to three distinct events occurring in Massachusetts: the
1768 Massachusetts Circular Letter, the movement of the Massachusetts General Court
from Boston to Cambridge, and the argument over the Whately letters. Each of these
events was unique and by closely examining the rhetorical construction behind the varied
arguments, we can see how Adams adheres to the same principled arguments that are
found early in his writings, even as rhetorically navigating the differing circumstances.
For it was at this point that Adams' talents and abilities, having developed for twenty
years, were finally given a platform. And we find that in the conversations between
Adams and British authorities that will be discussed in chapters four, five and six, that
Adams' strict adherence to the principles of British constitutionalism were unmoved. He
unapologetically constructed his case against British actions in terms of their violation of
these principal rights, utilizing all manner of polite conversation to stress the importance
and necessity of this ideology in the colonial political mind.
Some may wonder why I choose to skip what some consider the most infamous of
all Adams' writings, A Short Narrative of the Horrid Massacre. My reasons are several
and are outlined below.
In the first place, evidence suggests that this publication is not Adams' handiwork.
Several facts support this claim. According to the text itself, the pamphlet is a compiled
account drawn up by James Bowdoin, Dr. Joseph Warren and Samuel Pemberton.
Though John C. Miller credited Adams with a hand in the Narrative (184), most other
sources, both past and contemporary, disagreed and credited its authorship solely to those
whom appear on the author line. William Wells, for instance, reported that Bowdoin,
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Warren and Pemberton wrote the Narrative (329). Hiller Zobel stated that the Narrative
was “hastily concocted by Bowdoin himself” (213) and neither Puls, Alexander, or Stoll
mention Adams in relation so the document. Even Thomas Hutchinson himself, writing
in his History of Massachusetts Bay, though not directly, seems to credit the Narrative to
Bowdoin. Adams, however, is not mentioned in Hutchinson's discussion of this event
(279).
In fact, the only association Adams appeared to have with the document was a
short preface to the text which provided a brief account of the events which occurred on
March 5 and the circumstances for their occurrence. It is worth noting, however, that in
this portion officially attributed to Samuel Adams, he once again described the event
again in terms of constitutionality, yet with a twist. In Adams thinking, whereas other
events posed a constitutional crisis, the Boston Massacre existed as manifest proof of the
constitutional violations more than it was itself a source of constitutional dilemma.
The reasons listed above lend credence to the idea that the Narrative was not
Adams writing. But even if we were to assume Adams did have a hand in the document
and that other authors were listed to the sake of expediency, we would still have to
recognize the fact that this one piece is unrepresentative of Adams' works at large.
Consequently, it is unfortunate that some of Adams reputation mistakenly rests on this
one document. Indeed, Adams' association with this document appears to be a mistake of
historical assumptions.
There are additional reasons for not addressing this text in this dissertation. The
primary objection is that this text differs from the others because it is not really part of a
conversation. And, since conversation is the means by which rhetorical controversy can
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be traced and analyzed, the lack of a conversation makes it difficult to analyze given the
terms of this dissertation. For all the above reasons, I chose to ignore the texts
surrounding the Boston Massacre. This is not to say that it was not important, but rather
it was not withing the realm of this dissertation's purpose.
None of these hesitancies suggest that the Boston Massacre was not a pivotal
event in the struggle in which Adams was engaged. But, in keeping with his tendencies
and skills, Adams real accomplishment pertaining to this event was not writing the
narrative. Instead, his contribution was establishing March 5 as a day of
commemoration. In this way, the massacre served as a constant reminder which gave
credence to Adams' other arguments of constitutionality, a point which will be seen in
subsequent chapters. It served as a sort of proof of the consequences of tyranny and
oppression more than it offered an example of how British policy was tyrannical or
oppressive. For all the above reasons, the Narrative it does not really fit with the other
events I address in this dissertation, and for these reasons, I do not analyze it in detail.
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Chapter Four
The 1768 Massachusetts Circular Letter
The purpose of the following three chapters is to examine the way a rhetorical
definition of controversy can be understood to have played a role in some of the various
arguments taking place in the time of the pre-revolution. Recall from chapter one of this
dissertation that controversy is said to be essentially the meeting place of ideas, but that
in turn, controversy also tends to have negative effects on the quality of the necessary
debate. Recall further that in order for resolution to emerge from any disagreement, there
must be a mutually accepted inclination toward engagement of ideas, but that
controversies, by their very nature tend to cloud these meeting spaces. This, I argue is the
key to understanding the nature of the opposing sides of the Adams/Hillsborough debate
analyzed in this chapter. This chapter outlines the controversy surrounding the Circular
Letter and traces the argument between the Massachusetts House of Representatives and
Lord Hillsborough. Controversy is readily apparent in this conversation as the
accusations quickly escalated and led to greatly divided sides even more entrenched in
their own beliefs.
The defined purpose of the 1768 Circular Letter was to share the rationale and
justification of Massachusetts' actions with the rest of the colonies. Similarly, Adams and
the Massachusetts House hoped the other colonies would join them in a unified petition
against British policy. As it turned out, the 1768 Circular Letter was the spark that lit a
colonial battle over the relationship between the colonists and their British kin. As we
shall see in this chapter, rhetorical controversy can be helpful to understand the
argumentative strategies that were employed at the time. Analysis reveals a shifting
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argument that trends away from the original issues and is used to draw dire conclusions
as to the consequences of submission in the face of tyranny. I argue that to a large
degree, this shift was due to 1) Adams' strict adherence to his definition of the three
pillars of constitutionality discussed in chapter two and 2) his success in advancing and
establishing among the people these beliefs in reference to the actions taking place in
Massachusetts at the time.
By the end of 1768, James Otis' influence had begun to wane and his successor,
Samuel Adams, had already taken over as the primary writer of the Boston political
scene. Frustrated by what he viewed as repeated attempts at what was essentially
colonial suppression via illegal taxation, Adams took up his pen to express his
indignation at the Townshend Duties. The 1768 Circular Letter was the result of his
efforts. As Merrill Jensen explained, this letter was “in form, a report of the actions of
the Massachusetts House of Representatives” (250). Its form differed greatly, however,
from its effect. Though benign in appearance, the 1768 Circular Letter sparked a series
of events that had the dramatic effect of unifying the colonies around what would later
become some central tenets of the resistance movement.
The content and arguments of the Circular Letter were in principle quite similar to
the ideas espoused by James Otis and in John Dickinson's famous Farmers Letters. And
we should not be surprised, for Dickinson and the Massachusetts House were in
correspondence with one another around this time. Dickinson even sent preview copies
of his Farmers Letters to Massachusetts and requested feedback from James Otis. Given
the close relationship between Otis and Adams, it would not be surprising if Adams had a
hand in revising and tempering Dickinson's works in the same way that he did for other
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House writings. And thus, similar ideas in Dickinson's and Adams' works are to be
expected.
Regardless of which way the influence went, it is fair to say that influence existed,
the agendas and ideas were shared, and Dickinson and Otis/Adams had a mutual respect
for one another. This point is further evidenced by a couple anecdotes. First, it seems
that Dickinson believed that Otis' and Adams' work would be key to successfully
opposing British policy. In a letter written to James Otis just a few weeks before the
Circular Letter was written, Dickinson revealed that “whenever the Cause of American
Freedom is to be vindicated, I look towards the Province of Massachusetts Bay. She
must, as she has hitherto done, first kindle the Sacred Flame, that on such occasions must
warm and illuminate the Continent” (Warren-Adams Letters, 1743-1777 3). Otis would
have certainly shared this information with his right-hand man, Samuel Adams. And
support from Dickinson would have certainly given Adams a sense of importance.
Secondly, just as Dickinson approved of Massachusetts' role in the resistance, so
too did the town of Boston publicly approve Dickinson's Farmer's Letters. On March 21,
1768, Boston voted “that the thanks of the town be given to the ingenious author of a
course of letters, published at Philadelphia and in this this place, signed 'A Farmer,'
wherein the rights of the American subjects are clearly stated and fully vindicated” (qtd.
in Stille 91–92). Thus we can see that despite the physical distance separating them,
when it came to American liberty, Adams and Dickinson were kindred spirits.
At this point, controversy was brewing, but its manifestation was still to come.
The response to the Circular Letter provided ample opportunity. The story behind the
creation of the letter itself exemplifies the tremendous degree of care that was being taken
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by Boston's popular leaders to portray themselves in a very specific light. The fact that
they were in a public relations kind of fight for the allegiance of the people was not lost
on them. But to understand the situation in 1768, one must first grasp the history of the
Townshend Act against which Adams was writing. That story begins in 1766.
In 1766, Parliament and the colonists were already not on the best of terms. News
of the protests against the Stamp Act, including the violence and threats perpetrated
against officials, had reached the English shore. This added to the already existing
distaste for Boston's reaction to the Quartering Act. Much to the chagrin of Britain's
leaders, most colonial legislatures had simply refused to comply with the law. The
Townshend Act was in part a reaction to the colonies ignoring the Quartering Act, so the
latter deserves a brief mention here.
The Quartering Act was the brainchild of General Thomas Gage, commander of
the British Army in America. Provisions of the act required that troops be provided
housing and the necessary supplies to live at the expense of the colonial legislatures
(Jensen 66–69). This law was poorly received for a number of reasons. In the first place,
the very presence of a standing army in the colonies was considered by many (including
Samuel Adams) to be a standing threat to liberties. Furthermore, colonial legislatures had
not requested troops and they were now being forced to provide them supplies at their
own expense. Finally, somewhat paradoxically, it was the presence of the troops in the
colonies that provided the impetus for taxation (in the form of the Sugar and Stamp Acts)
in the first place. , Jensen reported that for these reasons “[m]ost colonial legislatures
refused to pay [the cost of housing troops] and within five years, the law was a dead
letter” (69). Understanding of the Quartering Act is important because it served as a
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precursor to the next stage of colonial discontent.
In January of 1767, it was reported to Parliament the cost of maintaining a troop
presence in the American colonies would be approximately £400,000 (Jensen 223). It
therefore fell upon the duty of Parliament and the minister to figure out a way to raise this
money. Britain was broke and Charles Townshend, then the Chancellor of the Exchequer
(equivalent to the Secretary of the Treasury in the modern United States), promised to
find enough revenue in the colonies to pay for all the expenses of troop presence. This
promise, it seems, was made rather carelessly for the purposes of political expediency.
Unfortunately for Townshend, making the promise proved easier than fulfilling it.
Townshend's proposals were numerous and included moving troops from the American
frontier and placing them in cities, charging Americans for the expenses of Indian affairs,
and imposing import duties at American ports. Jensen made it clear that though there
were a few clearer heads present who suggested minor changes, ultimately, “American
policy was determined by an irresponsible chancellor of the exchequer and by a majority
of Parliament more determined than ever to demonstrate British sovereignty over the
colonies” (225).
The result was the Townshend Duties, the news of which arrived on colonial
shores in 1768. For a few months prior, colonists had heard rumors of the decisions
made to punish the colonies and assert British control over the new world, but no one was
quite ready for the severity of the new law. The Townshend Duties seemed especially
egregious, considering that over the last fifteen years, Parliament had twice tried asserting
their control over the colonies in the form of unacceptable taxes and duties. Both times
these bills were met with fierce organized opposition that ultimately ended in Parliament
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revising and rescinding the Sugar and Stamp Acts, respectively. Consequently, many
colonists saw the Townshend Act as little more than a bully move by Parliament as if to
say, “we will tax you just to prove we can.” As seen above, colonists were partially
correct in their perception.
The Townshend Act consisted of three parts. The first was the Revenue Act of
1767 or as Merrill Jensen has called it, “one of the most futile and inept laws of the age”
(226–227). This portion of the act interfered with American exports by placing heavy
duties on imported goods. Moreover, money collected from these duties would be used
to pay colonial public officials such as judges and governors whom colonists had no part
in electing. As a result, the opposition to this part of the Townshend Act extended far
beyond simply opposing taxation: it bordered on a Constitutional challenge. For the right
to vote for one’s own officials and their salaries was among the most cherished rights of
the colonists in the republican ideology present during this era.
The second part of the Townshend Act suspended the New York Assembly as
punishment for ignoring the Quartering Act of 1765 (see above). This part of the Act also
alarmed colonists because it ostensibly interfered with the concept of independent
colonial legislatures.
The third and final piece of Townshend’s bill established an American board of
customs in an attempt to streamline the process of dealing with merchant complaints and
problems. In a failure of reason, Parliament appointed five already unpopular men to this
new board and placed it in the town of Boston, home of some of the most outspoken
members of the colonial resistance and experienced leaders of public incitement,
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including John Adams, James Otis, Thomas Cushing, Joseph Warren, Josiah Quincy, Jr.,
Benjamin Church and the subject of this dissertation, Samuel Adams.
Though the act was only law for less than three years, this time period consisted
of a drastic change of colonial mindset and the gradual solidification of colonial thought
that had been stewing for a decade.
Initial responses were mixed, so much so that Governor Bernard and Thomas
Hutchinson originally doubted that there would be any serious opposition in Boston.
August 14, 1767, was the second anniversary of the date on which the mob had hanged
Andrew Oliver in effigy in protest of the Stamp Act and served to remind these officials
that the mob was still aware of the happenings. Governor Bernard “identified the
'desperadoes' as Otis and his gang'” (Jensen 244). Over the next few months, the Boston
protestors took to the pages of the Boston Gazette to make their case for the
unconstitutionality of the new law, focusing particularly on the part that affected the New
York Assembly, an issue that due to New York's relatively conservative assembly was
mostly ignored by New York itself. Governor Bernard was under suspicion that there
was a tacit agreement between the two cities, whereby Boston would do the work of
protesting in the newspapers and then New York papers would simply copy the articles.
Jensen reported that this is exactly what happened, with New York's “Holt Journal
faithfully [copying] propaganda from the Boston Gazette during the winter of 1767-68”
(Jensen 245). Here again, one can see the way newspapers were used for their appeal and
the wide reach which they had.
The Townshend Duties were set to go into effect on November 20. On that day,
Thomas Hutchinson attended the town meeting with some friends and together, they
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made an argument for the government side of the issue “with such spirit that they
'silenced the Sons of Liberty.'” On the same night, as a preview of the mental stresses
that would overcome him in the near future, James Otis also gave a “long speech entirely
on the side of the government.” This was obviously not in the interest of the opposition,
so in response, the Boston Gazette did its best to downplay Otis' speech, noting only that
he had made an “animated address” (qtd. in Jensen 246). There was not, however, total
unity among the Boston press. In fact, other newspapers in town applauded Otis and
accused the Boston Gazette of not being able to print a full report because doing so would
have been an “antidote to the poison” they had been spreading with articles (qtd. in
Jensen 246) that had been penned by Adams and others over the previous months.
The “poison” referred to above is the kind of material credited to Samuel Adams.
Together with the team of Edes and Gill, Adams peppered the pages of the Gazette with
newspaper articles and happenings of the House of Representatives. In a commonly
repeated anecdote referencing this era, Harrison noted that
Samuel Adams was only the most persistent of the group of writers who kept the
columns of the Gazette filled with assaults on authority [and] conspired to keep
the 'war of words' going at full blast. John Adams tells of spending a Sunday
evening with a group of them 'preparing for the next day’s newspaper,--a curious
employment, cooking up paragraphs, articles, occurrences, &c., working the
political engine!' (213).
One of the most important of Adams' written pieces came into play at this time. It
is here that the negotiation of argument and controversy mentioned in chapter one truly
began. There is no doubt that Adams was opposed to the new law. In principle at least,
the Townshend Duties were as egregious as the Stamp Act had been and, in many ways,
they mirrored each other in their constitutional violations. Thus, as the date of enactment
approached, Samuel Adams was uncharacteristically quiet. He spent a good deal of time
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in his office, writing and thinking about the new law. Perhaps he realized that with James
Otis' failing health, it would be his burden to explain to the people of the colony what
was wrong with this new law and why failure to oppose it would have deleterious effects
on the well-being of the colonists. Perhaps he had taken note of the power of a unified
opposition in scaring off the Stamp agents and wondered if a similar tactic would be
effective here as well.
In any case, it was around this time that Adams “began to work on a document
that could be used to rally the colonies into a single chorus of protest” (Puls 69) which
was to take the form of a letter of protest to the king. A number of rhetorical factors were
considered by Adams when crafting the piece. He was not writing in a vacuum, but “had
to consider not only the king's eyes, but the colonists' hearts and to appeal to both
audiences at once... [b]ut [he] also needed to win advocates from Britain” (70). The
result was a deeply rhetorical document that straddled the fine line of “firmly stat[ing] the
colonial case while encouraging empathy abroad” (Puls 70), all while avoiding the charge
of treason that could result from challenging the authority of the king. A letter was
drafted by Adams which was presented to the House of Representatives on January 6,
1768. Due to the boldness of this essay, it was carefully revisited seven times before
being approved and sent to the Massachusetts Agent Denny De Berdt in Britain, to be
eventually forwarded to the king.
Adams doubted that the letter would have any real effect in England, so he
followed it up with the second part of his plan to unite the colonies in common resistance
to British oppression. The letter, now known as the 1768 Circular Letter, was proposed
to the House of Representatives on January 21, 1768. Because of fears by House
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members that this letter would prompt accusations of pursuing independence, the motion
“failed by a two-to-one margin” (Puls 73). Not ready to give up, Adams began to muster
support for the motion through backroom negotiations, which worked to such great effect
that the second time the motion was put forth, it was carried by a large majority. As an
added victory for Adams, the previously failed vote was expunged from the official
record.
The letter has been viewed with differing degrees of importance from various
historians. Mark Puls noted that “[t]he publication made a deep impression on the
readers in Britain and America and attracted more attention than any other colonial paper
at the time. British leaders were alarmed...at the threat of a united America... [and] [t]he
ministry viewed the circular letter as the colonies' most defiant act yet toward the British
Government”(73–74). Elsewhere, it has been described as “a moderate document
couched in temperate language that mildly protested” (qtd. in Stoll 68). John C. Miller,
on the other hand, credited the letter with “formulat[ing] a new theory of colonial rights
to combat the Townshend duties” (123), while Fowler noted that the letter was to
Governor Bernard, “an infamous document, and its circulation a singular personal
embarrassment” (80).
These differing views say less about the nature of the letter than they do to help
judge the merits of British reaction, for as Jensen explained, “[t]he Circular letter did
produce a 'union' of the colonies, not because of its merits, but because it was answered
by a circular letter from England presenting a challenge that no colonial legislature could
ignore” (251). Thus it was not necessarily the Adams' letter that accomplished the union,
but rather the response to Adams' letter which led to union. And it is here that we are
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able to see controversy at work. What Adams said to spark the reaction, what
fundamental theory of colonial rights were put forth, and what kind of response was
triggered is the issue of this analysis.
The House of Representatives of Massachusetts to the Speaker of Other Houses of
Representatives [The 1768 Circular Letter], February 11, 1768
Importantly, the arguments presented by Adams and Hillsborough are not
necessarily the main subject of this analysis. Rather, it is controversy manifest as a result
of the arguments that interests me. Controversy is made apparent when looking at the
movement of ideas as we observe the back-and-forth between Hillsborough and the
House. Consequently, though Adams' Circular Letter was mostly unremarkable in its
content, it is important for starting a conversation that created an opportunity for
rhetorical controversy to appear.
To a large degree, Adams recycled ideas that preceded him and had been
presented by people like John Dickinson. But despite these similarities, there was
something unique about Adams' letter which bears mentioning. Whereas John Dickinson
had written from the perspective of an anonymous farmer living somewhere in
Pennsylvania, Adams' writing, by virtue of its passage in the House of Representatives,
exemplified the collective mindset of the entire Massachusetts Bay colony. This
difference, I argue, was one of the reasons that British official responded as they did.
Consequently, though the Circular Letter's arguments were familiar, its impact
was great. The main difference was not in the words, or claims, but in the response that
resulted. This is not to say that Dickinson's Farmer's Letters did not garner a response
from loyalists, but any rebuttal was not as well-known and did not result in the same
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degree of fervor spawned by the Circular Letter response. With Adams' text, however,
there is a clear response from the British government, which resulted in an observable
colonial unification as all the colonial legislative bodies eventually approved the
document. It is this response and the dialogue between the Massachusetts House and the
Royal Government that allows for an analysis of rhetorical controversy. In the next
section, I conduct a close reading of the Circular Letter and locate the main arguments
which caused such a reaction from Lord Hillsborough.
Arguments of the Circular Letter
The Circular Letter was penned by Adams and passed by the Massachusetts
House of Representatives in early February 1768. From there, it was sent to lower
houses of assemblies in other colonies in hopes that it would create a sort of unified voice
of opposition. Again, though the suggestions contained in the letter were not
groundbreaking, Adams' position as a representative of the people, and the Circular
Letter's approval in the House, meant that his words carried with them the tacit approval
of the people of Massachusetts Bay. Consequently, though the sentiments might have
been recycled, statements that might have been dismissed as the rantings of a disgruntled
individual suddenly carried great weight. I argue that Adams contributed two important
ideas within the Circular Letter that contributed to reifying a new form of colonial
identity that was based on colonial rights over submission to Parliament. The first of
these was the rather bold observance that representatives from the individual colonies
should, as Adams stated it, “harmonize with each other.” The second idea was that of
constitutionally-sanctioned limits to Parliamentary power, that the Constitution was
greater than Parliament and consequently Parliament was subject to the Constitution.
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These were bold ideas for their day, especially when coming from a legislative body.
Consequently, Adams' letter virtually demanded a response from a British authority. This
response illustrates where controversy gained its first hold in the argument.
Adams' call for “harmonization” was not a new idea nor was it terribly radical. In
one form or another, unification had long been desired by Adams and other
revolutionaries who realized that cooperation was necessary to successful implementation
of their plans, particularly the non-importation agreements. In addition, some unification
had occurred just a few years prior when the Stamp Act Congress had convened and
crafted a set of resolutions which outlined many of the same concerns which plagued
Adams' Boston: lack of representation; illegal taxes; due rights of Englishmen, etc. Yet
the legality of the Stamp Act Congress itself had been questioned. And it was no stretch
of the imagination to see the potential dangers to British sovereignty brought on by a
unified colonial voice. Although Adams did not explicitly call for another assembly, it
seems feasible to speculate that were ties between the various colonies to be
strengthened, such congress might eventually occur. Thus, it seems reasonable to
speculate that Hillsborough was at least mildly anxious about the idea of harmonization.
There were other factors to consider as well. Since the events of the Stamp Act,
the leaders of Boston had grown rowdier in their efforts to stave off what it viewed as
intrusive legislation. Consequently, several years of unruliness buoyed by Boston's
recognition that their techniques were having the desired effect created even more
distress among the British at the notion of “harmonization” and sharing ideas among the
colonies. As noted before, the legality of the Stamp Act congress had been questioned
and British officials perhaps reasoned any kind of idea dissemination might result in
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other colonial leaders being “infected” by Boston's ceaseless discontent. Therefore,
“harmonization” of colonial thought and complaints was the last thing British officials
desired.
The word choice plays an important role here, particularly the selection of the
word “harmonize.” The phrase has musical connotations, for to harmonize is to refrain
from discord and work toward a more melodious end. In the same way, for colonies to
harmonize with one another means to get rid of the discord that had occasionally been
present between various colonies and work in concert with one another to a certain goal.
We must recognize that not all of the other colonies at the time were quite in line with
Boston's progressive stance on resistance. Some (or perhaps most), like Pennsylvania,
were more wary of disturbance and considered British policies in less dire terms and
Massachusetts as the factious colony. Therefore it is entirely possible that this
“harmony” or a standardization of outrage was exactly what the British feared. It was
easy for Britain to respond to the discontented claims of a single colony; but an
integrated, standardized, organized opposition would have been much more difficult to
rebut. Complaints arising from a single entity can be dismissed as the rantings of a few
fringe figures. An intercolonial united complaint, however, would have been much
harder to dismiss. Unionization, in this case, would give credence to the complaints. It
could be said that Adams understood the necessity of a united front against British actions
if for no other reason than for the sake of granting legitimacy to Boston's grievances.
And for this reason, Britain was especially displeased with the thought of a unified
campaign.
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Adams' method seems to be to suggest an action which is considered by most
objective readers to be a common-sense solution to the problem, yet knowingly
positioning the argument so that any reaction from Britain would itself assist in the union
of the colonies. For though the letter was technically penned to “the speakers of other
houses of representatives,” Adams realized that his letter would eventually reach British
eyes as well. Therefore, the very act of suggesting harmonization had a chance of
deleteriously effecting British/American relations. If Britain allowed this letter to
circulate with no response, colonial friendship would have been strengthened. But if
Adams' letter happened to invoke an overreaction, that too would have most likely
benefited the colonial case. It was a win-win situation for Adams, but only if he could
frame the suggestion in a seemingly nonthreatening way. Adams certainly would have
recognized the precarious proposition he was suggesting, so in an effort to be cautious,
Adams couched his request as a response to a high-order problem.
The source of Adams' discontent was the recognition that there was a problem that
needed to be resolved. That is to say Adams bases his argument squarely in the realm of
the conjectural and definitional aspects of stasis. In other words, Adams asserted that
there was a problem in the colonies (conjectural) and that it existed as a dilemma of
constitutional proportions (definitional). 1 These points will arise again in the discussion
of the British response.
The second important part of Adams' letter was his “formulating a new theory of
colonial rights.” Adams did this by framing the argument around the “pillars” of British
Constitutionalism and the inherent rights thereof.
Statis is perhaps best defined in book three of Quintilian's Institutio oratoria and is loosely
understood as a means of discovering the question that is being disputed. (Quintilian, 3.6.44-104).
Without first settling on a point of stasis, true deliberation is impossible.
1
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As discussed earlier, the lack of a codified Constitution in British law had
generally meant that anything a democratically-elected parliament passed was, by
definition, constitutional; for the ability of the citizens to elect new representatives was
their guarantee of liberties. This was not a concept exclusive to Britain; in fact the same
thought process was sanctioned by James Otis when he wrote that Parliament was a “selfcorrection [entity] sensitive to the principles of justice and responsive to the admonitions
of the courts” (Bailyn, Origins 180). Yet the idea that Parliament was not an unlimited
entity was gaining steam in the intellectual circles of American colonies. The suggestion
that Parliament was limited in the scope of its actions was a fairly radical departure from
previously accepted truths.
The transition began by “referring to constitutions as 'a sort of fundamental laws'”
(Bailyn, Origins 180) and eventually progressed to “distinguish fundamentals from
institutions and form the actions of the government so that they might serve as limits and
controls” (Bailyn, Origins 181). Thus, we must understand that Adams was not the only
one thinking in these terms. Indeed, on the same day the Circular Letter was published
in the Boston Gazette (March 14, 1768), the Boston Evening Post ran the third of a threepart series entitled The NATURE and EXTENT of PARLIAMENTARY POWER
Considered. Instead, Adams was simply among the first, and perhaps the most wellknown individual, to broadcast these ideas. The fact that he spoke as an official
representative of Massachusetts gave his words even more weight. Bernard Bailyn spoke
to this cultural shift when he explained the burgeoning theory of constitutional limits that
was being formed about the time that Adams wrote the Circular Letter. Bailyn cited the
Philadelphia resident William Hicks who wrote in 1768 that “If one were to concede that
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statutes were 'a part of the [Constitution]' simply because they were once promulgated by
government, one would have no basis for restraining the actions of any government” (qtd.
in Bailyn, Origins 181) and John Joachim Zubly who noted in his 1769 An Humble
Inquiry that “Parliament derives its authority and power from the constitution, and not the
constitution from the Parliament. [Thus] the liberties of Englishmen arise from and
depend on the English Constitution, which is permanent and ever the same whereas the
individuals which compose the Parliament are changed at least once every seven years...”
(Zubly 58).
When seen in terms of a movement, Adams' writing fit nicely into this progression
of thought, but his major contribution was to cut through the niceties and call it as he saw
it. Hence, in his 1768 Circular Letter, Adams makes that leap and proposed a new theory
of legislative regulation which posits a revolutionary concept: namely that “in all free
States the Constitution is fix'd; & as the supreme Legislative derives its Power &
Authority from the Constitution, it cannot overleap the Bounds of it without destroying
its own foundation” (Adams, Volume 1 185). Thus Adams' writing represents a step in the
series of movements which establish the importance of an unchanging, objective
“standard” that Parliament should be held to.
The issue of loyalty to a sovereign was not a new topic for, as mentioned earlier,
Adams himself had pondered the lengths of loyalty in the essays that appeared in the
Independent Advertiser some twenty years prior. But the idea of some sort of external,
objective measure of Parliamentary limits represented a bold advancement of the growing
philosophy. Again, as noted above, it was not a spontaneous creation by Samuel Adams,
but was an advancement from philosophies that had come before, including Dickinson's
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Farmer's Letters. Yet even among Adams' works, the Circular Letter is not the first time
that the phrase “In all free states the Constitution is fixed” was used in an official letter.
In fact, in what might adequately be called a preview letter, Adams had penned the same
general ideas found in the 1768 Circular Letter in a separate letter to the Earl of
Shelburne on January 15, 1768, just a few weeks prior to the Circular Letter being
approved and sent out. Much like the Circular Letter, the letter to Shelburne was also
recognized for its revolutionary claims and was the subject of much debate before it was
eventually approved by the House and sent on its way (Puls 72). The 1768 Circular
Letter, however, marked the first time that these ideas were being transmitted to other
colonies in an effort to demonstrate Parliament's overreach. This difference, perhaps, is
what sparked such a reaction.
It is this notion of constitutional limits on Parliamentary law that formed the
central theme of the letter. The structure of his reasoning refers again to the
aforementioned “pillars” of British Constitutionalism. His reasoning went like this:
-The Constitution was fixed.
-The Constitution consisted of several key rights including the rights of property
and rights of representation.
-Because these rights were native aspects of a fixed Constitution, they were fixed
as well.
-Whereas the Constitution guaranteed the right of representation, the
representative body of Parliament was thereby given power through the Constitution.
-Therefore for Parliament to defy the Constitution and tax without representation,
it eroded its own source of authority.
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But for Adams, the situation was clear: seeing Parliament in terms of their
statutory limits meant that the colonies did indeed have a case against taxation. The
argument carried significant weight, for it legitimized Boston's revolt against the Stamp
Act and their complaints against the Townshend Act. It was as if the colonists had known
all along that they were right, but now they had the constitutional theory to prove their
rightness. They were retroactively exonerated.
The important point, however, is that Adams based his entire argument squarely
on the realm of the constitutionality of the issue. Furthermore, Adams made it clear that
the necessity of this letter is solely the result of the British law. In essence, Adams was
saying that if such a policy had not been enacted which required the kind of
harmonization that he advocated for here, then the Circular Letter would not have been
necessary. As is stood, however, the British policy had instigated the actions of the letter
and the policy was ultimately responsible for the letter's existence. The rhetorical
invention accomplished here is justifying the cause of the letter in a way that puts the
burden on Britain, rather than the colonies. This is a sort of preemptive rebuttal to
Britain's likely response that Adams was inciting colonial displeasure toward Parliament.
There are other rhetorical considerations as well, including constitutional definitions
contained within; among these are Boston citizens' designation as British citizens by
which they were privy to certain rights such as the right to the redress of grievances.
Consequently then, the Circular Letter was to be thought of as a natural reaction to what
colonists considered illegal actions.
There was also speculation that the colonial claims were being misrepresented to
Parliament. Adams wrote that the Massachusetts House “have too much reason to
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believe that the Enemys [sic] of the Colonys [sic] have represented them to his Majestys
[sic] Ministers & the parliament as factious disloyal & having a disposition to make
themselves independent of the mother country” (Volume 1 188). Noting such
misrepresentation had the effect of further justifying Boston's decision to write this letter
as only defending themselves from rumors and slander. Furthermore, in this opening
explanation describing the purpose of this letter, Adams referred to the intent as one of a
“candid” nature. That is, the goal of the Massachusetts House was clear and transparent,
not the result of any malicious manipulative agenda.
In sum, the 1768 Circular Letter made a number of claims. These included limits
on Parliamentary authority and providing a justification for colonial actions. Rhetorically
speaking, Adams was defining the terms of the argument and starting the conversation
out on his best foot. He set the table and invited British officials to dine on his terms. As
we shall see, their response was the equivalent of smashing the fine china. Furthermore,
the letter reinforced and built upon claims made by the Farmer's Letter and other writings
circulating in America and London.
Jensen reported that at the time the Circular Letter reached England, “London was
in turmoil” and “[Secretary of state for the colonies, Lord] Hillsborough was in no mood
to take any nonsense from America” (253). “Fearing that the circular letter might
produce another colonial congress... [he] immediately wrote to Governor Bernard and
instructed him to tell the House that the circular letter must be rescinded” (Alexander 54).
Bernard presented the order to the House on June 21, 1768, and shortly thereafter coupled
the order to an ultimatum: either rescind the letter, or the House would be dissolved.
After deliberation, a vote was held at which by a tally of 92 to 17, the House voted to
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deny Bernard's order. From this point forward, toasts to “the glorious 92” would be
common in colonial America.
Circular letter to the governors in America, April 21, 1768
Hillsborough's letter to Bernard was followed by another circular letter to all
colonial governors. This letter is of particular interest to this study as it demanded that
they ignore Massachusetts' Circular Letter. As noted above, Samuel Adams had centered
his argument around the constitutionality of British policies, yet the interesting part of
Hillsborough's response is not what it said, but what it left unmentioned. Nowhere in the
letter did Hillsborough address the pertinent issues raised by Adams or respond in any
substantive way to the constitutional philosophy that Adams put forth. Instead, the tone
of Hillsborough's letter was dismissive and repudiating. Indeed, one gets the feeling that
Hillsborough held the claims in Adams' letter to be completely absurd and would be thus
viewed by any objective reader as silly and not worth the paper and ink it would have
taken to respond. Hillsborough was obviously of the mindset that Parliament could not
be questioned, and therefore to do so would have been foolhardy. Instead, Hillsborough
dismissed the Circular Letter as a “flagitious attempt to disturb the public peace” (Jensen,
Documents 717).
It is unknown what drew Hillsborough's ire: the fact that Adams proposed
“harmonization,” or the new form of constitutional theory he was submitting to the public
forum. Either way, Hillsborough would not stand for it and he lambasted Adams and the
rest of the legislature of Massachusetts for writing a “seditious paper,” meant to “excite
and encourage an open opposition to and denial of the authority of Parliament.” It was a
brief but pointed piece, scathing in its accusations and sharp in its tone. Hillsborough
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accused Adams of perverting the principles of the Constitution to his own ends. The
Massachusetts letter, Hillsborough said, was “of a most dangerous and factious form,
calculated to inflame the minds of his good subjects in the colonies...and to subvert the
true principles of the constitution” (Jensen, Documents 716–717). He warned the other
colonies, not-so-subtly, that the correct response to Adams’ letter was to “take no notice
of it,” and “[treat] it with the contempt it deserves” (Jensen, Documents 717).
We find, particularly in his letter to the Governors, a complete absence of any
recognition of legitimacy granted to Adams' philosophical advance. Instead, what we see
in Adams' construction is what Kenneth Phillips called the “decline of public
deliberation.” That is to say in Adams' rhetorical construction, the opportunity for
argument was severely truncated, due mainly to what I believe were conscious decisions
to base the substance of his argument on constitutional issues. For the rights of property,
representation and trial by juries were regarded by Adams as incontrovertible pillars of
the British system of government. This notion existed not only in Adams' mind, but also
(one could assume from the political make-up of the House) in the general population of
both the colonies and mainland Britain. These were the rights that had been a part of a
proud British heritage for hundreds of years and perhaps even more so because of the fact
that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 was not that far back in English history.
In truth, Hillsborough seemed unwilling to engage in the civil discussion of the
merits of Parliamentary regulation, and indeed, there was really no way that he could
have. In fact, the very structure of Adams' argument had made the issue nearly
impossible to be debated in a civil manner at all. Hillsborough accused the Circular
Letter of attempting to “[subvert] the true principles of the constitution,” yet he did not
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explain what exactly these true principles were. Adams' claim was that the rights of
property and representation were systemic within the structure of constitutional law, yet
Hillsborough seemed to implicitly disagree with this stance. But if the assertion of these
noble rights were “subvert[ing] the true principles of the constitution” the reasonable
question is what exactly the true principles of the Constitution were. Hillsborough did
not venture into the debate over the definition of constitutionality, for as mentioned
above, doing so would have been nearly impossible, or at least quite troublesome.
In actuality, Hillsborough had only three options when responding to Adams, each
of them dangerous in its own right. He could have denied that the rights described by
Adams were in fact essential parts of the Constitution or he could have argued that the
colonists were not actually British citizens and thus were not privy to the rights granted to
Englishmen. These two possibilities would have required a great deal of constitutional
debate to be settled; for if he were to argue the former, then the obvious questions of what
constituted constitutional rights were would certainly be raised; but if the latter, then it
could have been argued that if the colonists were not British citizens, why were they
under any obligation to British rule at all? The third option, which was taken by
Hillsborough, was to ignore that there was any substance to Adams' claim and simply
demand their dismissal. Hillsborough's response, therefore, represents a prime example
of the manner by which controversy can negatively influence the opportunity for
discourse. There was, simply, a strict unwillingness to engage the opposition, a decision
made more expedient by the fact that Adams framed the debate in terms of foundational
ideals.
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Hillsborough did not want to, and in fact could not, engage in the debate or allow
the various colonial houses of representation to do so either. For to allow debate on a
question granted a degree of legitimacy to the question. Furthermore, debating the
question of Parliamentary sovereignty would have undermined the most central tenets of
the colonial/Parliamentary relationship and would have resulted in increasing difficulty
when trying to justify the taxation policies. Were debate to be allowed, inevitable
questions would have been raised and more skepticism drawn. Thus Hillsborough closed
his letter with the explicit expectation that the various governors would heed his letter
and renounce Massachusetts' feeble attempt at inciting insurrection. He also ordered the
various governors to resist acceptance of the letter in their respective assemblies and
warned them that if there was any action in the assemblies or even a “disposition” to
receive or act on Massachusetts Circular Letter, they were to “prevent any proceeding
upon it by an immediate prorogation or dissolution” (Jensen, Documents 717).
The severity of the threat indicates the severity of the issue in the mind of
Hillsborough. In essence, there was no opportunity to reason with the Massachusetts
House. It is quite possible that by this time most of the British leadership was fed up
with the constant stream of objections coming from Samuel Adams and others.
Had Hillsborough been less severe in this insistence, his suggestion may not have
gotten the reception it did. But in an attempt to shutter one debate, Hillsborough
inadvertently opened a new one which was arguably far greater in its effect. Instead of
heeding the warning, one by one, the colonies of New Jersey, Virginia, Connecticut,
Maryland, Rhode Island, Delaware, Georgia, North Carolina and South Carolina all
defied Hillsborough, approved the Circular Letter and rallied behind Massachusetts.
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Pennsylvania also implicitly approved the letter, though they offered no official response
(Jensen, Founding 261–262). In addition, some colonies took supplemental steps which
antagonized the motherland. Virginia, for instance, approved the Massachusetts Circular
Letter and issued their own, even more gratuitously rebellious that Massachusetts'. In it,
Virginia encouraged the other colonies to join closely with one another to oppose those
measures “they think will have an immediate tendency to enslave them” (The Colonial
Records of the State of Georgia 654). Upon receiving the letter, Rhode Island declared
the Townsend Act unconstitutional and affirmed the Massachusetts letter, stating that
Hillsborough’s demands only confirmed “the necessity of a general union when the
oppression is common” (qtd. in Jensen, Founding 258).
Hillsborough had fumbled. His insistence and attempted discrediting of the
Massachusetts House led to the antithesis of the desired effect. He had bound the
colonies to one another in a way Samuel Adams could not have imagined. By the end of
1768, only New Hampshire had not publicly endorsed Massachusetts' actions. As
Canfield noted, “[t]he effort by the British government to compel the colonies to
renounce the Massachusetts Circular Letter aroused a fever of opposition. [Adams]
believed that no step taken in his colony had more united the country” (44).
But what is it about Adams' letter, and Hillsborough's response that touched such a
nerve? Certainly constitutional concerns had been raised with the threat to dissolve the
legislatures if they were to consider the letter, so the question then becomes why
Hillsborough thought he could get away with such a suggestion. The answer to this
question, I believe, lies in the realm of rhetorical controversy.
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There are two distinct factors at work here: the first being the work of Adams and
the second being Hillsborough's response. As to the first, Adams framed the argument in
a way that could not really be refuted in any short length of time: a problem made worse
by the four-month delay caused when sending letters overseas and back again by ship.
Hillsborough's hand was forced, in a way, to respond in the only way he could: with
complete dismissal and a stern warning, which as noted above caused a whole other
series of problems for colonial/British relations and only resulted in increasing the
controversy of the issue and further decreasing the possibility of reconciliation. Thus we
find this a prime instance of the controversy Goodnight speaks of when he wrote that
“[c]ontroversies [are] generative of argumentation without inviting an open, reflective
discussion of the controversial” (3).
Here we find a hallmark of rhetorical controversy, namely that when faced with an
argument one cannot win based on substance, controversy rules out engagement and
leads to the decision to simply dismiss, attack, or repudiate, which as shall be seen below,
can be effective so long as those being dismissed do not represent an underestimated
majority.
As to the second part regarding the “why” of Hillsborough's writing, I believe his
decision to dismiss Adams' points was ultimately what led to the tone of his letter to the
governors. Hillsborough had to respond, but could not (for the reasons mentioned above)
rebut Adams at length. Therefore, an ultimatum seemed to be the most prudent solution:
a decision perhaps exacerbated by a certain degree of confidence that Massachusetts was
universally viewed with skepticism. For when reading Hillsborough's letter certain
phrases seem to suggest a sense of a certain self-assurance, as if Hillsborough thought he
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was only reaffirming the commonly accepted notion that Massachusetts was seen by the
other colonies as just “that rowdy northern colony.” One example is Hillsborough's
determination that the Circular Letter was “calculated to inflame the mind of [the king's]
good subjects in the colonies” (Jensen, Documents 717). Note that in this example, there
was a segmentation of perpetrator and victim where Boston is considered separate from
“good subjects.”
Doing so indicates Hillsborough's rather poor judgment on the “feel” of the
colonial temperament. Perhaps Hillsborough was misled by his advisors with a sort of
“group think” or what Brian Garsten would call the dangerous result of “like-minded
individuals talking to one another” (4). Or perhaps it was a mistaken characterization of
the “universal audience” where Hillsborough assumed all colonies held disdain for the
steady constitutional drivel seeping from the Massachusetts House and thus thought it
prudent and effective to “disqualif[y] the recalcitrant” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
33) through a simple warning to the other colonies.
Regardless, Hillsborough's letter was read differently than had been intended.
Rather than heed his warning, Hillsborough's letter had proven again to the colonies the
breadth of infractions on constitutional issues. Hillsborough's threat was an abridgment
of the most treasured rights of assembly, including the right to freely meet and discuss as
representatives of the people. The various colonial assemblies recognized it as such.
The main point in this analysis is to notice how controversy in the situation tends
to shut down discussion and debate. And, as we shall see shortly, Hillsborough's
response provided an opportunity for Samuel Adams to powerfully respond.
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Letter from the Right Hon the Earl of Hillsborough, dated Whitehall, April 22, 1768
Hillsborough also spoke indirectly to the Massachusetts House of Representatives
in a letter written on April 22, 1768, and received by the House sometime in June of the
same year. The letter was actually addressed to Governor Francis Bernard, who thus
found himself embroiled in the conflict. More out of duty than desire (judging by
Bernard's preface to the forwarded letter in which he explained that he was “merely
ministerial in this business” and that though the House may see it otherwise, “I must
nevertheless to my duty”), Bernard forwarded Hillsborough's letter on to the House who,
upon reading it, were displeased by its sentiments. Yet at the same time, Adams must
have looked on the piece with great anticipation, for it afforded him great opportunity to
double down on his claims and provide more justification for Massachusetts' actions.
Hillsborough's letter was little more than an almost informally-written, businesslike request to Bernard ordering the House to rescind the Circular Letter. In it, however,
was an attempt to explain the curious occurrences in the Massachusetts House.
Hillsborough believed there must be an explanation for the strange actions since he
adheres to the notion that the people of Massachusetts, being “good subjects” who
displayed a “spirit of decency, and love of order” would have never consciously allowed
or approved such a scandalous bit of philosophy as was contained in the Circular Letter.
There may be some truth to this assertion as it is well-known that the Circular Letter was
only passed as the result of some backroom dealings. Consequently, Hillsborough found
his explanation for the events in his assessment of the way the Circular Letter was
approved. It was only through “a very unfair proceeding” by “a thin house at the end of
the session” that such a “measure of so inflammatory a nature” was ever approved.
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Furthermore, according to Hillsborough, the letter's goals were clear: it is “evidently
tending to create unwarrantable combinations, to excite an unjustifiable opposition to the
constitutional authority of parliament, and to revive those unhappy divisions and
distractions which have operated so prejudicially to the true interests of Great Britain and
the colonies” (Almon 138). Content in his own justification for these events,
Hillsborough held the Circular Letter “to be contrary to the real sense of the assembly,
and procured by surprize [sic],” and therefore it should be no trouble for the House, once
convened in full, to “rescind the resolution which gave birth to the circular letter... and to
declare their disapprobation of, and dissent to that rash and hasty proceeding” (Almon
138). Thus it is clear that in Hillsborough's mind the action taken by the House
represented an anomaly that could be rectified with ease at the next opportunity. But the
main point missing in Hillsborough's letter is any mention of the constitutional claims
that Adams had laid out in the Circular Letter. In Hillsborough's letter, we find that the
argument is rapidly turning from the issue of constitutional rights and focusing on the
question of whether or not the colonists had a right to challenge the authority of
Parliament in the first place. It was an attempt to rationalize what seemed to be (from the
perspective of the crown) an irrational event.
Stasis theory is relevant again as the opposing sides settle in on their various
positions. Adams argued from a position of constitutionality. He believed that
Parliament was subject to the foundational laws of British heritage. Hillsborough, on the
other hand, disregarded the question of constitutionality and argued instead that
Massachusetts was wrong to question Parliament's authority. Hillsborough was set in the
conjectural part of stasis – that is the question of whether a problem exists at all – by
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arguing that there was no right to question Parliament. Adams had moved beyond the
conjectural and settled firmly in the definitional, arguing that the crisis was one of
constitutional importance. When seen in this way, it is no surprise that the vying factions
were having difficulty reconciling with one another.
In addition to the differing argumentation schemas employed by each side,
Hillsborough, it seems, was wrong in his assessment of the situation. For if Hillsborough
had been correct in his assertion that the Circular Letter was indeed the creation of “a
desperate faction,” then his letter might have been received without too much hullabaloo.
But instead, we find that his unwillingness to deal with the constitutional issues brought
up in the Circular Letter caused more problems that they solved; for upon receiving
Hillsborough's letter, the House responded with a piece that went far beyond answering
Hillsborough's charges,. Furthermore, this opportunity was only available because
Hillsborough's statements were not really directed toward the House in the first place.
But the Adams seized the opportunity.
Hillsborough had focused on the inflammatory nature of the letter (presumably
because of its call to unify the colonies) itself and explained its existence to the governor
(and by default the House) by commenting on the quality of representation at its passing.
Hillsborough's choice not to address the constitutional issue but simply accuse the House
of underhanded procedures granted an opportunity that would not be missed. The House
response is analyzed next.
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The House of Representatives of Massachusetts to Lord Hillsborough, June 30, 1768.
(Printed in the Boston Gazette, July 18, 1768)
Adams, again writing for the House, seized this moment to further clarify and
press the colonial advantage in the active information battle. He crafted a piece that
served as a model of how to exploit opportunity. It was, in a sense, as if the lack of
argument about the constitutionality led to an implied acceptance of that particular issue.
Because Hillsborough did not address the constitutional issues, it was not necessary for
the House to address them either. They were, in a sense, granted. As the Latin phrase
goes: Qui tacet consentit – silence implies consent. Thus the argument had shifted.
Consider the argumentative procedure in the House's letter. Though left unsaid, it
was clear that the content of the Circular Letter (and not the manner in its passage) was
what prompted Hillsborough's letter to Governor Bernard and that this letter was simply
pondering the circumstances that allowed for such a scurrilous composition to be
sanctioned by the assembly. Were the letter addressed to the House itself, it can be
assumed that it would have taken a different tone and would have included different
content as well, perhaps even dealing with the constitutional issues of the Circular Letter.
But the House cleverly attributed these comments as the main point of his letter, which
they were clearly not, and sought to answer them, which they were never asked to do.
Thus the focus of debate shifted to the manner in which the letter was drafted and
approved in the first place. Furthermore, the House's response took the form of what
amounted to accusations of treason against the king by someone in the upper echelon of
leadership and the further demonstration of grievances and promotion of unification:
exactly what Hillsborough sought to avoid through his request.
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Adams' response, dated July 18, 1768, first characterized Hillsborough's request
as “very unusual”(Adams, Volume 1 220). As Adams explained, the assembly that had
approved the Circular Letter had served their term and a new one had been elected, so, he
noted, to ask a sitting assembly to rescind the work of a previous assembly, “upon pain of
forfeiting their existence” (Volume 1 220) was peculiar indeed - “perhaps there has been
no such precedence since the revolution” (Volume 1 220). However, since Hillsborough
had speculated on the merits of passage, the House humbly received the request and took
the opportunity to “carefully... recollect as far as they were able, the sentiments which
prevailed in the Hose, to introduce them to revert to, and resolve on the resolution”
(Volume 1 220).
One can anticipate what was coming in the House's response. They were about to
reexamine the events which gave rise to the call for the Circular Letter in the first place.
And sure enough, Adams began the justification with a reminder that the Circular Letter
was prompted by “deep concern, to the several acts of the British Parliament, which
impose duties and taxes on the colonies....” Furthermore, “[t]his concern... so far from
being limited within the circle of a few inconsiderate persons, is become universal,” for
“[t]he most respectable...in the province...are alarmed with apprehensions of the fatal
consequences of a power exercised in any one part of the British empire, to command and
apply the property of their fellow subjects at discretion” (Volume 1 221).
Here, Adams was reminding the readers that the taxes imposed on them were of
universal importance and ought to have been understood in the most dire terms as an
infringement on the basic rights of British citizenship. He went on to explain that since
the cause was of such great importance, it made perfect sense that the people of
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Massachusetts should have chosen to convey their thoughts to their fellow colonists.
This was not, explained Adams, an attempt to incite a riot, for Massachusetts was not in
the habit of compelling the other colonies to join them in resistance. Instead, according
to Adams, the Circular Letter should have been read strictly as Massachusetts informing
the other colonies of what actions Massachusetts would be taking.
Throughout this letter, Adams was careful to attribute ultimate responsibility of
the Circular Letter to the previous House, an entity that conveniently no longer existed
and therefore could not be punished. But his justification of the previous House's actions
takes the form of speculation. When explaining the root causes of the letter, he wrote:
...the former House very justly supposed, that each of the Assemblies on the
continent, would take such methods of obtaining redress, as should be thought by
them respectively, to be regular and proper. And being desirous, that the several
applications should harmonize with each other, they resolved on their circular
letter; wherein their only view seems to be, to advertise their sister colonies of the
measures they had taken upon a common and important concern, without once
calling upon them to adopt those measures, or any other. (Adams, Volume 1 221–
222)
Consider what was occurring in this one phrase. In only two sentences, Adams
simultaneously approved the former House's actions, reiterated the importance of their
actions, and advocated the continued harmonization of the colonies, all while washing his
hands of any responsibility for those actions. By explicitly stating that the actions were
the responsibility of “the former House” and clarifying their motives by saying “their
only view seems to be,” Adams was distancing himself from the actions of the former
House. At the same time his recollection of the former events and rationale that led to
passage of the Circular Letter helped to affirm the rightness of their actions.
Adams portrayed the desired harmonization of colonies as an obvious solution to
the problems caused by British law. For in Adams' description, the Circular Letter was
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nothing more than Massachusetts describing the actions it had taken, with no expectation
that other colonies would follow suit. It is a sort of paralipsis; that is calling attention to
something without explicitly advocating for it. Yet bringing attention to the action in the
first place is what planted the idea and caused the controversy.
Adams then proceeded to explain the step-by-step procedure that resulted in the
eventual passage of the Circular Letter. With full disclosure of the events – including the
controversial erasing of the first vote – Adams outlined the entire process, evidently
trying to demonstrate that despite Hillsborough's accusations, there was nothing overtly
scandalous about the way the bill was passed. The level of detail that is contained in this
recollection indicates that it was far closer to Adams' mind than he might have originally
let on when in the beginning of the letter he promised to “recollect as far as they were
able” the events. And indeed, this should be no surprise, for though we have the privilege
of observing these events in the overall picture, it also was known by anyone who was
present that Adams was essentially saying he had no responsibility for the document that
he himself created simply because the action had occurred in a different session. Such is
the ability of rhetorical argumentation!
Finally, interspersed throughout this explanation, Adams spoke of the
“inexpressible grief” which had fallen on the people of Massachusetts that their motives
should even be questioned by the king. Surely the reports sent to Britain about the
happenings in Massachusetts, including the events surrounding passage of the Circular
Letter, were “grossly misrepresented.” Furthermore, “it is a matter of astonishment, that
a transaction of the House, the business of which, is constantly done in the open view of
the world, could be thus colored” (Adams, Volume 1 224).
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Certainly this long explanation and revisitation of events was a far cry from what
Hillsborough sought, especially considering that he was not really asking for justification
in the first place but only seeking a repeal. Consequently, the House's decision to clarify
and justify rather than rescind would have been somewhat irksome. Hillsborough would
have preferred quiet resolution to what was becoming a very serious issue of deep
constitutional importance. Yet as noted above, it was a great opportunity for the House,
and they seized it. Thus much of the letter is an implicit effort to reacquaint the people of
the colony and by extension, as a result of the spread of newspapers and ideas across the
colonies, the rest of America of the British misdeeds and their resultant need for
unification while speaking to the abiding loyalty of the colonial subjects of the
Massachusetts Bay.
It was quite the rhetorical feat to justify and amplify a controversial stance, while
at the same claiming absolutely no responsibility for its existence, especially in this case
when Adams was ultimately responsible for the letter in the first place. Yet such a
technique was made possible by seizing the opportunity provided by Hillsborough's letter
and reading it apart from its obvious intent, focusing instead on the exact words and
responding in kind.
Resolutions of the Boston Town Meeting: September 13, 1768
Published in the Boston Evening Post, September 19, 1768
Samuel Adams followed his response to Hillsborough with another controversial
creation. Entitled Resolutions of the Boston Town Meeting: September 13, 1768, these
resolves attempted to summarize the frustrations experienced by Boston and
demonstrated that the rights of representation were deserved by Massachusetts and any
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hindrance thereof constituted a breech of constitutionality. Perhaps the most notable
aspects of this document were the numerous sources Adams referred to when
demonstrating the origin of these rights. He quoted a section of the preamble to a
document called An Act declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject passed by
Parliament in the first year of King William's and Queen Mary's reign which
contextualized the situation in which former King James was abusing his subjects.
Consequently, explained Adams, William and Mary decreed that “the levying money for
the use of the Crown, by pretense of prerogative, without grant of Parliament for a longer
time or in other manner than the same is granted, is illegal” (“Avalon-Resolutions”).
Furthermore, King William and Queen Mary:
granted, established, and ordained, that all and every the subjects of them, their
heirs and successors, which shall go to inhabit within said province and territory,
and every of their children which shall happen to be born there, or on the seas in
going thither, or returning from thence, shall have and enjoy all liberties and
immunities of free and natural subjects, within any of the dominions of them, their
heirs and successors, to all intents, purposes, and constructions whatever, as if
they and every of them were born within the realm of England. (“AvalonResolutions”)
If the decree of the sovereign was not sufficient to prove the point, Adams explained that
these rights had their source in other arenas as well. “[I]t is the first principle in civil
society, founded in nature and reason, that no law of the society can be binding on any
individual without his consent, given by himself in person, or by his representative of his
own free election.” These rights are “sacred and inviolable,” and an abridgment of them
is “a violation of the... royal charter,” and “the undoubted natural rights of the subject”
(“Avalon-Resolutions”).
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Adams concluded these resolves with the rather bold statement that since “the
governor had declared himself unable, at the request of this town, to call a general court,”
the town had voted a group of four men to serve on a committee “in order that such
measures may be consulted and advised as his Majesty's service, and the peace and safety
of his subjects in this province may require”(“Avalon-Resolutions”). In essence, since
Bernard refused to hold a general court, the town of Boston had selected men from the
town to consult with other towns in Massachusetts in a sort of extra-governmental
gathering to be held in Faneuil Hall on Tuesday, the 22 nd of September at 10 am. Not
surprisingly, Samuel Adams was one of the men selected for this role along with James
Otis, Thomas Cushing, and John Hancock.
The important points of this piece are the sources of proof that Adams used in his
description of the rights of colonists. I would even go so far as to say that from a
rhetorical standpoint, the affirmation of these rights was the main goal of the resolves.
For once these rights were recognized as valid according to any or all of the proofs
mentioned in the resolves, then the colonists had a legitimate complaint. Thus, Adams, in
an attempt to affirm these rights by any means necessary, crafted the resolves to
emphasize the several and redundant sources of rights. Consequently, these assertions
provided the necessary background by which to prove that colonial taxation and the
colonists' current status as unprivileged subjects were a violation of natural law, British
law, British precedent, royal charter and royal decree. Truly the colonists were in
possession of legitimate grievances.
When read in conjunction with the other letters examined above, it is clear that
Adams was also attempting to shift the argument again, moving it back to the central
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issues of rights. In fact, this document could almost be read as an addendum to the
Circular Letter in which Adams provided the background information to the causes of the
call for unification and cooperation. He attempted to prove that the colonists' grievances
were legitimate by demonstrating the sources of their violated rights. It was a kind of
justification of their actions up to that present time.
It is also important to recognize that in the process of focusing the resolves on the
issue of rights Adams was contributing to the growing controversy by ignoring the claims
made by Hillsborough that documents like the Circular Letter were illegal or intended to
promote adversity toward Parliament. Adams did not mention Hillsborough's
accusations. Neglecting to do so may have been purposeful as Adams was certainly of
the belief that these were legitimate problems and that conversation about the way bills
were passed, or the intent behind their passage, were tangential distractions to the more
pertinent topic of constitutional rights. However, we must recognize that ignoring
Hillsborough's claims left the question of intent unanswered and did nothing to stave off
the growing concern that Massachusetts was a discontent, rebellious faction, bent on
creating strife. In fact, it accomplished just the opposite. We will see that ignoring
Hillsborough's claims only served to affirm in the collective Parliamentary mind that
Adams and the Boston discontents were only interested in fomenting disorder.
Resolves of Parliament, February 9, 1769
A few months after the Resolutions of the Boston Town Meeting were published,
Parliament responded with its own set of resolves. Shorter and more pointed than the
Boston resolutions, Parliament's resolves served as a culmination of the British
interpretation of events. These resolves stated very plainly the deeply held belief that
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Boston's grievances were contrived, and, repeating almost verbatim the wording of the
letter than had been sent to the governors in the wake of the Circular Letter, “of a most
unwarrantable and dangerous nature, calculated to inflame thousands of his Majesty's
subjects in the other colonies, tending to create unlawful combination, repugnant to the
laws of Great Britain, and subversive of the constitution.” Furthermore, the resolves
stated that Boston was guilty of “illegal and unconstitutional [actions]... calculated to
excite sedition and insurrections in his Majesty's province of Massachusetts Bay,”
“manifesting a design...to set up a new and unconstitutional authority independent of the
Crown of Great Britain,” and “daring insults offered to his Majesty's authority, and
audacious usurpations of the powers of government” (Parliamentary History 476–479).
These several examples make it clear that the goal of the Resolves of Parliament
was to demonstrate the malicious intent of Massachusetts' actions. This is further
demonstrated by recognizing the unusual pattern of these resolves. Typically, resolutions
follow a pattern where several “whereas” clauses explain the circumstances and then
several “resolved” clauses explain the actions to be take in response to the situation. This
is the way the Boston town resolves appear.
The “whereas” clauses, however, are absent in Parliament's resolves. Instead, the
kind of accusations that one might find in a typical “whereas” section constituted the
“resolved” section of these resolves. Therefore, these resolves seem to be Parliament's
way of officially asserting the guilty verdict for Boston. It was their way of enshrining
the malicious motives behind Boston's actions. There was no judge or jury to proclaim
this guilt; it was a guilt bestowed on another by those who have pre-determined it to
exist. In the collective mind of Parliament, the guilt was obvious and readily exemplified
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by even a cursory glance at Boston's actions. Thus, there could be no questioning, no
argument, no justification. Their guilt was not relative. Their motives had been certified
as dangerous and intentional. No circumstances could have possibly existed that would
have freed Boston from the label of rebellious instigator. Their crimes were proven.
One can see the precarious step that Parliament had taken with these resolves. In
essence, the gauntlet had been thrown down. From this point forward, Parliament would
operate and make laws based on the official belief that Boston had no legitimate
grievance and was only intending to incite further dissension. No longer could Adams
and the rest of Boston's literary activists make the case that they were right in their
interpretation of law and thus justified in their resistance. Or, if they chose to continue to
make that case, it was futile. For no strength of constitutional argument based on natural
law, charter rights, or any other source mattered when the intent had been proclaimed and
determined to be unrelated to constitutional issue but focused solely on instigating a
rebellion. This determination was evidently circulating even before being formally
acknowledged by Parliament, for only a couple months prior to its passage British troops
landed on Massachusetts' shores, an event that Adams directly attributed to the attitude
held by Parliament toward Boston when he wrote, “these Troops, it is said were ordered
to be here at this time, because the State of the Town was such, as required the military
Aid to protect the Kings Officers & preserve the peace” (Volume 1 332–333).
Samuel Adams was under the distinct belief that Parliament’s feelings toward
Massachusetts were the result of false information being sent from the colonies.
Governor Bernard was thought to be the primary culprit and accusations of
misrepresentation constituted one of the reasons that Adams wanted Bernard removed
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from the post. That misrepresentation came in at number nine in a list of seventeen
reasons why the House petitioned the king for his removal: “He has very injuriously
represented your Majesty's loving subjects...[a]nd, by false representations, he has been
greatly instrumental...in exciting jealousies, and disturbing that harmony and mutual
affection which before happily subsisted...between [your] Majesty's subjects in Great
Britain and America (Adams, Volume 1 351). It was because of petitions like this that
Bernard was eventually recalled from the position he had held for almost nine years.
Bernard's removal from office is a bit tangential to the main point of this section,
but it is important to understand that even the source of Parliament’s collective attitude
toward Boston was subject to questions. Yet it is secondary to the understanding that
regardless of what Bernard might have said or not said about Boston's actions, Parliament
had made up its mind. Its decision was the culmination of a great deal of dialogue
between Massachusetts and Britain, all of it intentional, none of it productive.
We see again how controversy is rearing its head. Not that Adams necessarily
desired the conflict to continue, but that there was really no reason to resolve it. In fact
the possibility of resolution was growing ever more distant since the topic of the
conversation has shifted over the course of these four letters. It began as an issue of
constitutionality and got shifted to a matter of whether or not the Massachusetts House
had the right to protest in the first place. Then, it became no longer about the rights of the
House, but the manner in which the bill was passed. And, with these two resolutions, we
see the argument had shifted again from assertion of rights to affirmation of wrongs.
If there was a central theme to the overall conversation, it was lost somewhere in
the back and forth. Thus, it should be no surprise that at the end of the year-long period
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discussed above, rather than moving toward reconciliation and understanding, the sides
were more divided than ever. Opinions had settled. It was as if a number of distractions
had been erected around the central issue whether by intent or as a natural progression of
the conversation. Regardless of the cause, the end result was the same: in order to get
back to the constitutionality of the issue, the other issues had to be addressed, which led
to the opportunity for even more controversy and for more distractions to arise. So
controversy resulted in a decreasingly-focused conversation which inevitably led to more
divided sides. Resolution became more difficult as the self-perpetuating controversy
rolled on. I do find it interesting, however, that when looking at the works of each side,
the writings of Samuel Adams tend to be the more engaging of the two. Hillsborough
and Parliament on the other hand had a tendency to ignore these justifications and dismiss
the arguments coming from Adams and the Massachusetts House. This dismissal, I
argue, is the primary cause of decreased capacity for understanding, and it all began with
a single Circular Letter. The above was the result of a letter penned in a turbulent time,
with many opportunities for confusion.
Chapter five continues the analysis of controversy within 18 th-century Boston by
examining another series of letters written between the House and then interim Governor
Thomas Hutchinson. In the process, we shall see that though the situation changed,
controversy remained a consistent presence in the dialogues of the time.
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Chapter Five
Moving the Court
This chapter examines the conversation between the House and newly-appointed
Massachusetts governor Thomas Hutchinson and recognizes the key role that Adams'
pillars of constitutionalism played in his arguments against Hutchinson's decisions. It
also notes the role controversy played in positioning the argument in such a way that
productive disagreement was difficult to attain. We find in Hutchinson's framing of the
debate ready opportunity for criticism and charges of malicious intent. Yet we also find
that Hutchinson's opportunities for rebuttal were so curtailed that he had very little
chance to engage Adams. The end result was that Hutchinson not only dismissed Adams'
charges, but also the far more important constitutionality of the issue.
Following the repeal of the Townshend Duties in 1770, things calmed down in
Boston. Yet Samuel Adams was not content. For someone like Adams who was
constantly on watch for even the slightest violation of constitutional rights, there was no
lull. From the time he burst into the public spotlight with the Circular Letter of 1768
until the passage of the Declaration of Independence, Adams was always there, pointing
out some problem in colonial life. In his mind, the crises were everywhere: Townshend
Duties; the Circular Letter and subsequent demands to rescind; the Boston Massacre; the
ordeal over the governor's moving of the Court; the Thomas Whately letters; the Tea Act;
the Liberty incident; and the Quartering Act. These events all provided Adams a rationale
to continue promotion of the idea that the battle over colonial rights was not finished.
Yet for a brief period in mid-1770, there was a growing sense that there might be a
break in the constant dissension. Bernard was gone. Hutchinson was tentatively the new
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governor. Non-importation had resulted in the nearly total repeal of the Townshend
Duties, save the tax on tea. And, after news of the repeal reached American shores on
April 24, 1770, despite the recent “Massacre” that occurred in Boston, a wave of general
peace swept over the continent, either due to a general weariness of opposing all things
Britain, or else as a result of being able to finally claim victory. Indeed, as Merrill Jensen
noted, “by the end of 1770, resistance to British policies had collapsed and many
American leaders hoped that it would never be revived” (353). Yet beneath the veneer,
Adams was still at work, vigilantly standing guard over the Constitution and its effect in
colonial life. Success from the repeal of the Townshend Duties, for instance, meant little
to Adams, for in his mind, as we've seen thus far, his opposition to Britain was not about
any individual act, or a specific person. For Adams, an offense to the constitutional rights
of the colonist in one instance was an offense to the constitutionality as a whole.
Therefore, a little success and a subsequent “lull” in the motivations for resistance would
prove to be a non-issue for Adams.
In reality, the conversation discussed in chapter four and countless other
revolutionary texts such as the Farmers Letters had already had a tremendous impact on
the mentality of Americans. Colonists might have grown tired of the constant bickering
played out in the newspapers, but the work of Adams and others like him had helped to
affirm in the collective American psyche an expectation about the kind of treatment they
deserved at the hand of a British-based legislature. As Jensen explained, even after 1770,
“most Britons had learned very little about the colonies. They could not understand that
many Americans meant what they said when they rejected the supremacy of Parliament
'in all cases whatsoever'” (Founding 373). Furthermore, Americans had taken to a new
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kind of opposition in the form of a “tradition-breaking use of extra-legal political
methods and the participation of the people at large in extra-legal actions” (Founding
374) (think Boston Town meeting, and an intercolonial Congress). In other words,
Americans had realized the power of direct action and were not likely to relinquish their
new-found strength. Finally, as a result of the work of political leaders like Adams, there
was a lasting “popularization of radical ideas of American rights and of the relationship
that should exist between the colonies and the mother country” (Founding 374). It was
these kinds of changes that sustained Adams' significance.
As a result of the campaign against the Townshend Duties, Samuel Adams had
achieved a kind of superstardom among the popular party of Boston. But “[w]hen Britain
retreated in 1770, the control of the popular leaders collapsed despite desperate efforts to
maintain it” (Jensen, Founding 403). In addition to the collapse of non-importation, the
party witnessed a nearly complete exoneration of those tried for the Boston Massacre.
Hutchinson was particularly pleased with his handling of the rabble of the town.
In 1769, he had decided to move the House2 to nearby Cambridge in an effort to stave off
further opposition. In response, the House had refused to conduct any but essential
business out of protest. Bailyn notes that moving the General Court out of tumultuous
Boston and to the calmer Cambridge was among Hutchinson's proudest accomplishments
and demonstrated his astute handling of colonial affairs. He had rebuffed and frustrated
the endeavors of the commotion creators. Yet it was also this event which sowed the
seeds of his own destruction by contributing to a “deepening self-delusion” (Ordeal 170).
For in Hutchinson's deeply held belief in aristocratic manners and polity, he felt the need
The terms “House,” “Court,” and “Assembly” are used interchangeably in the original texts
and all refer to the meeting of the elected House of Representatives. I use the same
interchangeable terms in my writing.
2
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to not only act, but to “justify his actions and his authority... [and] overcome his
opponents by sheer force of logic and draw them to his side” (Ordeal 171).
Though Adams had been dealt a number of setbacks, he had the strength of
constitutional definitions on his side. And, as noted above, the standards and
expectations of the relationship between America and Britain had already been
challenged over the course of the last few years. Consequently there was a new kind of
thinking arising in the colonies. Therefore, if Hutchinson wanted a conversation, Adams
was willing to participate. But as we shall see, rather than increasing understanding
between the two sides, controversy facilitated a new discord which upended the peaceful
good feelings that had begun to emerge in the colony.
The issue at hand was far greater than just the location of the Court. For Adams,
it was a constitutional matter of the greatest concern. He argued that Hutchinson's action
“jeopardized the liberty of the province and violated the compact between Massachusetts
and the crown” (Lord and Calhoon 735-736). Hutchinson, on the other hand, being ever
the loyal servant, insisted on demonstrating the authority of the crown in colonial affairs
and was unwilling to move the Court back to Boston until he could “coax from the Court
a tacit acknowledgement of the validity of the crown's prerogative to instruct the
governor on the use of his powers...” (735).
Lord and Calhoon call the resulting controversy “a constitutional crisis” which
“challenged the power of the crown to interfere in the provincial matter of calling,
proroguing, and dissolving the assembly” (735). And indeed, for the revolutionary mind
it was a crisis of immense importance; so much so that six years later when Thomas
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Jefferson was drafting the Declaration of Independence, these actions were listed as the
fourth grievance against King George III.3
With so much at stake, it would not be long before Hutchinson's comments about
the decline of the popular party would prove to be wildly overstated. In the end, “[t]he
controversy provoked both Hutchinson and the Court to conduct particularly acute
inquiry into the sources and disposition of power in Massachusetts politics” (Lord and
Calhoon 736). And with that inquiry, the opportunity for controversy to disrupt
productive conversation was apparent.
In what follows, I examine Hutchinson's writings and compare then to the
writings of Adams to see how the arguments fail to engage one another, and instead
contribute to further discord.
Adams' role in this debate is certain, but less clear is his involvement in several of
the early letters. At the time, most of his known writings were still dealing with the
aftermath of the Boston Massacre. But his hand in the works of the town of Boston is
probable. For instance, the May 15, 1770, Instructions from the Town of Boston to their
Representatives was likely worked on by Adams as he was a major player in both
legislatures, but this letter contains language that is uncharacteristic of Adams' typical
writing style. Thus it is most likely that he was in the thinking rather than writing stage
of this letter. This is indicated by a firm reliance on the same sort of proofs that are found
in his known texts. Still, these instructions are not found in any of the anthologies of
Samuel Adams’ writings. However, the lack of explicit association does not hinder the
examination of controversy, nor does it detract from the point of these letters. Adams
Jefferson referred to these events when he wrote, “He has called together legislative bodies at
places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public Records, for the
sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures.”
3
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was likely present and heavily involved in shaping the opposition to the governor's
policies. After all, as John Alexander summarized, Adams “served on every important
committee the House appointed to compose petitions of other positions statements” (55).
Consequently, when the “House appointed a committee to consider the issue [regarding
the movement of the courts]... as usual, Adams was on it” (Alexander 87). We should
therefore assume that this instance was no different.
Instructions from the Town of Boston to their Representatives. May 15, 1770.
Published in the Boston Gazette, May 21, 1770
These instructions represented the start of the longer conversation about the
movement of the Court. The instructions themselves were printed on the front page of a
special supplement to the Boston Gazette of May 21, 1770. It was a long piece,
occupying the entire first page and continuing in a column on page three. Despite its
length, it can be summarized by two excerpts that are found in the text, the first in the
middle and the last near the end. These are important because they encapsulated the
entire argument. In other words, they set the stage by defining the issue as one centered
around the King's authority in colonial affairs. The excerpts are:
The king's prerogative, in the largest extent, includes, only, certain rights and
privileges, which, by law, the king hath as a third power of the common wealth,
intrusted with the execution of laws already in being. This prerogative our law
pronounces to be solely governed by the laws of the land:' those being the
measure, as well of the king's power, as the subject's obedience: for as the laws
assert and bound the just rights of the king; so they likewise declare and maintain
the rights and liberties of the people: hence it is adjudged law, that all prerogatives
must be for the advantage and good of the people: otherwise, such pretended
prerogatives are not to be allowed by law”. (T. Hutchinson, History, Vol. 3 373)
We have, for a long time beheld, with grief and astonishment, the unwarrantable
practice of ministerial instructions to the commanders-in-chief of this province. It
is high time, gentlemen, for this matter to be searched into and remedied.
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Such an enormous stretch of power, if much longer unchecked, will
eventually annihilate the essentials of all civil liberty. It is repugnant to the very
first principle of true government, (which was alone instituted for the good of the
governed,) that a remote power, not only much disconnected, but often different in
interest, should undertake, at pleasure, to control, nay command, in affairs of the
last moment, for the benefit and relief of the people.... (T. Hutchinson, History,
Vol. 3 375–376)
Note that in the above excerpts, the topic is very explicitly the question of the king's
authority in colonial affairs and the tragic consequences that would inevitably occur if
such actions were allowed. But the consequences must be understood in terms of the
cause of concern. Here we find that upholding the “essentials of all civil liberty” was the
main goal, as passive acceptance of policies that were even a remote threat to such
liberties must be opposed. Whether or not the king's involvement in the colony would
truly lead to an erosion of these liberties was a point that could be disputed. But the
reason for the instruction, that is to guard those liberties, was clear. It was a subtle
nuance and can be understood in terms of the warrant in argumentation theory. In short,
the crown meddling in the colonies had the potential to lead to tragic consequences, but
the warrant (the unstated premise that allows one to leap to a conclusion) was that the
potential tragedies were a violation of colonial liberty. In other words, the existence of
tragedy was itself groundless because the king essentially had the right to treat his
subjects as he chose. But due to the bulwark of the Constitution, the action violated
another, higher order: colonial, constitutionally-granted liberty. Tragedy of the kind
described here was only given substance, merit, or weight by the fact that its existence
was a violation of liberty. It is this adherence to the principles of liberty that suggest that
Adams had a hand in the creation of this argument, even if it wasn't specifically his
penmanship.

152

Hutchinson could have taken the instructions as they were intended: as the desire
of the people of Boston to make sure there was no creeping tyranny spreading in the
colonies. Therefore, his most calming response would have been to assure the people
that the decision to move the assembly was his own. Alternatively, he could have
reassured the colony that the instructions he received were only suggestions and did not
demand obedience. Instead, as we shall see, Hutchinson's response did nothing to calm
the fears of the colony and only ratcheted up tensions.
The exchanges between the governor and House were apparently recognized as a
kind of packaged set even in the immediate aftermath of the events, for Bailyn noted that
Hutchinson requested that the series be published for the public record. Hillsborough
declined the request, however, arguing that “publicizing the Assembly's 'flagitious'
arguments, even if only to refute them, might lead to a dangerous reaction on the part of
Parliament” (Bailyn, Ordeal 171). Furthermore, when Hutchinson suggested a
Parliamentary inquiry into the colonial claims, his suggestion was rejected “on the
ground that it could only lead to arguments on the first principles and hence would bring
into open contention the foundations of Parliament's authority” (Bailyn, Ordeal 171–
172).
The British stance seemed to be that Parliament’s authority was absolute, and thus
no questioning of this precedent would be allowed. Indeed, it should come as no surprise
that this was the common thought, for ultimate authority had traditionally been thought a
trait of the legislative body (Chrimes 42). But we begin to see that it was exactly this
attitude that gave rise to the kind of controversy that appears in this situation. The
unwillingness to engage in the arguments of the opposition was clear and apparent. We
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can expect that a further examination of the competing dialogues will reveal rapidly
diverging arguments, making reconciliation ever more unlikely.
His Honour's Answer, June 7, 1770.
Published in the Boston Evening Post, June 11, 1770
Hutchinson's response to the Instructions appeared on page two of the June 11,
1770, issue of the Boston Evening Post. It is positioned immediately following a short
article written by House members John Hancock, John Adams, Jedidiah Preble, Joseph
Warren and “Captain Darly” which expressed in a few short words the same general
sentiments as the Instructions mentioned above. Therefore, Hutchinson's response was
clearly meant to be seen as an answer to the House's claims.
Hutchinson's response resembled that of an apologia as he expressed regret over
any inconvenience that he has caused over the movement of the Court. Nevertheless, he
asserted that the appointed governor of the colony had the explicit authority to “[adjourn]
or [prorogue] the court to any town in the province. The place, as well as time of its
meeting, is left to the governor” (T. Hutchinson, History, Vol. 3 377). Yet he also hedged
his authority by noting that in this case, the decision to move the General Assembly and
thus the inconvenience caused by it was not his fault, but was as a result of an explicit
order from the king and that he was not able to now return the Court to Boston “[w]ithout
a violation of my instructions” (History, Vol. 3 378).
Hutchinson went on to say that the House had a number of important measures
that must be considered and asks the Assembly a rhetorical question: if they would be
willing to sacrifice the necessary business of the province over a petty issue like the
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location of the meeting house, especially since the right to move it was clearly granted to
the governor.
He ended his letter by reaffirming his dedication and affinity for the town of
Boston, remembering back some twenty years when he too had served as a representative
of the town. But, he noted, “I was then a servant of the town... I now consider myself a
servant of the crown. I know his majesty's pleasure, and I am doing my duty in acting
according to it” (History, Vol. 3 378).
The important point to recognize is that Hutchinson's letter did not address any of
the constitutional issues raised by the town in their instructions. In fact, the civil liberties
that were so important in the town's instructions were not addressed in Hutchinson's
response at all. Instead, he simply reasserted his right to move the Court and his duty to
do so as a result of the instructions. These claims, of course, are direct affronts to the
claims made by the House; namely that such meddling had a tendency to lead to tyranny.
Recognize that Hutchinson's response answered an unasked question: if the
governor truly had the right to move the Court. In reality, there was no disagreement on
the premise that the governor had the right to set the time and place of meeting and we
shall see below that the House acknowledged as much in their reply. But the issue of the
king's right to interfere in the matters of the colony was what the House expressed
concern over and this point is largely overlooked in Hutchinson's response to the town.
Instead, Hutchinson's argument centered on the accepted right of the governor to relocate
the assembly at will and the issue of interference from the crown or any other entity was
a non-issue. Hutchinson seemed unable to recognize that no one, including Adams and
the House of Representatives, was objecting to the movement of the House itself.
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Instead, their concern was explicitly over the threat of kingly interference in colonial
affairs and the unfortunate and absurd consequences of such interference.
The implicit dismissal of the House's fears over the loss of civil liberties portends
the devolving conversation. We find that already, after only two letters, each side is
basing its stance on completely irreconcilable positions. Reconciliation would
supposedly be possible were each side willing to address the same point, but as we have
seen, doing so is difficult and risks defeat or the appearance of fault or ignorance. It was
simply easier to neglect the opposition even at the expense of productive dialogue. It
should be no surprise then that as this analysis continues we find that each faction
becomes even more solidified in its stance.
In Council, 12th June, 1770. The address of his Majesty's Council of the said province.
Published in the Boston Evening Post, June 18, 1770
The assembly received Hutchinson's letter and replied almost immediately. The
reply was published a few days later on the front page of the Boston Evening Post.
Again, as above, there is near-certainty that Adams had a hand in crafting this reply, and
it is my opinion that this second letter from the House more closely resembles the writing
style of Adams. Yet, as before, this letter is not found in the annals of Samuel Adams’
writings. Nevertheless, it is entirely possible that he did play a role in its creation, given
that at the time Adams was the chief writer of the House of Representatives.
Furthermore, its content does correspond to the growing dichotomization between the
governor and the Assembly, something that Adams' mode of principled objections would
have played a significant role in perpetuating. Therefore, we must again cautiously
consider this letter as a product of Adams' thinking, if not his pen.
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In response to Hutchinson's claims about the king's order, the House recognized
and pointed out the contradiction straight away. “This power [to set meeting place and
times] is a full power: it is wholly in the governor, and to be exercised as he shall judge
necessary. It cannot, therefore, be subject to the control of instructions. Such a power
and such a subjection are incompatible” (T. Hutchinson, History, Vol. 3 379). In other
words, either the power to convene the House in the town and at the time of the
governor's choosing was either absolute or it was not. If yes, then the choice to move the
House falls on Hutchinson's shoulders. If no, then the governor's authority could not be
absolute. In this response, one finds a slight shift in the argument while still basing the
main point on constitutional grounds. Contrary to the governor's assertions that the right
to move the meeting place was the issue, the House focused almost exclusively on the
problems created by interference. They were trying to demonstrate the impracticality,
and therefore the illegality, of a distant entity meddling in colonial affairs. In this way,
movement of the Court was demonstrative of the reasons the governor was, by their
definition of charter rights, independent when it came to decisions of this nature. For
instance, the House argued that the legitimate involvement of the crown in local affairs
was preposterous on its face:
For it is impossible, in the nature of things, that the crown, at a distance of a
thousand leagues, should be able, understandably, and with a knowledge of
present circumstances, upon which a fitness of such a measure depends, to exert
that power. It is therefore fit and necessary that such exclusive power should be
vested in its representatives here (T. Hutchinson, History, Vol. 3 379).
And furthermore, the meeting time, and location of the Court were said to be for “general
convenience, safety, and utility” (T. Hutchinson, History, Vol. 3 380) and the assembly
argued that holding the Court in Cambridge fails in all these categories. In another
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instance that suggested Adams' role in these letters, the idea underlying these arguments
was the same one that was used in Adams' writings against the Townshend Duties when
he noted in the 1768 Circular Letter that due to the distance, colonists could not be
adequately represented in Parliament: “it will forever be impracticable that they should be
equally represented there & consequently not at all; being separated by an Ocean of a
thousand leagues” (Adams, Volume 1 186).
In the above examples we find a clear reference to the rationale behind
representation. In short, representation existed to allow those with knowledge of local
affairs to speak for the people in the governmental assembly. The House used this same
thinking when it argued for Hutchinson's undeniable right to determine the location of the
House without any outside influence. As was argued before, lessening of that privilege,
or in this case meddling in the process, was not objectionable because it trod on the
governors' authority necessarily. Instead, it was objectionable, as in the above case,
because treading on the governor's authority was the first step toward revoking the
ultimate privilege of representation. And representation, as we saw in chapter two, was
the only assurance of liberty that the colonists had. They no doubt realized that
Hutchinson, being forced to live and work with the House, was in part subject to the
consequences of the actions that he forced on the assembly whether they be
inconveniences or accommodations. Therefore, he was naturally inclined to select a
meeting place that was to the benefit of all, including himself. But to have an outside
entity, with no working knowledge of local events, no local ties, and, perhaps most
importantly, no share in the consequences of the policy, determine what the policy would
be was not only dangerous but a violation of the one of the principles of the British

158

system. We see in this case again that the ultimate objection was not the action itself but
the diminishing constitutional rights of the people affected by this action.
In sum, the Assembly's point centered on the realization that moving the Court
was solely and permanently the privilege of the governor and “no instructions can
supersede or control that right,” (T. Hutchinson, History, Vol. 3 382) and doing so
constituted a violation of representation which is a first order privilege of the colony.
Proof of this truth was manifest in the demonstrations of the impracticality of the law
being understood in any other way. In truth, it was a difficult discrepancy to grasp. For
according to the House, there was an almost indiscernibly fine line between acceptable
and unacceptable actions from the governor. They conceded that the king had a right to
give instructions and the governor has a right to consider them, but in the case where the
instructions led to an action that was demonstrated to be so strange and inconvenient to
the colony, the House expressed doubt. Thus, for the House, the argument was explicitly
over the rationale Hutchinson used when making his decision to move the assembly. If
the rationale was unaffected by the king's letter and was the result of an independent
decision, it was acceptable. But if the decision was the result of the king's letter, it was
problematic and contributed to the fear of growing tyranny from afar. Furthermore, by
pointing out all the various reasons why an independent decision was unlikely
(inconvenience etc.) the likely conclusion is that it was a decision influenced by the king:
Either A (an independent decision) or B (a decision passed down from the king). Not A.
Therefore B. And “B” in this case was a problem solely because it violated the right of
representation, if not outrightly, then tentatively.
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Ultimately, the House realized that there was nothing that could be done about the
location of the Assembly. I also suspect that they began to acknowledge that colonial
business did need to be done and that a shutdown of the House was impractical. By
rejecting the possibility that Hutchinson would arrive at his decision organically, the
House therefore apparently sought some kind of affirmation that the decision was
perpetrated by independent thought. Consequently, they implicitly asked for a
demonstration of what factors went into the decision. Or, if an explanation was not
possible, they pled that the governor assuage all suspicions by simply moving the House
back to Boston, “its ancient and constitutional place” (T. Hutchinson, History, Vol. 3
382).
But the main point is that in this letter, the House essentially reaffirmed its
commitment to the principles of British constitutionality and argued that within that
construct the governor's decision should be reconsidered as it posed an immediate threat
to colonists. Their argument closely mirrored Samuel Adams' own stance, which is why
it seems entirely probable that he had a hand in structuring this letter.
Lieutenant-Governor's Answer, June 15, 1770.
Published in the Boston Chronicle, June 18, 1770
Hutchinson's response amounted to an affirming of differences and a death-knell
for the deliberation. After reiterating that the decision to move the House was within the
governor's charter rights and noting the House's unwillingness to proceed despite the
unfavorable circumstances, Hutchinson essentially told the House to deal with it.
He objected to the possibility of satisfying the House now that the king's
instructions were known to exist. Had Hutchinson moved the Court by his own decision,
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there would presumably be no questioning of motives. But the fact that the king
suggested the move made all the difference. And Hutchinson conceded the futility of
justifying the point to the House:
If...I had in my own judgement thought it fit and necessary, that the court should
be convened at Cambridge, it would now be to no purpose for me to tell you so;
for though you admit it to be a part of the prerogative... you have... made
yourselves and the people judges when it should be exercised.... (T. Hutchinson,
History, Vol. 3 383)
In other words, Hutchinson believed that the House could not be satisfied and the king's
instructions simply provided them a convenient excuse for dissension.
He went on to say that since the conversation was going nowhere, he “will not
engage in a dispute with [the House] upon these points” (History, Vol. 3 383) and
delivered a final declaratory decision: “I am not able to comply with your request to
adjourn or prorogue the Court to Boston [and] therefore, earnestly recommend to you to
proceed without further delay, upon the publick business of the province”(History, Vol. 3
383). Reading Hutchinson's statement, it is clear that he was fed up with what he
considered inconsequential, counterproductive dialogue and sought to move on to more
important matters. What he did not seem to realize is that for the House, and for Samuel
Adams, the movement of the Assembly was representative of a far greater issue. Indeed,
as discussed above, the movement of the House was not even the central issue. To them,
it was a matter of principle, not of one specific event.
But Hutchinson had had enough. Hutchinson told the House that his decision to
move the Court was simply and firmly his choice and if he allowed his choice be
influenced by an outside entity, then that was also his prerogative. For “if I have done it
merely in consequence of instruction, and from a sense of my obligation to what appease
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to me to be his majesty's pleasure, I shall, notwithstanding, be justified...” (History, Vol. 3
382). In other words, Hutchinson had no obligation to answer the grievances of anyone
and ignoring the House's claims did not weigh on his conscience in the least. Note the
tone of dismissal and finality in his words. For Hutchinson, the time for deliberation had
passed and more important matters were pressing. Yet as we shall see from the House's
response, even Hutchinson's final word would not end the argument.
The House Reply
Published in the Boston Chronicle, June 18, 1770
The Boston Chronicle of June 18, 1770, reported that immediately after
Hutchinson's answer was read in the House of Representatives, a reply was ordered. It is
interesting that in this reply the House shifted the argument from what Hutchinson had
intended (House inaction) to something which further demonstrated the constitutional
relevance of the issue. From their perspective, the House's inaction was not detrimental
to the good of the colony, but was a protest of the greatest importance. In their reply to
Hutchinson the House expressed its intention to “abide by the resolution” and asserted
that they were “ready to answer for all the ill consequences that can be attributed to us.”
In other words, they placed their own reputation on the line and subjected themselves to
the judgment of their constituents as to whether their protest was legitimate or not.
Nevertheless, they explained that if the public good and productive legislature was really
so important to Hutchinson, the House was ready to “transact the public business,
provided your Honour will remove us to the aforesaid ancient and established seat of
government” (“The Answer”).
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Notice what the House accomplished by this statement. Whereas Hutchinson's
reply focused on the issue of the House not doing its elected job, the House shifted the
topic back to the constitutionality of the issue. By standing firm on their commitment to
uphold the rights granted them, they moved the burden of action back onto Hutchinson.
According to the House's argumentative construction, if the substantive issue was that of
public good, then Hutchinson held the key to resolution. The House was therefore freed
from any responsibility for inaction. Their willingness to stand under the judgment of
their constituents made the argumentative construction even stronger. Either way,
Hutchinson was in the wrong and the House was innocent.
One can easily see the point of contention. The factions were approaching a
stalemate with both sides trying to avoid responsibility. As we shall see in the following
letter, Hutchinson was not content to let the matter rest. After a few weeks, in a speech to
the assembly, Hutchinson shifted the topic yet again.
Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson's Speech. July 25, 1770
Published in the Boston Evening Post, July 30, 1770
Hutchinson's speech to the House was published in the Boston Evening Post on
July 30, 1770. In it, Hutchinson further demonstrated his misunderstanding of the
House's ire. Ignoring the previously mentioned point about the House's inaction,
Hutchinson returned to the theme of the king's prerogative to instruct the governors. He
doubled down on his assertion that the king's instructions should be, and by duty ought to
be, considered in the governance of the colony: “I have no reason to think that there had
been an alteration in his majesty's pleasure, which, I doubt not, was determined by wise
motives, and with a gracious purpose to promote the good of the province” (384).
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Hutchinson then reiterated the privilege of locating the meeting place and time according
to his own choosing. In doing so, Hutchinson demonstrated that he believed there to be
no legitimate argument against his moving the Court. To him, it was a simple matter of
the governor's privilege. Hutchinson failed to consider his stern assertions light of the
House's constitutionally-grounded grievances. This inability and the final refusal to
negotiate, or even consider, the House's objection served to only further entrench the
arguments used by each side.
Here is evidence of the problem caused by controversy: arguments that are not
sufficiently addressed do not remain static or suddenly become resolved. Indeed, the
very notion of agreeing to disagree is only beneficial to the party that has the power in the
relationship. Those being harmed by a policy are unlikely to be satisfied by agreeing to
disagree. Instead, non-engagement, or dismissal of the kind used by Hutchinson, has the
effect of further deteriorating the already remote potential for the kind of engagement
necessary for eventual reconciliation. Instead, the response to non-engagement,
especially with an issue deemed important by the opposition, is often an attempt to reexplain, clarify, or rephrase, in a way that will hopefully convey the gravity of the
situation. Therefore, it is no surprise that this is precisely what the House did, this time
with Samuel Adams officially at the helm.
The House of Representatives of Massachusetts to the Lieutenant Governor, August 3,
1770
Published in the Boston Evening Post, August 6, 1770
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It is here that Samuel Adams officially entered the debate4 though as mentioned
above, his presence and ideological thinking certainly preceded his name being attached.
But on August 3, 1770, Adams wrote a response to the governor's recent speech. It was
at this moment in the debate where the stakes were raised as a consequence of
Hutchinson's refusal to consider the Houses's grievances. For Adams' letter not only
objected to the governor's actions, but in an attempt to clarify the House's fears, tied them
to specific constitutional concerns. And, to make sure his message was received by the
populace it was printed in a one-and-a-half page spread starting on page two of the
Boston Evening Post of August 6, 1770.
It may be true, said Adams in the piece, that there was no malicious intent in the
removal of the Court to Cambridge, but this did not free Hutchinson from responsibility.
Appealing to the history of the colony, Adams noted that “there have been times, when a
corrupt and profligate Administration have ventured upon such Measures, as have had a
direct Tendency, to ruin the Interest of the People as well as that of their Royal Master”
(Adams, Volume 2 20). Therefore, according to Adams, the test for malicious intent in
this present case was quite simple. The “test, a Standard common to all [is] the publick
[sic] good” (Volume 2 21). For the House granted the governor the right to “hold the
Court in any other place when the public Good requires it.” Despite this right, “it by no
means follows that he has a Right to call it at any other place, when it is to the manifest
Injury & Detriment of the Publick [sic]” (Volume 2 20).
Note here that the “public good” is what Adams considered to be the main litmus
test in his assessment of the governor's actions. He went onto explain that what
In the footnote to this letter, the compiler notes that apart from the date and topic information
contained in the introduction, the entirety of this letter is in Samuel Adams' handwriting.
4

165

constituted the public good was very simply a determination of whether the action is
injurious to the people, or not. Note here that the definition of “injury” was somewhat
ambiguous. That injury removed the governor's responsibility was clear: “whenever
Instructions cannot [be] complyd [sic] with, without injuring the people, they cease to be
binding,” and furthermore, the prerogative to relocate the House “extends not to do any
Injury, never has and never can be denyd [sic]” (Volume 2 23). In other words, if the
instructions injured the people then they could not be binding on the governor. But what
was “injurious” to the colony? And what is it about injury that freed the governor from
following orders?
In order for Adams' claims to have any validity, there was an implicit but
necessary emphasis placed on the constitutionality of the issue. Understanding Adams'
thinking requires identifying the missing argumentative link located in the realm of
constitutionalism.
Adams had previously argued that the Constitution provided citizens with the
irrevocable right of representation. This was key, for when Adams spoke of injury, he
very simply meant that the people were injured when their rights were violated. And in
this case, moving the Court violated the peoples' rights of representation by interfering
with the representative process. Moving the Court did not automatically cause injury to
the people. But moving the Court did violate, or at least infringe on, the rights of
representation. And it was that violation which was illegal under the Constitution. This
constitutional violation in turn is what caused injury to the people. Therefore, in this
argumentative construction (and in this specific instance), injury to the people was
indicative of a constitutional violation.
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The supremacy of the Constitution provided the necessary force to make Adams'
claim legitimate. Or, to use a Biblical parallel construction with which Adams would
have no doubt been familiar, as the apostle Paul wrote, “...if it had not been for the law, I
would have not known sin. I would have not known what it is to covet if the law had not
said 'You shall not covet'”5. In the same way, without the “law” of the Constitution,
“injury” was meaningless. But the British Constitution provided the substance necessary
for the “injury” to be considered problematic. Therefore, actions which injured the public
violated the Constitution and were illegal.
So injury to the public (and therefore constitutionality of an action) was,
according to Adams, the test of legality. The question must then be asked if the public
had been so injured as a result of moving the Court. Consequently, Adams went to great
lengths to demonstrate that moving the Court had interfered in the legislative process and
thus detracted from the right of representation. Such evidence, said Adams, “has already
been declared by the House, and must be too obvious to escape your Honors
observation.” In fact, “every judicious and impartial Person will allow, that the holding
the General Court at Cambridge, is inconvenient and hurtful to the Province” (Volume 2
23). This construction was purposeful, for the injury was an important point to establish,
as its accepted presence was necessary for Adams' next charge.
He argued that since the location of the Court was undoubtedly damaging to the
colony, and the king would never request any action which would knowingly cause such
damage (or violate the Constitution), there must have been another explanation for the
actions that had occurred of late. That explanation is found in Adams’ speculation that
“the Ministry caused the Assembly to be removed from Cambridge, in order to worry
Romans 7:7

5
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them into a Compliance with any arbitrary Mandate, to the Ruin of our own of our
Constituents Liberties” (Volume 2 24). This connection between the actions of the
ministers and the constitutional consequences of the act demonstrated why moving the
Court was an issue of importance and the source of legitimate grievance. When
described in constitutional terms, the argument was cast in a different light. At this stage
in the revolution's progress it would have been unconscionable to think that the king was
actively responsible for actions which violated the Constitution. Thus, in an effort to
explain the occurrences, the party now thought responsible for these actions was not the
king, or even the governor, but a small group of conniving ministers out to misrepresent
and destroy any semblance of colonial liberty.
The evidences Adams used to support his accusation were more implied than
proven. He simply noted “That the Province has Enemies who are continually defaming
it, and their Charter, is certain; that there are persons who are endeavoring to intimidate
the province from asserting and vindicating their just Rights and Liberties by Insinuations
of Danger to the Constitution is also indisputable” (Volume 2 26). But importantly,
Adams went a step further and made a correlation between this instance and previous
events in the colony. In this way of thinking, the minister meddling in colonial affairs
was not to be considered an isolated incident, but rather one of a series of attacks on the
liberty of the province.
It was the responsibility of the people of the province, said Adams, to “struggle,
with all the powers with which the Constitution hath furnished up, in Defense of our
Rights; to prevent the most valuable of our Libertys [sic], from being wrested away from
us, by the subtle Machinations, and daring Encroachments on our Charter” (Volume 2 26).
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And here Adams went on to list the encroachments that had been foisted on the colony of
late and thus essentially recapped the entire history of grievances against the mother
country: “Courts of Admiralty extended from the high Seas”; “Multitudes of civil
Officers [customs agents]... sent here from abroad by the Ministry”; “ A Revenue, not
granted by us, but torn from us”; “Armys [sic] stationed here without our Consent”; “the
Streets of our Metropolis, crimsoned with the Blood of our fellow Subjects”;
“Instructions to Governors which threaten to destroy all remaining Privilege of our
Charter”; “Instructions... to rescind and excellent Resolution [the 1768 Circular
Letter]...on pain of Dissolution”; “the General Court... forced to give Way to regular
Troops, illegally quartered in the Town of Boston” (Volume 2 26).
Adams closed the letter by arguing that such actions constituted a grave violation
of the rights of the colony and the constituents therein, thus the House was under an
ethical obligation to fight against such actions with every ounce of strength. For “it
would be a kind of Suicide, of which we have the utmost Horror, thus to be made the
Instruments of our Servitude” (Volume 2 27). In other words, passive acceptance was not
an acceptable option under the given responsibilities of the House.
Several important things can be seen in this letter. First, in Adams' construction of
the issue, the opposition posed by the House was not for opposition's sake, but was rather
to be considered the natural occurrence of a free people who found their liberties
threatened. Thus Boston was innocent and justified in its actions making the false
accusations from the minister all the more egregious. This portrayal of the minister as
intentionally malicious will become increasingly important as the analysis proceeds.
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Another interesting aspect of this letter is the argumentative shift away from
Hutchinson and the importance of the instructions or the king's prerogative to influence
colonial events. Indeed, little was said about the king's involvement at all. Thus it is
clear that the major theme of Adams' letter was the demonstration of kinetic and potential
injury to the people of the colony in terms of convenience, finances and constitutional
rights. Furthermore, note that the pretense of the entire letter hinged on the ability of
Adams to “prove,” whether by common acceptance or by specific evidence, that the
actions caused by moving the Court were in fact injurious to the colony. If this claim was
demonstrated to be false, Adams' argument crumbled, for it was only the established
“injury” (and the resulting violation of the Constitution) that supported the opposition's
claim that minister was behind the actions. As Adams mentioned in the letter, there was a
presumption that a king would not knowingly injure his subjects. Therefore if there was
injury demonstrated, there must have been another explanation. It was the establishment
of the injury that freed the king (and thus the governor) from any responsibility for the
actions and places the blame squarely on the ministers. In this manner of thinking,
Hutchinson was relegated to the position of a naïve follower, ill-aware of the
machinations that are at work within the system to subjugate the colony. He was blinded
by allegiance and serving as but a pawn in the minister's game. This letter clearly marks
the point where the minister, Lord Hillsborough 6, who had proved to be such a nuisance
to Adams in the past, was blamed for the new occurrences. Furthermore, the thought of a
few rogue agents cloaked in the form of ministers operating outside of the royal decree
provides a nice bit of scandal to the accusations.
Throughout Adams' letters and Hutchinson's responses, it is clear that the “minister” referred
to is Lord Hillsborough, though the name is often hidden by the generic term “minister.”
6
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The reason bringing the minister into the conversation was so important is that by
shifting the focus onto the minister, Adams forced Hutchinson's hand, though perhaps
unintentionally. Especially after the events like the Circular Letter, which led to a rather
important revolt in the wake of Hillsborough's actions, defending such a man might have
proven difficult as it was counterintuitive to the generally accepted beliefs of the colony.
Doing so accomplished several things which would have been beneficial to Adams' case.
First, it removed some of the power from Hutchinson by making him appear weak and
manipulated. Secondly, it placed the crux of the argument in a position of relativity.
Injury to the colony as a result of the movement of the Court could not really be proven
or disproven, though Adams tried. But inconvenience, lessened constituent interaction,
even the uncertainty created by the potential for random movement of the Court 7 could
all be considered injurious to the effective and productive work of the House and, since it
ultimately hindered the work of the colony, detrimental to the colony as a whole and
therefore unconstitutional.
Therefore, going forward, there were two points that Adams extrapolated from the
argument and posed to Hutchinson: 1) the malicious intent of the minister and 2) the
injury to the colony. By focusing in such a way, Adams significantly narrowed the scope
of the argument. Hutchinson's response is interesting and further demonstrates the
manner in which controversy can degrade argument.
Finally, the case against the Court's movement had been strengthened by 1) tying
it to the other events which had occurred in the colony and 2) collectively considering
these actions as violations of constitutional rights. Note that whether the movement of
The constituents “have no Assurance,” says Adams, “that the next Freak of a capricious
Minister will not remove the Court to some other place” (Adams, Volume 2 23).
7
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the Court was truly a corollary to the same evil machinations that led to actions such as
the order to rescind the Circular Letter or not was left unsaid. In this example, it could
be argued that the two events were unrelated, as the Circular Letter incident was about
the supremacy of Parliament and moving the Court was about the governor's legal
prerogative. Adams, however, disregarded these discrepancies in favor of one
overarching theme: the ever-increasing attacks on the constitutional liberties of the
colony. This was a two-sided shift. On one hand, it was a rhetorical shift of immense
importance enacted by conflating a series of events as proof of a larger claim. Yet in
other ways it was not an unexpected turn. For when viewing this letter as a response to
Hutchinson, this letter does exactly what one might expect it to do. It answers questions
and clarifies points while focusing again on the source that lies at the heart of all of
Adams' arguments: the Constitution. It was, therefore, an immense shift cloaked in an
expected, unsurprising answer.
Controversy, however, being ever-present, meant that Adams' response was not
particularly applicable to Hutchinson's letter. Recall that Hutchinson's last letter was
essentially a non-response, saying instead that deliberations were over and the decision
was final. As expected then (because finality is not acceptable to the oppressed), Adams
tried again to clarify the legitimacy of the House's claims by explaining the vast
constitutional issues at stake by moving the Court at the bequest of an outside entity.
Thus understood, everything about Adams' response was a deeper exploration of the
principles of liberty that had previously been thought self-evident and unnecessary to
address. Viewed from the stance of controversy, we can consider Adams' response as an
attempt to explain to Hutchinson exactly why the House was fearful of the instructions
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conveyed by the ministers by explaining the correlation between moving the Court and
the other events in recent colonial history. Even blaming Hillsborough for the actions in
the colony could be seen as an attempt to explain why the House was cautious and
skeptical. In this way mentioning these instances was neither deferring nor diverting the
argument. It was not spin or rhetorical flourish. It was clarification, explanation, and an
attempted re-phrasing of the same principles that had been argued from the beginning of
the conversation. Yet as we shall see, Hutchinson's response did not consider these
examples as clarification but only as distractions to the main point of the governor's
prerogative.
Adams' construction had unintended consequences that were consistent with what
one might expect from controversy. Adams' statements served as evidence of the manner
by which controversy seeks to relocate the source of argument. This is exactly what
Olson and Goodnight claim controversy does when it seeks to “block, unsettle, and
reshape the commonplace in the interest of sustaining opposition” (249). The unintended
consequences were that after this letter, the range of acceptable deliberative topoi was
severely limited. To paraphrase the work of Hauser and Farrel, the discursive spaces, or
rhetorical forums, whose role is central to the working of rhetoric and productive
argument, had contracted. So, though Adams was by any measure addressing the
opposition, controversy, in the sense identified by Olson and Goodnight, had made
engagement with the opposition much more difficult. Because Hutchinson would not
address the constitutional issues that Adams advanced, Hutchinson focused on the
subsidiary issue of minister's reputation. To demonstrate this, consider Hutchinson's
response to Adams.
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The Lieutenant-Governor’s Answer to the foregoing Reply to his Speech to both
Houses at the opening of the Session, 1770
Published in the Boston Evening Post, August 6, 1770
Hutchinson's response was a lengthy rebuttal, occupying nearly three columns in
the newspaper. It was found on page four of the August 6th issue of the Boston Evening
Post, just following the House argument which was discussed above. The close
juxtaposition of Hutchinson's speech to Adams' argument made it clear that the speech
was a response to Adams' claims and allowed readers to get a sense of the varying claims
being made by both parties.
At first glance, it appeared to be a point-by-point repudiation of the arguments
made in Adams' letter from the House. And indeed, to a large extent, that was the case.
But there were some important variances which speak to the effectiveness by which
controversy has limited the conversation to a few basic points.
First, in response to Adams' claim that the ministers were operating independently
of the king and were pursuing their own agendas in the colony, Hutchinson stated that
there were “no sufficient grounds to suppose instructions to be the acts of a minister, and
not the king” (T. Hutchinson, History, Vol. 3 395). Hutchinson argued that the king and
his minister were in close contact and that the mind of the king was very much the mind
and actions of the minister as well. It is worth noting here that Adams' demonstration of
why he assumed the policies to be the machinations of a minister and not the king were
thoroughly explained in the previous letter, so much so that Hutchinson's dismissal of the
point does little to answer the questions or account for the mistreatment of the colonists.
Hutchinson did not seem to realize the precarious situation that Adams' treatment of the
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issue had created. If the minister was perceived to be responsible for the colonial
policies, then that was the end of it. For such problems could be remedied by simply
abstaining from heeding the advice of the minister as it was well within Hutchinson's
capability of doing. If, however, the recommendation handed down from the minister
reflected the mind of the king, then Hutchinson was to some extent absolved from his
decision to follow orders, but it places blame for the events on the king.
Hutchinson was therefore forced to find a fine line between the two possibilities
by claiming that the minister was operating in accordance with the king's wishes and
therefore Hutchinson himself had little choice in his following orders. This, however, left
the question of the malicious intent of the policies unanswered. Remember, the issue as
framed by Adams was over the “public good.” If the public was served by the act, then it
is deemed acceptable, but if not, then Adams argued that Hutchinson was under no
obligation to follow orders. To recap Adams' argument from above, if the public good
was not served as a consequence of any specific event then that served as proof that the
king could not be responsible, as the king would never do anything to hinder the wellbeing of his subjects. And, as the movement of the Court was now demonstrated to be
detrimental to the Constitution, and, by extension, to the public good, the king could not
be responsible. Therefore the minister must have been behind the decision.
One can see that the definition of “public good” serves as the crux of contention
and in order to effectively respond and rebut Adams' accusation about the malicious
actions of the minister, Hutchinson must demonstrate that the public good was not being
harmed by the removal of the Court to Cambridge. At this task, Hutchinson failed
miserably.
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In the first place, Hutchinson stated, “I must make my own reason and
judgement the rule, and not yours.” Furthermore, “[y]our main reserve,” he says to
Adams, “if it could be admitted, that whenever the prerogative shall be exercised in a
manner not for the public good... is unanswerable. In all controversies, as soon as one
party is allowed to be the sole judge, the knot is cut, and there must be an end of strife”
(History, Vol. 3 397, 399). In other words, Hutchinson admitted that the issue of what
constituted “public good” was indeterminate and allowing Adams to set the terms of the
argument would not solve the dilemma. Therefore Hutchinson's chosen response to
Adams was a non-response which had the effect of completely shutting off any
opportunity for deliberation. Indeed, Hutchinson saw no possibility of productive
dialogue and conceded that in the terms defined by Adams, there was no way to counter
the claim that injury to the colony has occurred.
Hutchinson proceeded by noting that the “remaining parts of your message having
no immediate relation to this controversy... I will make no reply to them, for I have no
inclination to multiply controversies with you; and those subjects have been so fully
discussed that it is not probable that you, or I, shall be able to cast any new light upon
them” (History, Vol. 3 399). Here Hutchinson was presumably referencing Adams' list of
events that had been forced on the colony of late. Hutchinson's dismissal of these claims
and his refusal to engage in the issues that affected the colonies, demonstrated his belief
that moving the Court was a completely separate issue from the rest of these problems.
Yet the attitude was similar to what is found in Hutchinson's previous letter: he saw no
possibility of productive dialogue and therefore ended discussion.
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Herein lies the rhetorical problem, however. Hutchinson failed to see the big
picture, that the “remaining parts of [Adams'] message” (History, Vol. 3 399) [i.e. the long
list of “innumerable Encroachments on our Charter” (Adams, Volume 2 26)] that he was
so quick to dismiss were important to the point of Adams' grievance. The state of the
colonies in general was not a separate event from the issue of the Court's movement.
Rather, they were symptomatic of the same overarching issue. As mentioned above,
Adams' letter was more than just a simple complaint about an individual event. It was, in
fact, a treatise of sorts, which directly related this one event into the history of abuses
perpetuated in the colony of late. For Adams, Hutchinson's dismissal was heresy, for the
matters which affected the House and the colony's relationship with the supreme
legislature were inseparable from the issue of moving the Court.
In each of these cases, the point to stress is that Hutchinson, whether by inability
or by choice, refused to engage Adams' argument and instead ended debate in the name of
what he saw as impossible circumstances. Controversy had reduced his main choice of
refutation to dismissal, calling the issue unsolvable and already thoroughly debated. In
truth, Hutchinson might have been right as the issues that Adams brought up had been
discussed at length over the past few years. In fact, previous chapters of this dissertation
talked about the way they were discussed and the problems that arose as a result. Yet the
issues that were dismissed (i.e. the injury to the colony and the correlation between this
action and past actions) were, in fact, the heart of the contention and if resolution was
possible at this point, it would only be through addressing things in terms of the argument
set up by Adams.
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But here we see rhetorical controversy at work. Not only had Adams' statements
narrowed the scope of the argument to the point where refuting it in a way that would
please the opposition was nearly impossible, but Hutchinson, in his response, did not
even attempt to engage in the argument. Adams had made the injury (and thus
constitutional violations) to the colony the main point of his argument. But Hutchinson
ignored this point completely and countered by shifting the focus. Yet due to the nature
of rhetorical controversy, the possibilities for alternatives were dwindling. Hutchinson
moved the basis of the argument to the reputation and intent of the minister, since that
remained the only possible refutation. Yet this also proved to be a difficult undertaking
for Hutchinson. For Adams, the intent of the minister was not the point. It was, rather,
secondary to the fact that injury to the colony had a long history of atrocities perpetuated
by the minister. That the minister was out to ravage the colony only explained the cause
of the atrocities. In other words, intent was meaningless if actions were tyrannical; for
even well-intentioned leaders could execute evil rules.
Nonetheless, Hutchinson dutifully defended the character of the minister and
noted that “[t]hose offices, for more than fifty years past, in almost every instance, have
been filled with persons of the highest reputation for learning and integrity...” (T.
Hutchinson, History, Vol. 3 395). Such a statement might have been acceptable only a
few years earlier, but in 1770 a statement about the integrity of the minister would have
seemed laughable to many of the colonists. Answering the question of why requires a
brief foray into the background of Lord Hillsborough.
Not much is written about Lord Hillsborough, but it is clear that his appointment
to Secretary of State for the colonies ratcheted up efforts to dispel American resistance.
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Actions approved through this office, such as the decision to move troops into Boston,
had a deleterious effect on relations between the colonies and the ministry. Hillsborough
was already on record as thinking little of the Americans, finding in them “a malevolent
and ungrateful disposition,” (qtd. in Alden 99) and at least one researcher goes a step
further and claimed that “Hillsborough hated... the colonists generally” (Jennings 181).
Therefore it is no surprise that Hillsborough's dislike of the colony was reciprocal. He
was, after all, the individual behind the ill-fated demand to rescind the Circular Letter,
which failed spectacularly and famously by a vote of 92-17 and had prompted the
dissolution of the House and led to the number “92” being toasted and celebrated
throughout the colonies. In short, it was Hillsborough's actions which had led to perhaps
one of the grandest moments of unity in the history of the colonies. Colonies had been
one in their common denunciation of Lord Hillsborough. And now, barely two years
later, Hutchinson was extolling the virtues of the same man. Hutchinson was at a
tremendous disadvantage. His respect for the office, and his loyalty to Britain, demanded
a defense of the ministers. But doing so was dangerous for all the reasons just mentioned
above. It was inconceivable that there was not a bit of residual anger from the past
events.
Lord Hillsborough was the man Hutchinson chose to defend. And controversy (of
the kind spoken of in this dissertation) had so twisted the topic of argument that defense
of the minister was one of the only remaining lines of argument. Hutchinson took the
bait. His defense of the minister left the charges of injury to the colony largely untouched
and not disproven, while the claims of an upright ministry were left open for mockery.
Hutchinson's attempt to defend the indefensible prompted a series of scornful letters

179

written by Adams under the pseudonym “A Chatterer” which further removed possibility
of reconciliation, especially when one understands that these letters represent the raw and
uncensored attitude of the man who was essentially in charge of the House of
Representatives. It remains in doubt whether readers of the time knew that it was
actually Adams behind these letters, though the topic and manner of writing may have
persuaded some of his authorship.
Articles signed: “A Chatterer”. Boston Gazette, August 13, 1770;
“A Chatterer”. Boston Gazette, August 20, 1770
Traditionally, newspapers were considered an outlet for political perspectives, and
for good reason. Publishers could get away with printing things that were considered too
scandalous or incendiary to be uttered in a formal setting. As William B. Warner
explained, newspaper publishers, under the guise of protecting freedom of the press,
printed material that was labeled “seditious libel.” Yet the newspaper system, “its formal
incoherence, its anonymous publication of writing, its eschewal of the accountability of
the author,” (351) all resulted in a powerful medium of opinion, to which Adams was no
stranger.
Consequently, when Adams took to the press and was freed from any duty of
propriety, shielded as he was by the friendly printers Edes and Gill of the Boston Gazette,
as well as a sense of anonymity, one might expect a radical departure from the generally
polite language found in the official House documents. Yet, in the case of these writings,
that is simply not what was seen. To be sure, there was a furthering of division in terms
of the argument and Adams took a few liberties in terms of sarcasm and coarse language.
But the case Adams laid before the people was really not that different from the
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principled stances that he had taken thus far in the conversation. Yet as we look further
into these letters, a number of instances demonstrate just how far the arguments have
diverged, and show that Hutchinson had lost much rhetorical ground.
When analyzing these letters, I considered them in tandem since they were
published in the same newspapers on consecutive weeks and are on the same topics. In
addition, there is no counter-letter from Hutchinson during this time. Finally, these letters
represented the end of the conversation as Adams did not engage Hutchinson in the press
or from the House again for nearly a year. The first of these letters appeared on the
second page of the Boston Gazette only because the first page was advertising the
publication of a host of new books. Yet the letter retained a prominent position in the
first column of the “news” section.
The second of these articles is unencumbered by any new books for sale, so is
prominently displayed on the front page in the first column. It abutted several articles
which discuss things such as the non-importation agreement.
It was obvious that Adams wrote these articles in response to Hutchinson. His
references to the governor’s ideas make this clear. In them, he seized upon two of
Hutchinson's former points: 1) that the instructions received from the minister were
actually the mind of the king and 2) that Hillsborough was a man of noble character and
could be trusted to do what was best for the colonies. Despite the slight language
differences, the heart of the message was essentially unchanged. Adams' appeal to the
constitutional issues at stake was consistent with his other writings. He was still
primarily interested in promoting the constitutionality of British law in the colonies and
demonstrating how failure to adhere to this standard had negative consequences for the
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colony. But reading the letters more closely, we find a larger purpose beneath the
response to Hutchinson. In these two publications, Adams was concerned not only with
the present situation, but the entire system by which the people were expected to submit
to corrupt leaders in any form. These letters were, in fact, an all-encompassing treatise
on the citizens' duty to stand against totalitarianism wherever it may arise and to
recognize their place in the long line of those who pursue liberty.
But first, Adams addressed the specifics of Hutchinson's claim. Recall that
Hutchinson's last letter claimed that ministers were of the highest character and ought to
be respected. Furthermore, that the instructions coming from the minister should be
considered as from the mind of the king. Recall also Hutchinson's claim that there were
“no sufficient grounds to suppose instructions to be the acts of a minister, and not the
king” (T. Hutchinson, History, Vol. 3 395). Adams' letter could be understood as an
attempt to document the falsity of that statement. Hutchinson's claim, Adams explained,
was ludicrous and the statement itself was only a hastily written response, grounded in
nothing rational. He wrote, “Will his Honor have us believe that the King can do a weak
& foolish, or a malevolent and wicked Act? If not, such instructions are to be looked
upon as acts of the Minister, and not of the King” (Volume 2 28). This response closely
mirrored previous arguments made about the same topic. Yet there is a difference in the
way this was presented.
The “weak & foolish” or “malevolent and wicked” act to which Adams is
referring was, of course, action caused by instructing the governor to hold the Court in
another town. Notice with this one phrase that the argument has moved quite a bit from
other recent letters. Only a week prior, injury to the colony was a hotly debated topic and
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Adams devoted a good portion of his letter from the House to demonstrating that injury
had occurred. But Hutchinson's response ended that topic of disagreement when he
deemed the issue of injury, or public good “unanswerable.” Consequently, Adams moved
on from this point and essentially took it as a given.
Note that in order for Adams' claim about the weakness or foolishness of the act to
have any legitimacy, moving the Court was predetermined to have been injurious to the
colony. For without the injury, there was nothing in the instructions that could be
adequately called foolish or wicked. In other words, it seems that at the time Adams
wrote this letter, injury to the public caused by moving the Court must have been a
generally accepted truth. The lack of clarification or proof in this very public
pronouncement means that it must have been agreed on by a good portion of the people
that movement of the Court was in fact a nuisance to the public and thus an infringement
on their rights of representation. It is worth noting that we do not know what kinds of
conversations were taking place in the local gathering spots of Boston at this time or what
ideas were being spread among the populace, but there was no doubt work being done
behind the scenes to explain to the skeptics and believers alike that they were in fact
being injured by moving the Court. As already noted, Adams was a man of the people
and he had an inclination for knowing how the people of the colony felt about issues. He
listened to them and they respected him for it. Therefore use of claims made without any
clarification suggests that controversy had moved the argument beyond that point
altogether. It means that it must have been a generally accepted truth at this point with no
further defense needed.
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Thus, it is concluded that the people were being injured by the House's movement
and consequently the king could not be responsible for such foolish actions. The
conclusion Adams drew mirrored and then expanded on the claim he made in the
previous letter from the House: the minister was responsible.
Here again, Adams was drawing a conclusion from among what must have been
readily accepted truths or at least ideas feasible enough to be taken as legitimate. For that
the minsters were capable of such atrocities would not have surprised anyone at the time,
with memories of the Circular Letter ordeal in their minds and no doubt kept fresh by
way of reminders at the local coffeehouses and taverns. For ministers were “to be
feared,” as Adams put it. They are prone to “idle whimsies,” “weakness and folly,” and
“daring and impudent attempts to destroy the Liberties of the People” (Volume 2 28).
And it was due to their rather sordid reputation that blindly following orders that come
from a minister, even in the name of the king was so problematic. Indeed, it seemed
prudent to Adams to simply demonstrate that the dangers of blindly obeying a minister
were far greater than the danger of the governor dismissing the minister's instructions.
Furthermore, the reputation of the minister made the instructions even more
suspect. For Hillsborough was not someone who could be trusted with power. On the
contrary, his previous actions had made him one to be regarded with skepticism.
But importantly, Adams was not speaking about Hillsborough exclusively.
Though Hillsborough was the main antagonist in these letters, the general principles
could have been applied to any government official who operated in a similar fashion,
including Hutchinson himself. For leadership without accountability was a constitutional
issue in many different instances. Hillsborough was one of several ministers and
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overseers who used their authority to promote their own ends. As Adams postulated, “if
we look back we shall find that some of these officers of the crown have been as deficient
in learning or integrity, or both, as we know some ministers of state have been” (Volume
2 31). For due to the intrinsic corruption of power, the people must always be on guard
against intrusive policies that curtail liberty. Adams noted that throughout history, those
in power have demanded submission from their subjects and “it is enough for those who
are dependent on the great for commissions, pensions, and the like to preach up implicit
faith in the great...” (Volume 2 31).
The attack against Hutchinson was obvious. Adams was essentially accusing the
governor of defending the minister only because his livelihood depended on it. And this
accusation called into question Hutchinson's credibility to speak about the matter in an
objective way. Adams contrasted the governor's biased mind with others, “whose minds
are unfettered will think for themselves,” saying that the latter “will judge freely of every
point of state doctrine, & reject with disdain a blind submission of authority of mere
names...” (Volume 2 31).
Furthermore, Adams argued that the king himself would not stand to see his
subjects submit themselves to such arbitrary rule. Adams noted that “the House seemed
to think it impossible that our gracious King, should hold his Subjects to a blind
obedience to Orders which they were not permitted to see; and therefore concluded, and
as I humbly conceive very justly, that this order in a particular manner, was to be
suppos'd [sic] to be an Act of the Minister and not of the King...” (Volume 2 29). Note
here that the burden of submission was held as another sort of proof that the king could
not be blamed for the instructions. Since the King presumably operated in accordance
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with, and understood, the implications of constitutional rules, the violation of those rules
pointed directly to the minister being responsible.
Adams sneaked in another point in this passage: the fact that the House had not
actually seen the instructions which sparked this whole dilemma. This sentiment was
never explicitly mentioned in the House's objections analyzed above, yet it makes an
appearance here. This is interesting because as Lord and Calhoun explained, a year
earlier the House had asked to see the original instructions and were told that the
governor was “forbidden from revealing their contents” (qtd. in Lord and Calhoon 740); a
gracious order had been passed down via a “circular letter of 1768 to all royal governors
which prohibited them from showing any part of and instruction to an assembly or
council” (qtd. in Lord and Calhoon 738). Therefore Adams was fully aware of the fact
that the instructions could not be seen, yet he criticized Hutchinson for their
unavailability. There was a time, said Adams, when the good word of an authority would
have been adequate to assuage the curiosity of the people. But “in these times of Light
and Liberty, every man chuses [sic] to see and judge for himself... [and] it is a pity
[Hutchinson] did not condescend to communicate those wise reasons... that [the
people]...may have a common understanding” (Volume 2 29) and determined the
adequacy of the wisdom for themselves.
This too seems to be leading toward a certain conclusion. For the charge of who
wrote the instructions could not be answered or refuted other than by the governor's good
word. And as we've seen thus far, Adams adequately demonstrated that when livelihoods
were on the line, the honor of a leader should never supplant or negate the need for
transparency and truth. I suspect that by this point Adams knew full well that the
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instructions were the product of ministerial action and did not come from the king. Yet
his decision to broach this topic shows once again that the governor's implied answer of
“you'll just have to trust me” was unacceptable on issues of liberty.
And here we come to the conclusion, to what Adams was building to all along.
His explanations and arguments against the threat of arbitrary power amounted to a
commentary on the entire history of the growing rebellion. It is clear that Adams valued
this skeptical approach to power as an important part of maintaining liberty. He went on
to explain that the presence of those who demanded to be treated with “profound
veneration, without the least enquiry into their nature and tendency” were regular features
of history and “[w]hile such a disposition prevailed, O how orderly were the people, how
submissive to the government! (Volume 2 31)”. But according to Adams, order was
secondary to liberty, and tranquility should not have been expected when the rights of the
people were threatened. Politicians preferred a quiet, reserved populace that was fully
submissive to the governmental policies; but, he argued, such expectation is illogical
once the people have tasted freedom. And as the disaffection that the subject began to
feel for their overseers grew, Adams noted, the tendency was to dismiss it, as when “the
secretary of state was to be informed that the people were become rebellious.” They did
the same thing to St. Paul, Adams claimed. He came “preaching doctrines opposite to the
humour of the Jewish Masters, that he 'turned the world upside down'” (Volume 2 32).
This choice of anecdote should not be overlooked. Adams clearly believed that
something important was occurring in the colonies. Whether or not he speculated at this
time that revolution would eventually come is uncertain. But he recognized that one way
or another, devotion to the constitutional principles of British law would result in a major
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transformation of British/American relations. Adams was essentially positioning the
people of the colony and their growing disaffection as part of a long and glorious lineage
opposing tyranny in all forms. And here we see Adams' rhetorical technique appear. He
expanded this occurrence into a lesson with far-reaching application.
Thus, for Adams, each of these problems was only valid when compared to the
constitutional rights of British citizens. It was the Constitution that served as the standard
by which actions of the minister (the instructions which were sent and the act of sending
the instructions) were compared and deemed malicious and ill-intentioned. If it was not
clear in Adams' writing, it was certainly implied. For without that standard, there was no
room for objection. But set up as it was, Adams' conclusion was quite clear: given the
degree of sovereignty built into the charter, the governor had no responsibility to respect
or abide by instructions given in the manner as these were.
Consequently, the governor's decision to ignore the charter and abide by the
instructions represented a tremendous threat to the liberties of the people. In the end,
Hutchinson, Hillsborough, and all those who sided with them were seen as a corrupt
cabal, bent on solidarity over liberty, blind to the duty that they had to uphold and protect
the constitutional rights of the people.
It is important to consider controversy and its work throughout this conversation.
In fact, it is controversy which ultimately explains the degenerative state of the argument
in Adams' and Hutchinson's letters. Notice how far the central point of argument had
moved since the first objection was written to Hutchinson. In these final letters, there
was no mention of issues that were central to the earlier part of the conversation. Gone
was any mention of Hutchinson's prerogative as governor, or whether the House should
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go about its business despite the objection. Gone was the argument over whether or not
relocating the House had really injured the people, or hindered productive legislative
work. These items of contention are in the past. Instead, the conversation had reached
the point where the main topic of disagreement was the character of the minister who sent
the original instructions to Hutchinson in the first place. This was the topic that closed
the conversation and on which Adams launched his grand theory on the dangers of such
blind and willing homage.
Thus, Adams' topical method of writing, with unwavering commitment to the
liberties of the people, caused a rift in productive conversation. I do not think this was
intentional but can be considered instead to be the result of controversy working
throughout the conversation. Hutchinson was a victim of Adams' rhetoric, for it was
Hutchinson's responses that led the way to the tangential topics. Adams' writings,
including these final letters, tend to be responses to the statements and questions posed by
Hutchinson. Hutchinson's rather dismissive responses are worth pondering. There are
two possibilities why they took the form that they did.
The first reason is simply practical, yet it speaks to the eventual consequence that
I will discuss below. Simply, Hutchinson wrote as he did because he could. In other
words, there was little incentive for Hutchinson to resolve the disagreement at this time.
He was fully aware that whatever disagreements the House might have had with his
policy decisions, he was the final judge. Therefore resolution was not a concern. It
seems entirely reasonable that had the situation been different, and Hutchinson was held
accountable by the people (by election or some other means), he might have devoted
more effort in attempting to engage the colonists in their grievances. As it stood,
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however, all their explaining was futile. Every explanation of how the policies were
detrimental to the Constitution fell on deaf ears. Of course some of the main issues might
have been answered, but in the end, there was no need for Hutchinson to really give the
grievances the attention they deserved. Adams noted as much in his first “Chatterer”
letter when he questioned how Hutchinson was able in one day to answer the questions
that took a “Committee of the House full Eight Days hard Labor” (Volume 2 29) to write.
The answer, Adams speculated, is that there was no need for Hutchinson to give them
adequate time. “Some men”, said Adams, “are said to have intuitive knowledge; and
such have nothing to do but write down pages of unanswerable reasons as fast as the Ink
can flow” (Volume 2 29). To reiterate, Hutchinson was able to ramble unintelligible,
tangential rationale all day long simply because he could. There was no incentive to do
otherwise.
The second reason that I believe Hutchinson's responses took the form they did is
that Adams' responses generally adhere to the principles of constitutionality; not that they
specifically mention the Constitution at every opportunity, but rather that constitutional
rights undergird all of his examples and all of his statements as to what is or ought to be
considered illegal.
This principled stance was, I suspect, particularly difficult for Hutchinson to argue
against. For Hutchinson, changing circumstances required changing attitudes toward the
situation, and his letters attempted to explain why these circumstances had changed and
what should be done in response. But at every opportunity, Adams brought the
conversation back to the Constitution, arguing again that without exception, the rights of
the colony transcend circumstances. Consequently, Hutchinson took different
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approaches, hinging his argument on some point he extracted from Adams' letters, but to
no avail. Adams' principled stance had made agreement nearly impossible. But
underlying everything was the same consistent adherence to the pillars of
constitutionality.
Consider some examples. Why was the ministry's meddling considered
problematic? Because doing so violated the limited, self-contained sovereignty of the
colonies in determining their own legal processes. And why was the decision to move the
Court, if predicated on the request of an external entity, an issue? For the same reason as
above. Adams viewed the colonial system in terms of charter rights, which set up a
crown-appointed governor and an elected legislature. This was, to Adams, a closed
system, supported by the constitutionality of British law and the pillars of the
constitution. Therefore, a violation of the charter was essentially a violation of the
Constitution. We see again that Adams' rhetoric was not necessarily known for its use of
tropes or creative phrasing, but rather for its unwavering consistency. Its constant source
of authority was the constitutional rights of the colonists as given by Britain. There were,
it seems, no consequences that would justify a betrayal of these rights and this is what
made the whole process and conversation so rapidly devolving. Looking through Adams'
writings, one finds a remarkable trend of stability and even-handed approaches to the
problems facing the colony. But there is also another trend found in the writings of his
opposition: they believed, almost without exception, that the circumstances of the event
provided a justification for changing the relationship between Britain and the colonies.
This ideological divide started the various conversations down two very different paths
which, as time went on, exacerbated the differences and forced particularly Adams'
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opposition (Hutchinson, Hillsborough, and others) into increasingly difficult positions
until they reached the point where they could no longer reconcile. As a demonstration of
the widening differences, consider how Adams' principled arguments played a major role
in helping to construct the identity of the colonists.
Recognize that the very point of Adams's principled stance was occurring before
his very eyes. Adams, in reference to the instructions of Lord Hillsborough, warned of
the dangers of blind obedience and the inevitable loss of liberties that result. And here,
we find that Hutchinson, by blatantly ignoring the constitutionally-based grievances put
forth by the House, was essentially guilty of the same crime. But it was only Samuel
Adams' adherence to the principles of constitutionality (and the resulting controversy)
that contributed to the widening rift by demonstrating at first hand the problems
associated with unaccountable authority.
Consider this in other terms: Adams' adherence to constitutional principles led to
Hutchinson recklessly dismissing Adams' claim, thereby demonstrating the exact problem
that Adams warned against. Adams' skepticism was at its core a deep mistrust of
unaccountable power, and Hutchinson's response to Adams' claims effectively served as a
case study for the very dangers about arbitrary power and blind obedience that Adams
warned against. Consequently, Hutchinson's responses simultaneously demonstrated and
affirmed the points Adams made. Colonists began to understand that the current system
would never work. They began to realize that as long as there was an unaccountable
authority in any capacity, the right to petition for the redress of grievances was effectually
worthless. Whether or not the consequences of this ideal were applied all the way up the
chain of government and eventually applied to the King is unknown, but it is likely that
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doubt had begun to creep in, and Adams' dedication to the principles helped usher in the
new ideology and cast doubt over the status quo.
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Chapter Six
The Whately Letters
This chapter looks beyond the superficial statements made by the several texts
penned in 1773 by Adams in the House of Representatives, and by Governor Thomas
Hutchinson, and traces the arguments being expressed by each. In doing so, I
demonstrate once again how failure by those on one side of the argument to engage the
other and Adams' continued return to arguments of principle led to a rapidly nonproductive dialogue, dismissal, and attempted distractions. I argue that it was
controversy at work within the texts that resulted in creating an impossible situation for
Governor Hutchinson by forcing him into precarious argumentative positions.
On March 14, 1771, Thomas Hutchinson had officially taken over as the governor
of the Massachusetts Bay. As indicated by the events discussed in the previous chapters,
his service as acting governor had done little to hinder what patriot colonists considered
ill-intentioned actions of the British officials. Events like the movement of the Court had
created a general dislike for Hutchinson among Adams' group of supporters. Though
Jensen noted that “Boston leaders had no great issues as before 1770,” Adams and his
band of political activists “worked with what they had, and they were geniuses at political
propaganda on every level” (Founding 412). In response, the early 1770s saw a
reenergized opposition.
The techniques practiced in the previous years had honed Adams' understanding
of what it took to effectuate change in the colony. As a result, Adams began to shift his
rhetorical strategy, relying less on the newspaper for pseudonym-signed letters, focusing
more on the dissemination of information to a wider audience. This approach gave rise to
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the Boston Committee of Correspondence. As a result, everything that was written at the
time was shared throughout the colony. Thus the rhetorical strategy was different and the
potential payoff was greater.
Adams' 1771 letter to Massachusetts correspondent to Britain, Arthur Lee,
outlined the kernel of an idea that would eventually give rise to the Boston Committee of
Correspondence. He was, as he wrote, a concerned citizen, convinced that:
The Grievances of Britain & the Colonies... spring from the same root of
Bitterness & are of the same pernicious growth. The Union of Britain & the
Colonies is therefore by all means to be cultivated. If in every Colony Societies
should be formed out of the most respectable Inhabitants... who should once in the
year meet by their Deputies, and correspond with such a society in London, would
it not effectually promote such a Union? And if conducted with a proper spirit
would it not afford reason for the Enemies of our common Liberty, however great,
to tremble.” (Volume 2 140–141)
Adams admitted that his plan was unrefined, but was instead, “a sudden Thought & drops
undigested from my pen.” And noting the difficulty of such an “arduous Task for any
man to attempt to awaken a sufficient number in the Colonies to so grand an
Undertaking,” he nonetheless concluded that “[n]othing however should be despaired of”
(Volume 2 141). Note here that even at this stage in resistance, Adams considered Britain
to be more a kindred soul than an enemy and hoped that closer associations with Britain
would be a key to fixing the corruption found in the colony. This again reinforces the
idea that revolution was not desired, until it became a solution of last resort. Though his
plan of regular correspondence with a “Society in Britain” would never come to full
fruition, Adams' dream of intercolonial communication was shortly to be realized.
The idea for such correspondence was nothing new. Richard D. Brown explained
that “this kind of self-constituted society, voluntarily associated to exert influence in a
political cause, was a recurrent idea” and that “New York dissenters had used the press to
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initiate such a series of corresponding societies in 1769” (45). New York's committees
were short-lived, however, and Adams' plan essentially appropriated the idea and applied
it to a more manageable land area: Massachusetts Bay. The plan included committees
being established in as many Massachusetts communities as possible, ostensibly to
facilitate the kind of wide-spread communication that would be useful in times of crisis.
There were other advantages to this setup as well. First, it functioned as a kind of
extra-legal legislative body. For, as Brown noted, a procedure for uniting “all the towns,
in an annual general meeting already existed in the General Court” (46). Committees of
correspondence, however, could “furnish an independent means of mobilizing the
province” (47) in the event that the governor refused to call the Court into session as had
occurred in 1768. Secondly, because the committees would be a public entity and “would
speak to and for the whole community... the professions of the committees would have to
be be recognized in England as public declarations” (47). Such organization, Adams
hoped, would help establish a degree of legitimacy to Boston's grievances. As he noted,
writing as “Candidus” on the front page of the Boston Gazette on September 16, 1771,
“To divide and thus destroy, is the first political maxim in attacking those who are
powerful by their union” (Volume 2 134) and committees of correspondence, he reasoned,
would hinder such divisive attempts. Just as the 1768 Circular Letter was intended to
further unite the colonies, so too would a committee of correspondence present a united
front by facilitating the sharing of concerns and ideas. For “nothing can so much
encourage [depriving the colonies of their rights] as a mutual inattention to the interests
of each other” (Volume 2 134). The same principles would be applied to the towns within
Massachusetts. Such committees, Adams hoped, would destroy the perception of
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opposition disseminating solely from Boston and more accurately portray to the British
officials the widespread dissatisfaction felt in response to British policies.
The committee officially sprang into existence on November 3, 1772, when
it was then moved by Mr. Samuel Adams, That a Committee of Correspondence
be appointed to consist of twenty one Persons – to state the Rights of the Colonies
and of this Province in particular... to communicate and publish the same to the
several Towns in this Province, and to the World as a sense of this Town...”
(Boston Town Records 93)
Also included in Adams' bill was a request of “each Town a free communication of their
Sentiments on this Subject” (Boston Town Records 93). The bill was unanimously
approved.
Such was the situation in late 1772. The Committee was established and, shortly
thereafter, was funded by the town to print 600 pamphlets containing both The State of
the Rights of the Colonists, and The Enumeration of the Violations of our Rights and send
them throughout Massachusetts (Brown 65–67). Gradually, the towns began to respond,
with Marblehead, Newburyport and Plymouth shortly taking up the cause and issuing
their own documents expressing dissatisfaction at British policy. News began to flow
both to and from Boston.
The Committee of Correspondence marked a major shift in Adams' rhetorical
outlet and had major repercussions for the events which were shortly to transpire.
Richard Brown remarked that Hutchinson was “scornful of the Boston Committee of
Correspondence and its works, [and] soon came to recognize the threat it created for his
objectives in Massachusetts public life” (58). Perhaps no event during this era caused
more headache for Hutchinson than the publication of the Whately Letters.
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In 1770, Benjamin Franklin had been appointed as the Massachusetts agent to
England. Several months into this position, Franklin came to posses a series of letters
written by Hutchinson during the height of the opposition over the Townshend Duties,
which had originally been sent to Parliament member and later British Secretary to the
Treasury, Thomas Whately. The letters had been shared and had made their way into the
hands of former British Prime Minister George Grenville, who lent them to another, and
then died before they could be returned. It was upon Grenville's death in 1770, said
Franklin, that he became aware of the letters and thought perhaps they may be of use to
the colony (Jensen 419–420; Puls 133–134; J. C. Miller 278–280). And useful they were.
The packet of letters was sent by Franklin to Thomas Cushing in December 1772, who
then shared them with Samuel Adams and other members of the Massachusetts House.
After reading Hutchinson's letters, Adams immediately grasped the fortuitousness of the
gift and promptly set to work making use of the letters. As historian John Alden noted,
“Adams knew persuasive propaganda when he saw it” (135) and this was first-class
material.
Hutchinson himself recorded that “a few weeks before the [House] session began,
it was whispered about, that there were letters in town, procured from England, written
by some great men, which were proofs of a conspiracy which had long been carrying on,
for enslaving America, and that the letters would soon appear.” (History, Vol. 3 283).
Hutchinson's explanation of these events clearly indicate that he considered the events
surrounding the letters' receipt and release as a conspiracy directed at discrediting him.
When Benjamin Franklin sent the letters from England, he did so with explicit
instructions that they should not be copied lest his own reputation be muddied in England
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(J. C. Miller 278–279; Jensen 420). Yet Hutchinson seemed to foresee the potential for
outrage and, after becoming aware of the letters' return to Boston, hurriedly wrote to a
friend in London, instructing him to burn any letters which might be used to cause further
agitation. “I have wrote what ought not to be made public,” he said (Bancroft 441).
Mark Puls speculated that some of the so-called Whately letters might be among those
destroyed at Hutchinson's order (138).
Underlying the speculation about the content of the letters was a series of texts
penned by Samuel Adams in the House of Representatives and Thomas Hutchinson
between June 2, 1773, and June 29, 1773, where we can clearly see rhetorical controversy
manifest. It is these which are to be analyzed.
June 2, 1773
Upon receipt of the letters, the House voted to clear the galleries. The doors were
shut when the letters were brought to the attention of the full House. Consequently,
records of what occurred in this closed-door meeting are minimal and the same basic
explanation of events is found in nearly all source documents. The collected volume,
Speeches of the Governors of Massachusetts, is one of these in which a transcript of the
events is recorded. Few details existed within, save the observation of Samuel Adams
that “the minds of the people were much agitated by a report, that letters, of an
extraordinary nature, had been written and sent to England, greatly to the prejudice of this
province....” But, apparently feeling obliged to share the scandalous discovery with the
assembly, the transcript recorded that Adams “offered them for consideration of the
House” (Speeches and Answers 402). The House accepted and that afternoon a
committee examined the letters and, as reported by John Hancock, concluded that “the
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tendency and design of the said letters, was to overthrow the constitution of this
government, and to introduce arbitrary power into the province” (Speeches and Answers
403). The report was accepted and the House assigned a committee of nine (including
Samuel Adams) to determine the responsive course of action. It is from this report that
Adams' role in the forthcoming conversation is made apparent. This committee would
prove to be one of Hutchinson's main opponents. In letters later examined in this chapter,
he wrote to this committee and addressed them as the “Board.”
Unfortunately, this is as much detail as exists in the House records. A few more
observations can be gleaned from a personal letter Adams wrote a few days later in which
he concluded that the letters might well reveal “persons who have been principal movers,
in all the disturbance misery, and bloodshed, which has befallen this unhappy country”
(Volume 3 43). Though still vague, these two statements are enough to reveal the starting
point for the pending disagreement. First, notice the emphasis placed on the
constitutional implications of Hutchinson's letters. As indicated from the account
mentioned above, it was this intent which the House of Representatives had determined
to be the important aspect behind Hutchinson's letters.
Secondly, Hutchinson's letters were portrayed in association with the train of
accusations and complaints against British policy that had resided in the colonies. Time
and again, Adams had wondered why the policies enacted in the colonies were deemed
necessary by Parliament. But suddenly it was clear. It was as if Adams had stumbled
upon a cipher which made the various parts of the colonial puzzle fit together.
Perhaps more important to this dissertation is the manner by which the letters
were discussed in the public arena before they were actually released. In one form or
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another, all the major Boston Newspaper (The Boston Gazette, the Evening Post, the
Massachusetts Gazette and the Massachusetts Spy) published some explanation of the
June 2 events. The Massachusetts Spy, due to its atypical Thursday publication
(Tuesdays being the norm), was the first to publish an account of the letters and did so
with an ominous tone. The article was buried inconspicuously in the last column of the
second page and was sparse in detail, noting only that “For several days past some
extraordinary discoveries have been talked of, which were expected to amaze the whole
province.” The same column went on to say that
very important matters will soon transpire, which will bring many dark things to
light – gain many proselytes to the cause of freedom – make tyrannical rulers
tremble, and give occasion for the whole people to bless the providence of God,
who causeth the wicked man to fall into the pit he hath digged [sic] for another.
(“Thursday, June 3. Boston” 2)
Only then did the article proceed to explain the events of June 2, including clearing of the
galleries and the vote of the committee.
Thus, we find in the debate over the Whately letters a different sort of rhetorical
undertaking than previously encountered. Perhaps more than other instances of
controversy discussed so far in this dissertation, the letters from the House during this
event must be seen in light of previous events. They did not stand alone, but represented
a sort of vindication of the speculations that Adams had espoused over the years. In other
words, what made this situation unique is that these letters served two distinct functions.
First, and most apparently, they demonstrated the nefarious machinations of Thomas
Hutchinson. But secondly, and just as importantly, they served as a legitimizing agent for
past accusations made by Adams. For instance, a couple years prior, Adams had asserted
that movement of the Court from Boston to Cambridge was emblematic of a larger
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problem of constitutional rights and misrepresentation on the part of some within the
colony1. But there, contained in the Whately letters, was proof: it was Hutchinson who
was behind the whole thing. Now that the letters had been discovered, Adams' claims
were retroactively exonerated from the label of conspiratorial. Thus, in one sense, these
letters represent much more than another instance of colonial abuse. They essentially
served to encapsulate the entire history of colonial charges against British actions.
Consequently, the rhetorical maneuvering contained within the dialogue about the letters
is important, for it reveals the degree to which the House pressed their new-found
advantage. Their immediate rush to establish the intent of the letters shows that they
realized their fortune. For in doing so, they overlooked some of the more obvious
questions which might have otherwise come into play: questions regarding the factuality
of the letters; the context in which they were written; the supposed authorship; or the
ethical implications of their manner of procurement. Instead, the House ignored these
questions and rapidly decreed that the letters were written with ignoble and malicious
intent. And, with the new Committee of Correspondence apparatus established, it was
nearly certain that the conclusions of the House of Representatives would not stay
contained within the city. These ideas would spread. Consequently, whereas in past
conversations, controversy was the result of and facilitator to decreasing dialogical
ability, here, controversy was thrust into the situation almost immediately simply because
these letters, and the assumptions made from them, relied so heavily on previouslyargued issues. Therefore, these letters, more than any other conversation studied in this
dissertation cannot be examined alone, but must be understood within the context of five

See chapter five of this dissertation.
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years of colonial occurrences. They were the product of years of controversy presiding
over the whole argumentative process.
It is with this mindset that Adams and the House proceeded to accuse Hutchinson
of actively and intentionally undermining the colony and published their declarations in
the newspapers. Having accomplished this first order of business, the House deliberated
on a proper response. And herein lies the crux of this segment on controversy working in
argument. The House set the terms of the debate before Hutchinson had an opportunity
to explain. And though he did try, the accepted truth of Hutchinson's motives, as we shall
see, is what drove the House agenda, while Hutchinson, knowing that his letters were
kerosene in the hands of a professional pyromaniac, pursued another strategy to shift the
topic of argument.
Hutchinson certainly recognized his dilemma. Addressing the points according to
the House agenda and decrees presumed the legitimacy of their claims. But any attempt
to shift topics to some of the other questions regarding the letters cast Hutchinson as
guilty. Below, we see the manner by which the arguments shifted and gave rise to
rhetorical controversy.
From the Governor to the House of Representatives, June 3, 1773
Published in the Boston Gazette, June 7, 1773
The House had already determined that Hutchinson was in the wrong and had
moved on to deciding what course of action to take in response to their decree. It was
Hutchinson who initiated the conversation. In other words, there was nothing specific
about the House transcripts discussed above that forced Hutchinson to respond. Yet when
he did, he used the terms that had originated in the House. The point of contention, if
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there was one, was the intent of the letters. However, as the House had already
determined the intent to be malicious, Hutchinson was at a distinct disadvantage. It was
as if the jury had already passed judgment before the trial had even begun. Hutchinson
therefore entered the conversation very cautiously .
It was not until June 3 that Hutchinson wrote to the House asking for details about
the rumors that had reached him. Obviously he was aware of the accusations, but his
request to the House on June 3, 1773, did little to dispel the accepted notion that he had
indeed written the letters for unconstitutional purposes, though again, such letters were
known only to the House and were only rumors to the public. Hutchinson's short
response assumed an air of surprise, as if the letters referred to were unknown to him.
Yet at this point, he was seemingly willing to engage the House on the notion of the
letters' intent. Hutchinson wrote, “I have never wrote any public or private letter, with
such intention [to subvert the Constitution], and am not conscious of any letter which can
have such an effect” (Speeches and Answers 403). Notice that this statement was a direct
refutation of the House's point about subverting the Constitution.
The letters in question were penned some four years prior, so it seems reasonable
that Hutchinson was actually surprised at the statements coming from the Assembly.
Perhaps he tried to recount his past correspondences, asking himself if there was anything
that could be construed as attempting to “subvert the constitution.” For we must also
remember that Hutchinson was no stranger to attacks from the House and perhaps
doubted the gravity, or even the existence, of the letters they were said to possess. Yet
public fervor had grown tremendously as rumors and speculation ran rampant throughout
the town. Thus Hutchinson requested what seemed to be the only reasonable action: that
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the House provide “a transcript of the proceedings of [June 2]...that I may be informed to
what the letters they refer, in order to my considering what steps are proper for me to take
upon the occasion” (Speeches and Answers 403).
From the House of Representatives to the Governor, June 6, 1773
Published in the Boston Gazette, June 7, 1773
The House responded to Hutchinson two days later with a two-part letter. The first
was a transcript of the June 2 proceedings discussed above and, following the instructions
of Hutchinson, the dates of the letters in question. The second was a request based on
Hutchinson's claim that he “never wrote any public or private letter, with an intention to
subvert the constitution.” In response, the House asked that “copies be laid before us, of
such letters as your Excellency has written, of those dates, relating to public affairs of this
province...” (Speeches and Answers 404). This latter part was published in the June 7
issue of the Boston Gazette.
This note to the governor accomplished several things for the House of
Representatives. First, it laid the burden of proof on the governor. By making it clear
that they had already determined the intent of the letters and by asking for evidence to the
contrary, the House had limited Hutchinson's potential responses. Secondly, even in the
House's response, the details of the letters remained vague. For the transcripts of June 2
events that were requested contained no information about the content of the letters
themselves, save the general observation that they were subversive to the Constitution.
This meant that Hutchinson was still relatively ignorant of any details and was forced to
make assumptions about the tone, topic, and recipient. The dates and acknowledgment
that the letters were “written to a gentleman in England, lately deceased,” (403) were
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apparently all the information Hutchinson had as to the specifics of the letters. He
therefore would have had a difficult time recalling the details of letters written years
before on dates specified by the House. He could, however, have inferred a couple
things. First, the dates would have indicated that they were written when he was not in a
position of colonial authority, that is to say not officially governor of the province.
Secondly, given the gravity of the House's accusations, Hutchinson rightly assumed that
the letters in question must have been written in an informal setting, such as to a personal
friend.
Up to this point, the dialogue had been rather uneventful and the conversation
generally revolving around the issue of intent. That status changed with Hutchinson's
reply to the House's request.
Immediately following the House's response to the governor as found in the
newspaper is a short piece entitled simply, “A Soliloquy.” Though no specific
identification is given of its author or its intended meaning it is strategically placed as if
to embody the thoughts of Thomas Hutchinson. Sandra Sarkela has argued that it served
the purpose of “indicting the Hutchinson administration” and to “discredit those who
continued to defend Hutchinson and his policies” (555). So, though this soliloquy is not
officially part of the back-and-forth conversation, it does demonstrate the involvement of
others in the argumentative process, further increasing the opportunity for controversy in
the situation.
From the Governor to the House of Representatives, June 9, 1773
Published in the Boston Gazette, June 14, 1773
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Up to this point, the argumentative focus was on the intent of the letters. But
Hutchinson's response changed the argumentative trajectory. His response to the House
was explanatory, accusatory, and inconsistent. He began by confirming receipt of the
House's transcripts and dates of letters in question and noted that based on the date and
accusations, they were written “many months before I came to the chair” and “they were
wrote, not only with that confidence, which is always implied in friendly correspondence,
by private letters, but that they are expressly confidential” (Speeches and Answers 404).
And it is here that the problems brought on by failure to engage argument enter the
situation. For both of these explanations serve to defend the purpose of the letters by
elevating propriety above intent. For Hutchinson, the issue was one of the relevance of
the letters to events of the time and the manner by which they were procured. In other
words, Hutchinson was concerned with a violation of the private/public realms. The
House's argument, however, as indicated in their previous letters to Hutchinson, was
centered on the issue of intent of the letters, with little regard for the way they were
discovered or the manner in which they were written. We find here the beginnings of
some irreconcilable differences which provide great opportunity for rhetorical
controversy to work.
Despite these assertions, the details about the letters were still vague and, though
Hutchinson had a good idea who the letters were written to, it was unlikely that he
recalled exactly what he had written. Later in his response, he implied that he had
possession of copies, though this might have been a fabrication. At this point in time,
publication of the letters in local newspapers was still a week away, so unless he had
copies, the gravity of the letters was yet unknown. Yet it was clear that Hutchinson had
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no intention of handing over copies of the letters in question, even if he did possess such
copies. Thus we come to the second part of Hutchinson's response.
Having deferred responsibility for the letters' content on the basis of their
unethical procurement, Hutchinson proceeded to deny the topical accuracy of the House's
conclusions. “[The letters] contain nothing more respecting the constitution of the
colonies in general, than what is contained in my speeches to the Assembly, and what I
have published in a more extensive manner to the world” (Speeches and Answers 404).
In other words, according to Hutchinson, the letters had nothing to do with the
Constitution, nor were they ever intended to be read in reference to the Constitution. And
it is with this choice of positioning that we see the dilemma Hutchinson was facing and
the sticky rhetorical situation brought on by Adams' framing of the issue. Rhetorical
controversy had forced Hutchinson's hand, making engagement with the issue difficult
and unlikely. It was a case similar to what Goodnight recognizes when he stated that
“[c]ontroversies [are] generative of argumentation without inviting an open, reflective
discussion of the controversial”(3). Hutchinson was generating an argument without
adding to a discussion of the letters' intent, thereby opening the door to further
controversy and further degenerative argument.
The House had the advantage, for they had the letters in hand, whereas it seems
that Hutchinson was at this point unaware of what exactly he was accused of saying. It
was only the general conclusion of malicious intent drawn by the House that was known
to Hutchinson. Therefore, even if Hutchinson did indeed have copies in his possession,
requests for these copies of the letters, along with “other such letters, as your Excellency
shall think proper” (Speeches and Answers 404) was tantamount to requesting
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Hutchinson's self-incrimination. At this point, Hutchinson still had the opportunity,
however slim, to claim that the letters were fabricated, or perhaps taken out of context.
But Hutchinson knew full-well that anything more laid before the House would either
affirm the legitimacy of their discovery or would likely be subject to inference and
speculation, both of which would only foster further tumult.
Thus, regarding his response to the House's request, Hutchinson's options were
three: refute the House's inquisition on the basis of the personal nature of the letters; deny
the House's conclusions of the letters' intent; or accept responsibility for careless remarks
and make excuses for the letters' content by explaining the circumstances. The last of
these options would have admitted some degree of guilt and Hutchinson perhaps thought
that such an admission would have only provided further fuel to the rebel cause. He
therefore relied on the only two options that seemed to provide an opportunity for escape:
claim privilege on the basis of their personal nature and then deny the House's
conclusion. Given what we know about Samuel Adams, one of Hutchinson's choices was
unwise and the other was ill-conceived.
The appeal to the personal nature of the letters was unwise, for it had the effect of
ignoring the central tenet of the House's claim and did nothing to reconcile the facts of
the case with the perception that Hutchinson was hiding something. The choice to claim
that the letters were irrelevant to the issue of subverting the Constitution was illconceived, for by doing so, Hutchinson demonstrated just how little he had learned about
dealing with Samuel Adams.
One might think that after years of tangling with Adams, Hutchinson would have
realized that the argument about the constitutionality of British policies went far beyond
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specific references to the Constitution itself. In Adams' mind, defending the Constitution
meant defending any intrusion upon it. Thus, any threat to the property, representation, or
trial by jury rights of the people was grounds for opposing the policy. Therefore when
Hutchinson claimed “there is not one passage in them, which was ever intended to
respect, or…ever understood to respect the particular constitution of this government”
(Speeches and Answers 404) he was defining Constitution in a way that Adams would
simply not agree with and thus neglecting a central tenet of the House's claim.
Thus we see here that rhetorical controversy is beginning to show. Hutchinson's
failure to address the House's claims and explain the situation resulted in a widening rift
about the nature of the disagreement. For Hutchinson, the private nature of the letters
was of greater import than the constitutional implications that the House extrapolated
from them. For the House, just the opposite was true. As we leave this part of the
conversation, notice that the argumentative topic has shifted slightly.
The central question posed by the House could be conceptualized to be something
like “were Hutchinson's letters meant to subvert the constitution?” When considering this
question, the House would have said yes, while Hutchinson would have said no. And a
debate over this question would have been a productive conversation as long as the
central question of the letters' intent was adhered to by both parties. However, such a
focus would have been difficult for Hutchinson to stand on, for doing so would have
necessitated an explanation as to what exactly the intention was. Here, Hutchinson had
no hope of succeeding. As long as the question remained on the intent of the letters, there
was no opportunity for a successful explanation. What could his explanation have been?
That he wrote in order to uphold the Constitution? Or that there was no explicit purpose
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and he was just venting to a distant pen pal? In short, as long as the question remained
one of intent, Hutchinson was limited in his possible responses.
Therefore, the expedient option, which Hutchinson chose, was to forego entirely
the question of intentionality and reach for the broader question of applicability. After
all, if he was able to prove that the letters were in fact unrelated to the Constitution, then
their intent was meaningless. But by denying the House's central question and attempting
to refocus the debate on the applicability of the letters to the Constitution, Hutchinson
opened a door to a demonstration about how these letters were indeed constitutional.
And as shall be seen in the next section, the House seized the opportunity to demonstrate
how grave they considered the constitutional threat to be.
Resolves of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, June 15, 1773
Published in the Boston Gazette, June 21, 1773
Armed with the public knowledge of the letters and the refusal of the governor to
cooperate or engage their accusations, the committee that had been formed on June 2 to
consider the letters, which was led by Samuel Adams, penned a series of resolves which
permanently enshrined, in the public record, their interpretation of the letters' intent. The
Resolves also found a way to integrate the governor's statements from other parts of this
dialogue and used them to further the conclusion that something foul was afoot.
The Resolves were published prominently on the front page of the June 21, 1773,
issue of the Boston Gazette. Furthermore, in case there were citizens who did not read
the Gazette, the resolves were published in the June 21 issue of the Boston Evening Post
and the June 24 issue of the Massachusetts Gazette as well. At the moment of the
Resolves passage, the Hutchinson's now infamous letters had not yet been released to the
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public. Therefore it seems clear that Adams was furthering the idea of a conspiracy in the
minds of the colonists.
The Resolves charged Hutchinson with a plethora of heinous acts, including
introducing “measures, destructive of our constitutional liberty” in order to “advance
[his] own fortunes, and advance [himself] to posts of honor and profit, not only to the
destruction of the charter and constitution of this province, but at the expense of the rights
and liberties of the American colonies” (Speeches and Answers 407). Finally, Adams
justified both the Resolves and subsequent skewering of Hutchinson as done solely in the
name of allegiance to the king and to Great Britain. The only solution for such
treasonous actions, as Adams saw it, was “to pray that his Majesty would be pleased to
remove [Hutchinson] forever from the government thereof” (Speeches and Answers 409).
Shortly after the Resolves had circulated in the newspapers, copies of the letters
were mysteriously “discovered” by John Hancock, and Adams, desiring to follow
Franklin's orders, had the “copies” reprinted, instead of the originals and as Jensen
explained, “within a few days the letters, suitably edited to make Hutchinson... look as
bad as possible, began to appear in the newspapers” (Founding 420) and into the waiting
hands of a primed public.
Hutchinson himself bemoaned the slant of the letters, saying, “[i]t was not
possible for a greater art to be made use of to inflame the people,” for “the most unnatural
construction had been made from some of [the letters] by detaching them from what went
before and followed” (qtd. in T. Hutchinson, Diary and Letters 82). Nevertheless, the
effect was great. Hutchinson had done himself no favors by asserting personal privilege
and denying the constitutional relevance of the letters. For now they were exposed and
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nuanced by the skillful hand of Samuel Adams. Now, the public could see for themselves
what the governor was trying to hide behind the privilege of personal correspondence.
Looking back, it seems absurd to think that the personal context of the letters would have
mattered, or that Hutchinson really thought that claiming injustice for invasion of
personal letters would have stopped the House from pursuing their release. When the
rights of the people were in question, there were no limits to what could be done for
political expediency.
Reading these Resolves leaves one with the sense that the events uncovered by the
letters were monumental. Descriptions of the governor and his covert plan to subvert the
colonies were complete with all the trappings of a modern spy novel. According to the
Resolves, the letters revealed a plot which was formed and executed over many years and
was identified by betrayal, international espionage, brainwashing, bloodshed, secret
correspondence and culminating in a violent coup d'état. Consider these excerpts from
the resolves:
-The governor was “under no official obligation to transmit intelligence of such
matters as are contained in said letters... therefore, that these letters, however secretly
wrote, must naturally be supposed to have, and really had, a public operation” (Speeches
and Answers 406).
-“[H]e has been practicing every method among the people of this province, to fix
in their minds an exalted opinion of his warmest affections for themselves” while at the
same time “ by his 'secret confidential correspondence'... introduc[ing] measures,
destruction of our constitutional liberty (Speeches and Answers 407).
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-“[T]hese 'private letters,' being wrote 'with express confidence of secrecy,' was
only to prevent the contents of theme being made known... and this rendered them the
more injurious in their tendency, and really insidious” (Speeches and Answers 406).
-“[T]here has been, for many years past, measures contemplated, and a plan
formed, by a set of men, born and educated among us, to raise their own fortunes, and
advance themselves to posts of honor and profit...” and promote “the introduction of a
military force into the province, to carry their plans into execution” (Speeches and
Answers 407).
These are but a few examples which demonstrate the conspiratorial tone of the
accusations. Hutchinson's claim as to the personal nature of the letters played right into
Adams' hand. For even these attempted justifications were simply cited as proof of the
conspiracy.
Yet as we peer deeper into the text, beneath the superficial accusations, we find
that the malicious actions of which Hutchinson was presumed guilty were rather vague
and their argumentative construction, suspect. Yet, these Resolves were effective in
portraying Hutchinson as wrong. By every account the House Resolves doubled down on
their judgment of intention. In addition, the House held Hutchinson responsible for the
actions which they say resulted from his letters. As we shall see, both of these were
rooted in highly speculative assertions and relied heavily on controversy-induced appeals
for their substantive power.
There are some parts of the House Resolves argument that need further
explanation and can be quickly summarized. According to the House resolutions,
Hutchinson's intent to subvert the Constitution caused him to write the letters, which
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resulted in actions such as the arrival of military forces and inaction of revenue laws (i.e.
the Townshend Duties). These actions, it was thought, prove the intent. Yet, importantly,
by any objective measure, it was only the actions (military presence and revenue acts)
that could be deemed unconstitutional. Therefore, as will be explained in further detail
below, the House's argument can be seen as fallacious.
The first fallacy present in this argument is the ad hoc ergo propter hoc (after that
ergo because of that) fallacy. In essence, this argument was found when the House
claimed that the actions (military presence and revenue acts) came after the intent to
subvert the Constitution, therefore were caused by the intent. According to the Resolves,
Hutchinson's letters “contain aggravated accounts of facts, and misrepresentations”
(Speeches and Answers 405). These misrepresentations, they claimed, “produce[d] the
severe and destructive measures which have been taken against this province” (Speeches
and Answers 406). In other words, the House argued that the arrival of troops was a
result of this misrepresentation caused by Hutchinson's intent. But we must acknowledge
that directly associating intent with actions, especially when actions were not of one's
own decision, was disingenuous. For even if Hutchinson's intent was to subvert the
Constitution, and even if this desire led him to misrepresent the colonies to his superiors
in Britain, there were many other voices, including the Massachusetts agents, who had
opportunity to speak out in opposition. The House's claim disregarded the roles of
members of Parliament, Lord Hillsborough, and all the other players in colonial policy
decisions. It ignored all the egos, desires, and politics that factored into these decisions.
Therefore to place blame for the troops and revenue acts exclusively on Hutchinson was,
by any measure, incomplete and fallacious.
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The second fallacy was essentially circular reasoning. It appeared when the
House argued that Hutchinson's misrepresentation was proof of his desire to subvert the
Constitution. But, we must also recognize that without first assuming that Hutchinson's
desire was to subvert the Constitution, his misrepresentation might have never led to the
House members to the conclusion that they reached. For various other explanations as to
the cause of the misrepresentation were equally legitimate, including ignorance,
carelessness, or just plain stupidity.
The recognition of circular reasoning is especially important for this study
because its presence leads to a greater understanding of how rhetorical controversy
played a role in the arguments. For we must remember that there are more factors to
consider in persuasive appeals than pure logic and that fallacies can and do have great
appeal when framed in certain contexts and left unquestioned. And in this case, I believe
that the House's argumentative might lay in the superior definitive power that had been
instilled in the public mind. Controversy then, seeking victory over civil engagement,
seized the opportunity to press the issue from a stance of general consensus.
Controversy in the House Resolutions
Though the previously released transcripts from the House charged Hutchinson
with “intending to subvert the constitution,” this exact phrase was not found in the House
Resolves. The closest similarity is in the closing two paragraphs where the House
concluded that Hutchinson “secretly, endeavored to undermine, alter and overthrow the
constitution of the province.” Hutchinson had, in the June 9 letter to the House, stated
that the Whately letters were not written in reference to constitutional issues and therefore
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had no relevance to constitutional issues. So the question remains: where did Adams get
this association with the Constitution?
The answer to this question lies in the argumentative construction of the Resolves
themselves. For the fundamental argumentative issue was Hutchinson's intention when
writing the letters. According to the House, Hutchinson's intention was to subvert the
Constitution. This accusation, judging from the transcripts of June 2 nd events, was the
principal accusation drawn and declared by the House. Looking closely, we must
recognize that in the Resolves, this statement operates not as a starting point of the
argument, but as a conclusion. After all, in order to make that claim of intent, the House
had to have some proof which demonstrated the accuracy of the charge. And indeed, the
Resolves in their entirety operate as proof of this conclusion, which is why it appeared in
the closing paragraphs. Yet realize that the intention to subvert the Constitution was not
only the conclusion drawn by the House, but it also functioned as a preliminary rationale
by which they considered his letters.
As a means of simplification and explanation, consider the situation in the form of
a hypothetical conversation between two colonial inhabitants:
Person 1: “I just read the Whately letters and noticed that Hutchinson greatly
misrepresented us. Why do you think he did that?”
Person 2: “He misrepresented us because he desires to subvert the Constitution”.
Person 1: “How do we know that his intention was to subvert the Constitution?”
Person 2: “Because he misrepresented us”.
This simplified example demonstrates the circular reasoning occurring in the
House Resolves, but in its brevity, it leaves out several argumentative steps which are
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important to note. When expanded, it might have been said that Hutchinson intended to
subvert the Constitution, therefore he misrepresented the colonies, which resulted in
troop presence and revenue acts. These events, being unconstitutional, prove his intent to
subvert the Constitution. Yet again, notice that the argumentative trajectory necessary to
arrive at the conclusion is only permissible if one first accepted the postulation that
subversion of the Constitution was, in fact, Hutchinson's goal. For though the middle
parts of the argumentative structure remained (i.e. the presence of misrepresentation), to
neglect the initial charge of intent to subvert the Constitution opens the possibility of a
variety of explanations.
For example: Hutchinson misrepresented the colonists because he was
incompetent, which resulted in troop presence and revenue acts. These events, being
unconstitutional, prove nothing, except that an incompetent governor was subjecting the
people to unnecessary burdens. The same could be said with any other trait by which the
governor's misrepresentation was said to occur: stupidity, carelessness, foolishness, etc.
In short, the conclusion that Hutchinson was intending to subvert the Constitution was
only possible if one began with the same premise. So we find that though circular in its
reasoning, the House constructed an argument centered around the premise that
Hutchinson's actions were intended to subvert the Constitution.
Of the accusations piled on Hutchinson, only a few could reasonably be claimed
to actually be subversive to the Constitution. Therefore the issue of constitutionality
stems not from the misrepresentation itself, but from the acts that were thought to have
resulted from Hutchinson's misrepresentation: the arrival of troops and the establishment
of revenue acts. It could be said that without these occurrences, there was no reasonable
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cause for the House to assert that the Whately letters had any relevance to the issue of
constitutionality. Not surprisingly, Hutchinson essentially argued the same thing in his
message of June 9 when he wrote: “there is not one passage in [the letters], which was
ever intended to respect...the particular constitution of this government...” (Speeches and
Answers 404).
The rest of the grievances noted by the House, including misrepresentation,
transmitting intelligence, and sending secret correspondence might not have been in
keeping with the high standards of a sitting government official, but they were not
crimes. And herein lies the key to understanding this controversy. We must recognize
that the accusations made by the House only received their power and legitimacy on the
basis of the declared unconstitutionality of the actions perpetuated by them. In other
words, these accusations had no rhetorical merit if the unconstitutionality of said acts was
not already firmly enshrined in the minds of the people who read the accusations.
Thus we see the consequence of controversy once again. Adams and the House
understood that the letters were not incriminating without some sort of referent. But by
tying them to the issue of constitutionality, they were able to tap into a simmering
resentment and lingering fears about subversive activities that had been lying beneath the
surface for years prior. Thus in their Resolves, Adams and the House destroyed
Hutchinson's primary justification that the letters were not constitutional in nature by
subtly shifting the argument to include more than just the letters in the definition of
constitutionality. And they did so in a way that could not really be refuted. For though
they technically did respond to Hutchinson's excuse that the letters were not about the
Constitution, they did so by referencing not the letters themselves, but the actions that
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were perpetuated by the letters, thus conflating the two. Hutchinson's letters were
considered to be constitutionally relevant because they resulted in unconstitutional
measures being foisted upon the colony. It was guilt by association. And it made
potential response extremely difficult. For to refute the House's charge, Hutchinson not
only had to separate his letters from the actions which they supposedly caused, but he
also had to demonstrate that the arrival of troops and the revenue acts were not
unconstitutional. It goes without saying that this was a monumental task. For though the
public ire over the Townshend acts had lessened, skepticism lingered and no one wanted
to relive the days of non-importation. It was a powerful memory.
Thus we find that controversy, in its effort to find possible means of argument,
twisted the subject by simple conflation and made what could have been a simple
argument over the intent of the letters into an unsolvable dilemma. Hutchinson was at a
tremendous disadvantage, for he was up against a colonial attitude that held the arrival of
troops and the revenue acts as not only unconstitutional, but also responsible for deaths,
riots, unavailability of goods, and other annoyances.
Such attitudes were no doubt fostered by the perpetual appearance of these issues
in the local newspapers and the cogent arguments made by John Dickinson, Samuel
Adams (as an anonymous writer), Mercy Otis Warren, and others. Furthermore, with the
aforementioned Committee of Correspondence in place, such localized fervor was
unlikely to remain in Boston. All these events worked together to create a figurative
situational powder keg. Hutchinson could not win. His possible responses to the House
resolves were severely limited. The Resolves had been widely distributed, as had the
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letters themselves. Consequently, controversy was further fortified in this argument when
Hutchinson chose the easy, but safe way out: he changed the subject.
Message from the Governor to the Board, June 17, 1773
Published in the Boston Gazette June 21, 1773
Before beginning this analysis, note that this message was written not to the
House of Representatives per se, but to the Board that had been elected by the House to
consider what to do about the Whately letters. Think of it as a sort of House
subcommittee. Further, recall from earlier in this chapter that Samuel Adams was a
member of this Board. The difference between the Board and the full House will become
more important later in this chapter.
Hutchinson's first attempt to change the subject was found in a brief piece written
on June 17, 1773, and published in the June 21 issue of the Boston Gazette. In it,
Hutchinson asks the Board to send him the letters they had in their possession so that he
might compare their holdings to his own and explained that there was a good chance that
personal copies did not exist as “I do not always keep copies of private letters” (T.
Hutchinson, “June 21, 1773” 3). The mention of “private letters” is interesting, for it
could be seen as a subtle attempt to assert the personal content of the letters, as if to claim
that their private nature ought to have been respected.
In other parts of this brief message to the Board it was clear that Hutchinson was
trying to delegitimize the House's findings by casting doubt on the letters' importance or
legitimacy. His rationale came in two forms. First, that the letters in question were
potential forgeries and not actually Hutchinson's work. Such doubt could only be
assuaged by comparing handwriting, or copies. Secondly, even if the letters were
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Hutchinson's writings, he argued that their content was taken out of context. Hutchinson
claimed that the Board could not “possibly form a right judgement of all the parts of them
unless you should also be furnished with the Letters to which mine were wrote in
answer” (T. Hutchinson, “June 21, 1773” 3). In Hutchinson's mind, there was one way to
rectify all these doubts. The Board should send Hutchinson the letters they possessed.
Transcripts of the letters had not yet been printed, so the only knowledge the
public had of these letters was found in these brief messages sent between the House and
Hutchinson and consequently printed in the newspapers. But beneath these simple
requests was raging a public relations battle for the attention and understanding of the
people. Seen in this way, Hutchinson's explanations take on a different importance. He
was justifying himself not only to the House, but to the public as well. If the public was
able to dismiss any concern as problem of context, for instance, then the House's
discoveries had no merit. This is especially important in some of the following messages.
From the Governor to the House of Representatives, June 21, 1773
Printed in the Boston Gazette, June 28, 1773
Hutchinson followed his June 17 message with a message to the full House
written on June 21. It was concise and was given front-page placement in the June 28th
issue of the Boston Gazette. In this letter, Hutchinson expressed “concern, for the honor
and reputation of the colony” and regretted the way the House “in an unparalleled and
most injurious manner, determined the intentions and designs of the Governor” (Speeches
and Answers 409).
Particularly interesting is the fact that Hutchinson still did not refute, address, or
otherwise consider the charges contained in the Resolves. Perhaps after viewing the
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public response to the Resolves over the five previous days, he knew it was purposeless,
or perhaps he knew there was nothing that could be said. And indeed, Hutchinson's own
account of Massachusetts history suggests that this was the case. He wrote,
These resolves being published... the minds of the people were generally
impressed by the addresses both of council and house for the removal of the
governor and lieutenant-governor. An attempt from the governor to expose the
proceedings... would have exposed him to redoubled abuse and calumny.
(History, Vol. 3 294)
Regardless, Hutchinson's response did nothing to answer the House's accusations, which
suggest that there might have been another motive to his reply. It is further evidence in
the second part of this short reply where Hutchinson reminded the House, and thus the
citizens of Massachusetts, that while the debates over the letter were going on, the House
was neglecting its other obligations. This seemed to be intentional strategic
maneuvering. For if Hutchinson was able to drum up public disapproval at the House not
doing the job the people had elected them to do, public pressure could perhaps make the
House move on from the issue of the Whately letters. Thus, he wrote to the House, “I
must remind you that you are near to the close of the fourth week of the session, and, that
you have done little, or none of the business of the Court” (409). It is plain to see that
Hutchinson's reply could have been read as a futile attempt to encourage the House to
move on from the issue of the letters, thereby sparing Hutchinson from the scorn of the
people.
The House Resolves had focused squarely on Hutchinson's intent when writing the
letters. And, though I have demonstrated the fallacious construction of these Resolves,
their focus remained. Hutchinson's messages which followed and responded to the
House Resolves, however, were notably void of any relevance to the House's claims. As
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mentioned above, it was entirely possible that Hutchinson – feeling that the House had
backed him into a corner – saw no other way to get out of the situation but to change the
subject or distract the House from their focus. But as seen in other conversations
examined in this dissertation, by placing so much emphasis on the constitutional
implications of certain events, the House's focus was not easily disrupted. Therefore,
though Hutchinson attempted to get out of the bind created by the House's stalwart focus,
he did so in a way that neglected to address the main topic at hand. This neglect created
another alternative argumentative strain. The House, however, was not distracted. Their
response just two days later acknowledged Hutchinson's argument, yet simultaneously
refocused the argument to the constitutional implications of the letters.
His Excellency's message to the House
Printed in the Boston Gazette, June 28, 1773
Before the House response, Hutchinson followed his June 21 statement with an
even shorter one requesting that a copy of the Resolves be laid before him. I see little
rhetorical merit in this request, other than it indicated Hutchinson's desire to understand
the happenings of the House. Nevertheless, it is part of the conversation, so I mention it
here.
Message from the Board to the Governor, June 22, 1773
Printed in the Boston Gazette, June 28, 1773
This short piece addressed Hutchinson's June 17 request that the original letters be
shown to him as proof of their legitimacy. Not surprisingly, the Board which had been
assigned was unwilling to hand over their prized letters. As justification, they claimed
that the House had only given them the letters with restriction that “we by no means
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suffer [the letters] to go out of our hands”(“Message from the Board to the Governor” 2).
Note again this was the Board speaking and not the full House. In reality, there was little
difference between the two bodies as leaders in one were also leaders in the other. But
the status of the Board as a “separate” body from the House provided some cover from
Hutchinson's request.
In response, the Board explained that they “are not at Liberty to lay them before
you in the usual Way,” but they were willing to “open the Letters in your presence”
(“Message from the Board to the Governor” 2) in order to allow comparison of
handwriting for verification purposes. If Hutchinson's intent had been to cast doubt on
the value of the letters they possessed, he had failed. The House's suggested compromise
gave Hutchinson the opportunity to examine the letters, but only under the scrutiny of the
House.
This message quoted Hutchinson's June 17 statement (discussed above) where
Hutchinson had argued that the Whately letters were taken out of context and could not
be fully understood without first seeing that which the Whately letters were responding
to. To this claim, the House responded that “we are desirous of forming a right judgment
in this matter, we shall with candor read and consider any letters your Excellency shall
please to lay before us for that purpose” (“Message from the Board to the Governor” 2).
In other words, specifics did not matter. If context was important, then any context
Hutchinson could supply would suffice.
It seems that at this point in the argument, the point of these brief messages was
no longer about ascertaining the truth of what the House possessed. Instead, it seems
clear that the battle for the public approval was of far greater import. Notice the stated
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willingness of the House to work with the governor to seek truth. Their concession and
understanding seems completely reasonable, so much so that it would have been hard to
Hutchinson to refuse the House's offer. Doing so would have made him look stubborn
and as if he had something to hide. In the public's mind, if the letters did contain any
questionable material, accepting the Board's offer would have been a way to at least
partially work toward resolution by answering some of Hutchinson's posed doubts (e.g.
whether they were really his letters and if the context mattered). Thus the Board's
response essentially left the ball in Hutchinson's court. Since the Board had made
concessions, or at least appeared to do so, the burden to demonstrate cooperation was
Hutchinson's alone. With this in mind, consider the next message Hutchinson sent to the
House on the very next day.
His Excellency's Message to the Board, June 23, 1773
Printed in the Boston Gazette, June 28, 1773
Apparently the letters did eventually make their way to the governor in one way
or another, for Hutchinson's June 23 message to the Board admitted that the letters “laid
before me... appear to be of my signing.” But Hutchinson was greatly displeased by the
restrictions placed the letters and considered it a personal affront to the dignity due a
governor. To Hutchinson, the notion that the Board was a separate body from the House
was preposterous. Therefore the notion that one could give instructions to the other, or
that the Board could use House orders as an excuse to not cooperate with the governor's
request were, in Hutchinson's words, “unusual and indecent.” Such restrictions, said
Hutchinson, “ought to have been rejected by you as carrying with it strong suspicion of
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that unfairness with which the whole proceeding relative to these and other letters had
been carried on from the beginning”(T. Hutchinson, “June 28, 1773” 2).
It seems that this point, Hutchinson was reaching his wit's end. Of this brief
message, only one sentence addressed the subject of the whether the letters were actually
Hutchinson's or not. The remainder of the message was scolding the House for their
impertinence. Note again that by focusing almost exclusively on the disrespect paid to
him by the House, Hutchinson neglected any of the more important parts of the previous
letter.
There was no indication that Hutchinson was going to turn over copies he might
have possessed. Therefore it could be said that Hutchinson had incriminated himself with
his effort to cast doubts on the legitimacy of the letters which the House possessed. After
all, it was Hutchinson who had said that right judgment could not be ascertained without
other letters for context. As noted above, this statement was likely intended to detract
from the remarkableness of the Whately letters. But it was poorly executed, for it
allowed an easy response. The Board simply parried that statement into an unresolved
burden. If the letters could not be understood without context, then Hutchinson should
simply provide contextual background. His inability or unwillingness to do so would
further incriminate him.
I believe rhetorical controversy can be seen here in the way that Hutchinson was
first forced to respond to the condemning Resolves. The limited argumentative options
available led him to change topics and attempt to delegitimize the House. But attempted
subject change or delegitimization are not typically the first argumentative choice of
someone who has the upper hand in the argument. Here too, Hutchinson's rhetorical and
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argumentative choices indicate his difficult position. Had there been a rational way to
address the House's claims about the intent of the letters, Hutchinson would have
undoubtedly taken it. But the path that was laid out from the very beginning of this
conversation severely diminished the possibility of resolution. “Put your adversary in the
wrong and keep him there”(qtd. in Zobel 19) was the mantra Adams chose when waging
the war of words, and here, in this instance, the maxim was manifest. For without the
House's repeated insistence about the intent of the letters, there would have been little
motivation for Hutchinson to raise the issue of context at all. But the fact that he did, and
that it was such a losing proposition, indicates that Hutchinson was running low on
options. Clearly the tides had turned against him and the House/Board had backed him
into a corner. Hutchinson's feeble arguments indicate his desperation.
From the House of Representatives to the Governor, June 24, 1773
Published in the Boston Gazette, June 28, 1773
The House considered Hutchinson's June 21 message and replied with a piece that
was also published in the June 28 edition of the Boston Gazette. The preface to this
message specifically noted that it was an “Answer of the House to the Governor's
Message of the 21st Instant.” However, given the topics of the letters exchanged between
June 22nd and 23rd discussed above, it seems quite likely that the House factored these
into their June 24 letter. For we see here, perhaps more clearly than anywhere else in this
conversation, the identified source of the House's discontent. Though Hutchinson had
tried to detract from the intention of the letters by claiming private privilege, or
contextual inadequacy, or the personal disrespect such an inquisition had been paid him,
it was to no avail. The House's response to all these as found in this June 24 letter simply
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stated that due to their “extraordinary nature,” a lack of focus on the Whately letters
would have “betrayed a total want of a proper attention, not only to the honor and
reputation of our province, but the true interests of our constituents (Speeches and
Answers 410).
Clearly, the House believed that the interests of the colony were well-served by
spending legislative time analyzing and acting on the Whately letters. Furthermore, the
matter of disrespect paid to the governor, though unintentional, was nonetheless
unimportant. For propriety paled in comparison to their duty to constituents. Thus the
House accused Hutchinson of missing the point. They wrote that if Hutchinson had
“duly considered that those letters contained matters of a very extraordinary measure...
[he] would have judged it needless to remind us” of the date and the obligations to
constituents. The implied statement is that since Hutchinson felt the need to remind the
House of their obligations, he obviously misunderstood the grave implication of the
letters. Finally, as a sort of final statement of repudiation, the House reminded
Hutchinson that “we are... answerable to none but our constituents, for the time we spend
in doing that part of the public business, which they have chosen us to transact”
(Speeches and Answers 410). In other words, the House's allocation of legislative time
was none of Hutchinson's business.
In sum, the House response and the ultimate conclusion to this conversation was
to dismiss all of Hutchinson's claims as irrelevant to the larger and vastly more important
point that the letters had great applicability to colonial rights and thus should be
understood as such. Thus, by justifying the time spent on these letters, they were also
affirming their importance.
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With this response, the House essentially sealed the issue from further
deliberation. After all, what more could be said? Where could Hutchinson look for
further arguments? Deliberation had been thoroughly discouraged. Time and again
Hutchinson's objections had been answered in a way that only further established the
importance of these letters to broad colonial policy. In the battle for public opinion, the
House's actions portrayed Hutchinson as an out-of-touch authority, unaccountable to any
and exhibiting poor judgment. They had refuted Hutchinson’s attempt to redirect their
energies. And, though Hutchinson would have been able to repeat the same assertions of
impropriety or disrespect that he had attempted earlier, by this point, through controversy
and the increasing difficulty of legitimate responses, the topic of deliberation had
meandered far from its original purpose.
Conclusions
Since the House's final letter to the governor did not address any of the
constitutional issues that had been previously debated, we must ask ourselves where this,
the fundamental issue of the entire conversation, was left. Given what has been discussed
previously in this chapter, that the Constitution was under attack from the governor's
intended subversion was a point that had never been adequately refuted. Though the
conversation had shifted tremendously, veering wildly off the original topic, the House's
point still stood. Their claim had not been refuted.
The conversation began as a debate over the intent of the letters with the House
claiming to know Hutchinson's intention and Hutchinson denying their conclusions. The
House then provided just enough detail to allow Hutchinson to claim that the letters were
personal correspondence and thus had nothing to do with the Constitution. This claim
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opened the door to Samuel Adams' definition of constitutionality and its broad
application. And, despite Hutchison's repeated denials of intention, nothing was said that
undermined this central premise. Therefore we see that though the Constitution remained
a central issue in the conversation, there were subtle shifts in the way it is discussed and
in the implications of its appearance.
And in this summary, we see remnants of Samuel Adams' rhetoric. By appealing
to broad generalizations, he was able to claim rhetorical power on an issue that might
otherwise not be available. Furthermore, we see again his strict adherence to the
principles of constitutionality, though they are admittedly of secondary importance. They
were nevertheless used to advance a particular point of view, while remaining consistent
with his longstanding application of the Constitution in determining his stance on, and
response to, colonial events.
Simply, Adams considered troop presence and revenue acts as unconstitutional on
the premise that they violated the right of property. Furthermore, it was this definition
that allowed the main association used to conflate Hutchinson's letters with the issue of
constitutionality to exist in the first place. Were Adams' definitions not established, there
would have been no way to claim that Hutchinson intended to subvert the Constitution;
for there would have been no association with the Constitution. Arrival of troops and
revenue acts would have been simply nuisances and thus Hutchinson's letters would have
been only misrepresentative, with no constitutional implications. Thus controversy once
again appears via Adams' consistent appeals to constitutionality and the general
unwillingness, or inability, of the opposition to adequately respond to these claims.
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Finally, as an indication of these messages' effects, it is worthwhile to note that
after June 28, 1773, there were very few mentions of the Whately letters in the
newspapers. Here and there are found some editorials which contain reference to the
letters, but the conversation between the House and Hutchinson appears to have ended
after June 28. The Massachusetts Spy of June 30, 1773, did publish a brief final report on
the findings of the letters, which listed a few paragraphs that the House had considered to
be the “most exceptional” (“June 25, 1773” 1). But apart from this sort of conclusion and
specifics, the conversation about the intent or the legitimacy of the letters appears to have
ended.
There were, however, a few instances of articles appearing which could be seen as
reactions to the conversation. It was as if the House's portrayal of events had
successfully cast Hutchinson in a very particular, nefarious sort of light and, having made
their case, the rest of the populace, both personal citizens and other towns in
Massachusetts, were decrying the actions and intentions that Hutchinson had been
“proven” to have. Consider a couple examples.
The July 12, 1773, issue of the Boston Gazette contained an unsigned letter where
the author critiques one of the Whately Letters. The letters, the writer claimed, offered
proof that Hutchinson “designed to procure an armed force to put the revenue laws in
execution...” and that Hutchinson “falsely represent[ed] the town of Boston” (“Boston
July 12” 2). Clearly, the House's public pronouncements had persuaded at least this
person, and likely others, of Hutchinson's intentions and the major consequences of his
actions.
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As a second example, consider the effect that this campaign had on the colony at
large. Earlier in this chapter I discussed the emergence of the Committee of
Correspondence, and noted that the House's statements must be considered in relation to
this new method of spreading news. As the Boston Evening Post of July 12, 1773,
indicated, the system appeared to have worked. The newspaper published a letter from
the town of Duxborough in which the Duxborough Committee expressed many of the
same sentiments that had been found in the House's publications, including several
statements directed at Governor Hutchinson himself. Not only had Duxborough assumed
the same attitude toward British infringements as had the House of Representatives, but
Duxborough credited the town of Boston for their enlightenment. They wrote, “[W]e
look upon ourselves particularly obliged to the Town of Boston for their Care and
Vigilance in this Day of Darkness and Danger, and shall be ever ready to co-operate with
them...for the Vindication of our wounded Liberties...” (“To the Committee” 2). Clearly,
if Boston's actions had diminished its reputation, it was not by much. For in the eyes of
neighboring villages, the town of Boston, contrary to Hutchinson's portrayal, was not a
riotous, unruly mob town, but a shining example of righteous indignation and purposeful
protest.
Such examples clearly vindicated Adams' method. If we were to extend the
application of these examples to include thousands of other individuals and, via the
Committee of Correspondence, hundreds of other towns throughout the colony,
Hutchinson was facing an uphill battle to retain respect and legitimacy as a governor.
Samuel Adams, operating within the Board and in the House of Representatives,
clearly won this battle for the public mind. Adams had articulated a vision and the people
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had adopted his portrayal of events. He did so through his strict adherence to the rights
articulated in the Constitution. While Hutchinson faced such a difficult path with his
argumentative options severely limited, controversy allowed him an escape, but with a
caveat. Changing the conversation led to further discord, which further exacerbated the
disagreement. In the end, Adams' adherence to principles demonstrated the complete
inability and unwillingness of Thomas Hutchinson to address the charges which faced
him. Controversy had resulted in the two factions being completely irreconcilable:
principles versus distractions and excuses.
For the people of Massachusetts, Hutchinson represented a breach of the
colonial/British trust and an abridgment of their liberties, by representing a sense of the
British high-minded unconcern for their grievances. These events truly marked the
beginning of the end for Hutchinson. Due in part to the discrediting accomplished by
Adams and the Boston press, the respect which in part had sustained Hutchinson's
legitimacy as governor was waning. Events which transpired shortly after the
controversy of the Whately letters sealed Hutchinson's fate.
Boston colonists, emboldened by the diminishing reputation of Hutchinson and
feeling as if their complaints tended to fall on deaf ears, took matters into their own
hands. Resentment over the Tea Act of 1773, and the meddling in colonial affairs that it
represented, resulted in the famous Boston Tea Party of December 16, 1773. Parliament
reacted by passing what were called the colonies called “The Intolerable Acts”. Far from
accomplishing the goal of only punishing Boston for their insubordination, this act had
the effect of uniting all the colonies with a combination of anger and fear. After all, if
Boston's port could be shut down, what was to stop Parliament from enacting similar
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measures to punish other colonial ports? Slowly, the other colonies began to see the
importance of unity against this kind of affront. As Edmund Cody Burnett explained, the
events which preceded the Boston Tea Party had “creat[ed] the necessary machinery for
effectively promoting concerted action among the colonies, and, given an appropriate
impulse, the machinery would speedily be set in motion” (17). And with the advent of
the Tea Party, the “machinery” and the intercolonial communication groundwork that had
been laid with the 1768 Circular Letter began to pay off. As a direct result of the events
discussed above, 1774 saw both the removal of Thomas Hutchinson as Massachusetts
governor as well as the gathering of the First Continental Congress. Both these events
marked the fruition of Samuel Adams' long term goals. The former signified casting off
remnants of an old Massachusetts. The latter signified the first steps of a dawning
America.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusions and Application
In this dissertation, I have argued that this movement can be understood in part
by recognizing the principle-based rhetoric of Samuel Adams and examining the effect
this method of argumentation had on the dispute over colonial rights.
This project has attempted to apply a rhetorical insight to Samuel Adams: to ask if
there is perhaps a modicum of rhetorical significance in his words, and if so, to identify it
or to determine if Adams was indeed nothing but an instigator. In chapter one, I
explained the intentions of this dissertation and revealed the personal and scholarly
rationale behind this study. I also outlined a basic understanding of rhetorical
controversy and demonstrated the way Adams is traditionally considered among scholars:
as an important, but rhetorically-negligible figure.
Chapter two was my attempt to locate, among his many writings, a consistent
theme and an identifiably rhetorical “style.” Several identifiable characteristics emerged
from this study, including a particular method of invention characterized by adherence to
what he calls the “pillars” of the British Constitution. These discoveries, in turn, led to
the necessary ideological beliefs that must have existed for Adams to substantiate his
claims. These, I argued, are as much a part of his rhetorical characteristics as the words
he wrote because they allow the logical grounding of his assertions. Without them, his
principles, or “pillars” were baseless. Finally, these characteristics must have been
grounded in another, elemental, vastly greater internal philosophy, which I called his
commitment to civic virtue. These elements, taken in conjunction with one another, were
what constituted Samuel Adams' rhetoric. And, though they are were necessarily
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indicative or predictive of the particular word usage or phrasing one might expect in his
writings, they were, nevertheless, truly rhetorical in nature. That is, they carried with
them a great capacity for persuasion. This principled stance was, I argue, the defining
characteristic of Adams' rhetoric.
Chapter three was a truncated biography explaining Samuel Adams' life and
education, revealing his rise through the ranks of political activism to eventually attain a
great level of respect and influence in Boston's political scene. And, as demonstrated
later in the text, this upbringing would have great effect on the positions Adams would
hold later in life.
Chapters four through six applied the discoveries of chapter two to some very
specific events that occurred in Boston between 1768 and 1773. I traced three neatly
delineated conversations between Samuel Adams and his political opponents and
demonstrated by way of three instances, how as a result of a particular kind of
controversy, conversations over important policies can quickly become unstable and
ineffectual. In the study of the Circular Letter exchange, we have seen how a simple
idea, which was seen as extreme by an unintended recipient, sparked an exchange that
had deleterious effects on the British /colonial relationship. And I demonstrated that at the
heart of the division was the ever-shifting conversation that rapidly devolved from the
original complaint issued by the House. The end result was that the colonies were unified
in precisely the way Hillsborough feared and desired to avoid.
In the study of the movement of the Court, I examined the way Adams' principled
stances on the rights of the colonists resulted in a controversy that further divided the
factions. Hillsborough stubbornly refused to engage in the claims that Adams, and
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presumably many others, thought to be substantive. Consequently, Hutchinson backed
himself into the corner of having to defend the indefensible, ironically demonstrating the
dangers of arbitrary obedience as he argued for the foolishness of such a belief.
And, in the study over the Whately Letters, I explained how controversy, and an
unwillingness to engage the opposition, resulted in an argumentative construction which
tapped into a general cultural belief and assigned grave constitutional implications to
what were otherwise personal letters written to a friend. The inability of Hutchinson to
address these concerns in a sufficient way cost him his job and his reputation.
In all these instances, I have shown how Adams' strict adherence to the principles
that constituted his rhetorical stances resulted in a rapidly devolving argumentative
productivity. Adams' refusal to consider circumstances to diminish the importance of
principles led to his opposition swiftly changing argumentative course. As controversy
grew and continued to work within the conversations, the varying positions were further
divided until at the end of the conversation, the two sides were arguing points only
vaguely similar to that which existed at the beginning. Furthermore, forced to respond to
Adams' principled stance, British authorities demonstrated an attitude of dismissal that
was clearly evidenced in their writings. This, I conclude, resulted in a fractured sense of
loyalty as Adams and presumably the rest of the colony began to see that the opportunity
for reconciliation and a redress of grievances based on productive dialogue was
crumbling. One can clearly see how the colonists could have grown weary of having
laws foisted upon them by impersonal and distant entities with little regard for the
colonists' rights.
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I will not be so bold as to say that if Hutchinson or Hillsborough had engaged
Adams' arguments more thoroughly, war could have been avoided; for the events
discussed in this dissertation were but three of the thousands of occurrences and
intellectual battles that occurred which eventually led to independence. But it is also
clear that the arguments surrounding the Townshend Duties, the moving of the
Massachusetts Court, and the Whately letters did not help mend relations between the
colonists and British officials.
Limitations of this Study / Suggestions for Future Research
This dissertation is a small contribution to a vast field of inquiry. Yet it is my
hope that this study might initiate a new way of studying the revolutionary era. For
despite the wealth of texts that exist from that era, very few have been thoroughly
analyzed with a rhetorical approach. And, to the best of my knowledge, none have
specifically examined defined conversations between opposing sides.
Obviously the biggest deficiency of this study is its scope. Due to the hundreds of
letters identified as his, and countless others that have not yet been associated with
Adams, a truly thorough examination of Adams' texts would result in a dissertation of
several volumes in length. Nevertheless, I believe the conclusions drawn in this
dissertation represent a fair assessment of the methods and consequences of his writings
and help to shed some more light on Samuel Adams as a political writer. Perhaps this
dissertation will serve as a starting point for other rhetorical scholars to explore the
relatively untapped field of important people who made a nation with their words.
Samuel Adams represents the first step in what could be a deep understanding of the
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rhetoric that emboldened people to throw off allegiance to a distant power and try to
carve their own niche in human history.
Future research may expand the number of texts to include the events after the
Whately letters, including the arguments surrounding the Boston Tea Party, the
Intolerable Acts, or the First Continental Congress, in all of which Adams played a
significant role. Alternatively, future studies may choose to do a more in-depth analysis
of the arguments in events preceding this dissertation (the Stamp Act, for instance, and
the resultant riots that destroyed Hutchinson's home). Though I briefly mentioned these in
the dissertation, there is great opportunity for further research. Consequently, the topics
served by this dissertation represent only a small slice of the possible rhetorical artifacts
in which Samuel Adams had a hand. It therefore is not a conclusive study, but a starting
point for further study of Samuel Adams.
Were early-American rhetorical researchers ever to exhaust analysis of Samuel
Adams, they need not fret. For the source material in this era extends far deeper than
Adams himself. Samuel Adams represents only one of the hundreds of important figures
who played a role in shaping and guiding the colonial mindset during the prerevolutionary era. Boston was home to a number of these figures, but Virginia had
Patrick Henry, Connecticut had Roger Sherman, and Pennsylvania had Benjamin Rush.
This list does not include others like James Otis, Mercy Otis Warren, John Dickinson, and
Jonathan Mayhew, all of whose work played a significant role in the establishment of an
American identity. Adams should be listed among these figures, but he constitutes a
place not of any greater importance, but perhaps as only among the most recognized
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contributors to the cause. And given what we know of Adams' piety, I have a feeling he
would have wanted it that way.
In short, this dissertation is only a brief foray into the much broader rhetoric of the
American Revolution. It is my hope that the analysis conducted within this dissertation
may facilitate other studies in the same general area. I believe it represents a starting
point for studies on how controversy existed in the colonial era and of its effect on
colonial politics.
Interpretations of the Findings
The main takeaway from this dissertation is that there is indeed a characteristic
rhetoric to the writings of Samuel Adams which can be summarized as a principled
approach to arguments. Furthermore, the effects of this rhetorical construction can be
observed when juxtaposed with opposition arguments and placed in context of the times.
Finally, I believe that such juxtaposition reveals the workings of controversy, which in
turn can be credited for the breakdown of communicative progress.
Given what has been disused in the previous chapters, I believe that much of the
existing speculation about Adams is incorrect. Previous scholarship identified him as a
revolutionary thinker, but an unremarkable rhetor. My findings suggest a different
conclusion. I suggest that Adams was a remarkable rhetor, but not necessarily a
revolutionary thinker. As to the former point, I do not mean “rhetor” in terms of
intricately woven phrasing and lofty eloquence. Instead, I mean that his ideas carried
with them great substance and his remarkableness came from his ability to position an
argument in such certain terms and accepted truths that they become almost self-proven
and thus self-perpetuating. In other words, his specific brand of rhetoric was remarkable
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for its effectiveness. As to the latter point (Adams as an unrevolutionary thinker), I mean
that his ideas were, for the most part, ideas from the minds that preceded him (Otis,
Dickinson and others). This fact does not negate his importance, for it is also my
assertion that his significance cannot be understated. But his role, given what we have
seen in his rhetorical constants, is more that of a popularizer. His rhetoric had the effect
of seizing commonly-held notions and, through incremental stages, elevating them to the
level of accepted truth and then basing his argument in these accepted truths. It is my
assertion that Adams possessed an acute awareness of the cultural conventions that
surrounded him in early Boston and knew precisely what statements would be acceptable
in the minds of his readers. He had a unique ability to consider the perceived truth of the
time and extend the consequences of those truths toward a necessary conclusion.
So, part one of this dissertation is specifically about Adams. It is a study of his
methods, style, contribution, and rhetorical tendencies. There is another part of this
dissertation, however, which deals more with the effects of his rhetoric on the
circumstances of the time.
It is with this latter focus that we discover how the identified rhetorical constants
found in his work effected the overall conversations that were circulating in the era. As I
discussed in chapters four through six, Adams' strict adherence to pillars of
constitutionality allowed him to easily refute the various arguments made by his
opposition. Consequently, his rhetorical choices defined and limited the argumentative
possibilities and led his opposition to respond in the only way they could: through
changing topics or casting aspersions on Adams' claims. Yet as demonstrated, because
Adams' arguments were based in inherently accepted truths, his opposition's refutations
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were seen as violative of constitutional rights. In other words, Adams' rhetorical choices
had the effect of demonstrating to the colonists how the pillars of constitutionality which
governed British political heritage also gave legitimacy to their grievances.
Consequently, Adams demonstrated that Britain’s refusal to accept these arguments
constituted not a small problem, but was an issue of great importance.
Finally, we see that because of the limited argumentative options, Adams'
opposition chose the easy way out of their problems. And here, controversy of the kind
described by Goodnight, Hauser, Philips and others, was manifest. Controversy was
given life by the inability or unwillingness of the British to address the substance of the
colonial charges. This was made more difficult because the way Adams had framed the
issues meant that there was no truly good explanation for their actions. Controversy,
then, seeing an opening, “infected” the conversation and led to rapidly deteriorating
discourse. By refusing to engage Adams and relying instead on appeals to authority or
claims of privilege, the British opposition essentially doomed any possibility of
productive dialogue and reconciliation. The ultimate effect of this was that colonial
worries were further proven to be valid. The consequently was that slowly but surely,
Britain was seen as less of a noble motherland. It was, to continue the analogy, more like
a petulant, irascible “uncleland” with whom reconciliation could be attained only by
sacrificing colonial rights.
Though the specific instances discussed in this dissertation are only three of the
many events occurring in the years leading up to the revolution, I believe that they can
grant important insight into the way arguments of the time worked in public discourse.
For when recognizing that any colonial support for rebellion was not automatically
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granted on the basis of colonial pride, for instance, we began to see the need for
explaining the change of heart. I submit that it was a gradual process, brought on by
years of tiresome arguments. I suggest that colonists' realization that Britain and the
colonies suffered from irreconcilable differences was key to that process. Furthermore,
the kinds of arguments analyzed in this dissertation was one of the many factors that led
the people to this recognition and fostered support for eventual revolution. And it is this
consequence of Adams' rhetoric that especially has contemporary applicability.
Contemporary application
Though the circumstances which existed in Adams' time and the modern era are
very different, arguments of the kind that are found in Adams' work still very much exist
in current discourse. Not only does this dissertation have applicability to today's political
climate, but I believe there are warnings embedded in this examination which it would
behoove modern people to consider. In this dissertation, we have witnessed the problems
that can arise when arguments are twisted from their original intent and when legitimate
grievances go unaddressed by various factions.
Therefore, we must recognize that regardless of era, controversy is always
present, ready and willing to diminish productive dialogue for the sake of political
expediency. Controversy, in this sense, is a natural outcome of democracy and it cannot
be completely abolished except by total suppression of the opposition. But suppression
of opposition is tantamount to totalitarianism, which is antithetical to democracy.
Consequently, as long as the blessings of the “other side” are necessary, whether that be
the electorate, or the opposition party, controversy will exist. And because controversy
cannot be eliminated without destroying the basis of its foundation, it would behoove us
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to learn to channel it into healthy, productive venues. The alternative, as seen in the study
of Adams' rhetoric, is messy and undesirable.
As noted in the justification for this study, my concern as a scholar and teacher is,
to a large degree, the engagement of argument. Closed-off spaces hinder productive
dialogue and lead to a self-perpetuating ideology incapable of negotiation with
alternatives. This, I believe, is dangerous to the continued existence of a democratic
system as its very life relies on the opportunities to challenge ideas and policy. Stated
another way, a system where one's party dominates the conversation and forces any
opposition into silence is not democracy. Such a pattern more closely resembles
totalitarian rule.
I fully understand that painting one's opponents as stupid, elitist, or unreasonable
is far simpler than meeting with them on the field of productive discourse. But we find in
the example of Samuel Adams, a demonstration of what happens when arguments are
ignored or twisted. The conversation slowly devolves, until reconciliation is seemingly
impossible. The result of this turn of events is never good, for I believe that at the point
where one considers his opponent to be irrational, and the varying arguments to be
irreconcilable, it is here that extreme measures, violence, hatred, or, in the case of Samuel
Adams' time, revolution becomes self-justified. After all, when one is trying to negotiate
with an irrational being and his unwillingness to concede stands in the way of what one
considers “progress”, what can be done but forcibly remove him?
But irrationality is a mental construct, determined only by the mindset of the
individual doing the judging. One can easily see how contemporary politics encourages
this kind of mindset. It is divisive, unsubstantive, and relies largely on identity politics
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for success. In this arena, there is little room for meeting on issues. Victory trumps the
kind of deliberative democracy that is so important to maintaining a functional society.
Instead, the populace relies on simplistic themes to demonize, ridicule, and delegitimize
their opponents.
I am not blinded by hopefulness, nor am I naïve about the fact that this kind of
politics is deeply rooted in the American process and often it is successful. It is perhaps
the only true bipartisan occurrence in politics. But I also believe that there are genuine
consequences to this kind of divisive politicking. And I believe that scholars are uniquely
positioned to initiate potential change. Therefore the larger application of this
dissertation is a call to scholars who study argument, debate, and rhetoric. It is those who
should be on the front lines of the movement to increase productive public dialogue.
Scholars are not immune from strong political beliefs, but far be it from us to sacrifice the
chance of productive conversation to score a few cheap political points. But more than
being passive permitters of dialogue, we ought to be actively encouraging it in the
classroom and, if possible, in the communities we inhabit. The historical study and
teaching of rhetoric are laced with connotations of democracy and civic engagement and
are home to a proud tradition of encouraging productive argument. And, though these
associations are not absent from contemporary rhetorical studies, I fear they have taken a
back seat to more popular, but less foundational studies. Dare I say that pop-rhetoric has
overshadowed traditional rhetoric's noble origins?
Perhaps it is time to reaffirm the pivotal role that rhetoricians are uniquely
qualified to play (due to tradition, training, and opportunity) in furthering and improving
public discourse. It would, of course, require setting aside personal beliefs for the benefit
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of dialogue itself and would mean allowing all voices an opportunity to speak, regardless
of how much they conflict with our own. I believe that this kind of dialogue is essential
in furthering political discourse, for the rhetoric of Samuel Adams provides insight into
what can happen when arguments are not allowed entrance to the public sphere and are
instead relegated to the exterior, labeled as the illogical, and therefore inconsequential,
rantings of the few.
Certainly, this is a non-partisan issue, as all sides of the political spectrum are
guilty of stifling opposition voices in one form or another. But recognition of its presence
behooves us, as scholars and teachers, to reconcile our own political or social beliefs with
the recognized value of teaching students how to think well. And thinking well demands
a great deal of engagement with the “enemy,” even when it seems hopeless. It requires a
great deal of tolerance for opposition, as well as a good deal of humility, to cast aside the
conception that one's view is immutable and without fault. Brian Garsten noted that
“such an approach may produce uncertainty and temporary defeats, but that simply
means that [opposing sides] may have to take turns ruling” (Garsten 211), but when you
consider what is at stake – the unification and progression of society – it seems a
worthwhile effort.
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